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ABSTRACT 
This study has considered the incentives motivating listed mining and industrial 
compr,_,ii~s to provide governance related disclosures in their annual reports. An 
examination is made of the impact of listing rule 4.10.3 that was applicable from 30 
June 1996. Accordingly the years 1995, 1996 and 1997 are examined. A sample of 
100 mining companies and 100 industrial companies was drawn primarily from the 
Connect 4 database of companies. Adopting political cost theory the study 
hypothesised that governance disclosures were positively related to the proportion of 
non-executive directors, gearing, ownership diffusion, Big 6 external auditor and 
firm size. 
Two measures of governance disclosure are examined. Firstly, governance 
disclosures were measured using a dichotomous index of 30 items suggested by the 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) through Appendix 4A of the listing rule. The 
second measure included the 30 items suggested by the ASX together with an 
additional 25 items of governance disclosure found in the annual reports of 
companies included in the sample. In total, the second dichotomous index comprised 
55 items. For both measures of governance disclosure, each item disclosed by the 
company received a score of "l", otherwise "zero". Items disclosed .were added and 
the total score for each company wa's used in statistical analysis. The comprehensive 
index applied in the current study has not been employed in previous studies. 
Overall, descriptive results indicated governance disclosures have increased 
significantly over the period 1995 to 1997 for both mining companies and industrial 
companies for both measures of governance disclosures. In 1995, companies that 
had a separate governance statement in their annual report was 68. This more than 
ii 
doubled after the introduction of the listing rule, where 189 companies in 1996 and 
191 companies in 1997 had a separate statement. This indicates an increase of 173% 
for mining companies and 1884V<) for industrial companies. 
Prior to the introduction of the listing rule, the mean number of governance 
disclcsm~s suggested by the ASX for mining companies in 1995 was 9.82 
discl.osures. After the listing rule introduction, the mean number of governance 
di.~closures increased to 16.27 disclosures in 1996, and, 17 .54 disclosures for 1997. 
The mean number of ASX plus additional items of governance disclosure for mining 
companies in 1995 was 14.26. After the introduction of the listing rule the mean 
number of governance disclosures increased to 22.66 disc1osures in 1996 and 24.31 
disclosures in 1997. 
For industrial companies, the mean number of governance disclosures suggested by 
the ASX prior to the listing rule introduction in 1995 was 9.29 disclosures. The mean 
number of disclosures increased to 16.62 disc1osures for 1996 and 17.45 disclosures 
for 1997. ASX suggested and addit:.:,nal disclosures for industrial companies also 
increased. In 1995, the mean number of disclosures was 13.59 disclosures, this 
increased after the listing rule was introduced to ·23.01 disclosures in 1996 and 
24.29 disc1osures in 1997. 
The highest ranked items of governance disclosure for mining companies in 1995 
were the break-up of directors into executive and non-executive, and acknowledging 
that r-f.;;ks exist. For industrial companies the highest ranked items were the break-up 
of directors into executive and non-executive, and presence of an audit committee. 
After the listing rule became operational, the highest ranked items for mining 
iii 
companies in 1996 and 1997 remained the break-up of directors into executive and 
non-executive, and acknowledging that risks exist. For industrial companies the 
highest ranked items in 1996 and 1997, were the break-up of directors into executive 
and non-executive, and acknowledging that risks exist, acknowledgment of ethical 
standards and information on the responsibilities of the board of directors. Audit and 
remuneration related information was the most prevalent category of disclosure for 
both mining and industrial companies. However, some individual items of disclosure 
within these categories were not adequate. 
Although governance disclosures have consistently increased for both industry 
groups, findings have highlighted some areas where disclosures are lacking. Prior to 
the introduction of the listing rule an area of governance where disclosures were 
lacking with mining companies included procedures for reviewing the membership 
of the board of directors. In 1997 65% of mining companies and 77% of industrial 
companies did not disclose this item. Disclosure on the main procedures for 
establishing and reviewing the compensation arrangements for executive and non-
executive directors was also lacking prior to and after the listing rule introduction. 
For mining companies in 1997, 49% of companies did not disclose the main 
procedures for reviewing compensation arrangements of executive directors and 56% 
of companies did not disclose compensation arrangements for non-executive 
directors. For industrial companies in 1997, 72% did not disclose procedures for the 
review of executive directors• compensation and 67% did not disclose procedures for 
reviewing non-executive directors' compensation. There was also a Jack of 
disclosure for both mining companies and industrial companies on the procedures for 
nominating external auditors and reviewing the adequacy of external audit 
arrangements with an emphasis on the scope and quality of the audit. 
iv 
Regression analysis has indicated support for a number of the hypotheses tested. 
Model 1 examined ASX suggested governance disclosures. Prior to the introduction 
of the listing rule in 1995, firm size was the only significant variable for mining 
companies. Firm size and ownership diffusion were both significant for industrial 
companies in 1995. The independent variables gearing, ownership diffusion, Big 6 
external auditor and firm size were significant for mining companies in 1996 and 
1997 after the introduction of the listing rule. For industrial companies, gearing, and 
firm size were significant in 1996, and ownership diffusion, finn size and proportion 
of non-executive directors were significant in 1997. Proportion of non-executive 
directors was negatively correlated to governance disclosures, this was not in the 
expected direction. 
Model 2 examined ASX suggested governance disclosures together with additional 
items of actual disclosure. In 1995 before the listing rule was introduced, ownership 
diffusion and finn size were significant for both mining and industrial companies. In 
1996, for both mining companies and industrial companies, after the listing rule was 
introduced, the independent variables gearing, ownership diffusion, Big 6 external 
auditor and firm size were significantly related to governance disclosures for mining 
and industrial companies. In 1997 all independent variables were significant for 
mining companies. For industrial companies in 1997 ownership diffusion, Big 6 
external auditor and firm size were significant. 
The research findings show that governance disclosures have increased considerably 
since the listing rule was introduced on 30 June 1996. There is also evidence of 
some differences between governance disclosures being made by mining and 
industrial companies before and after the introduction of ASX listing rule 4.10.3. 
v 
Prior to the introduction of the listing rule, ownership diffusion was significant for 
industrial companies and not mining. After the introduction of the listing rule in 
1997, an ,unforseen significant negative association of proportion of non-executive 
directors to governance disclosures for industrial companies was found. Gearing was 
significant for mining companies in 1997 and not significant for industrial 
companies. 
vi 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This study adopts political cost theory to empirically examine the relationship of 
governance disclosures by listed Australian mining and industrial companies to 
selected corporate characteristics following the introduction of listing rule 4.10.31• 
Background of the study 
The topic of corporate governance has emerged in importance with a number of 
corporate failures in Australia and around the world from the I 980's through to the 
present time2• Calls for the refonn of corporate governance systems have r~sulted 
from more widespread and comprehensive media coverage that has focused 
attentions on corporate governance failures3 and managerial accountability. In 
Australia this process of reform has included the introduction of the Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX) listing rule 4.10.3 which became operational on or after 30 June 
1996. Appendix 4A4 of this listing rule provides a list of suggested governance 
items a company may choose to dif:c!ose in their annual report. 
' 
• 
Previously listing rule 3C(3)(j). Specific details of the listing rule are detailed in Appendix A. 
Evidence of recent Australian and overseas companies' failures with corporate governance 
contributing to their demise can be found in the following newspaper articles, Collins (2002}, 
Buffini (2002), and Davis (2002). 
Recent corporate failures in Australia include HIH, OneTel, Ansett and Harris Scarfe . 
Refer to Appendix A for a full list of indicative items. 
1 
There is no universaliy accepted definition of corporate governance. A number of 
informed comments, on what might constitute good corporate governance have been 
discussed. Amc:ag these comments, corporate governance has been referred to as a 
system by which companies are directed and controlled, (Bosch, 1993). The ASX 
adds to this by defining corporate governance as the nionitoring and controlling 
mechanisms that are established by companies with the aim of enhancing shareholder 
value (ASX, 1994). Lewis (1999) broadens the definition to describe corporate 
governance as a "system of rights, processes and controls established both internally 
and externally over the management of a business entity with the objective of 
protecting the interests of all stakeholders" (p. 2). These stakeholders range from 
shareholders to owners, managers, employees, consumers, suppliers and competitors. 
Lynn (1996) also emphasises that governance is about accountability where 
"corporate governance is, in essence, about putting in place and maintaining an 
appropriate accountability system; management is accountable to the board for its 
actions, and the board is accountable to the owners for its oversight of management" 
(p. 16). 
The increasing globalisation of companies has added to the debate on what 
constitutes good governance. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) has formed a task force on corporate governance and released 
a paper in 1999, (OECD Principles of Corporate governance, SG/CG/(99) 5). The 
paper makes several recommendations on what constitutes good governance 
disclosures. The paper suggests that good corporate governance "should provide 
proper incentives for the board and management to pursue objectives that are in the 
interests of the company shareholders and should facilitate effective monitoring, 
thereby encouraging firms to use resources more efficiently" (p. 2). In addition, the 
2 
OECD is trying to encourage uniformity in disclosures between companies so that 
investors can make more informed comparisons between companies. 
Around the world a number of corporate watchdogs have contributed to the debate 
and made recommendations regarding best practice in the area of board composition 
and structure. From the United Kingdom (UK) advice has come from the Cadbury, 
Grei;:nbury and Hampel Committees. Contributions from the United States (US) 
came from discussions by the American Law Institute. In Australia, early 
recommendations on appropriate governance principles came from the Bosch 
Committee, and the Investment and Financial Services Association Ltd (IFSA)5. The 
introduction of the Cadbury report in the UK had particular influence in Australia. In 
1994, subsequent to the release of the Cadbury report, the ASX relelJsed a discussion 
paper on appropriate governance practices. This subsequently led to the introduction 
of the new ASX listing rule 4.10.3. 
This listing rule requires each listed company to provide a statement of the main 
corporate governance practices in their annual report for the reporting period. The 
listing rule is not considered mandatory as governance disclosures are not stipulated 
and no fonnat of disclosure for companies to follow is prescribed6 rather an 
indicative list of items a company may choose to disclose is provided in Appendix 
4A of the listing rule. Items of governance disclosure may include such items as 
' 
• 
The Investment and Financial Services Association Ltd (!FSA), was previously the Australian 
Investment Managers Association (AIMA) who merged with the Financial Services Association, 
along with the Business Council of Australia (BCA). They have been at the forefront of 
improving disclosure of corporate governance infonnation. IFSA represents the institutional 
investors in Australia. The AIMA in 1995 issued a well publicised set of guidelines on corporate 
governance disclosures . 
It should be noted, that the ASX has mandated some disclosures relating to corporate governance 
in relation to naming directors, their positions and any share interests in the company, prior to the 
new listing requirement 4.10.3. In addition companies are required to disclose the presence of an 
audit committee under listing rule 4.10.2 and if applicable explain why they don't have one. 
3 
whether the chairman is an executive or non-executive director, procedures for 
nominating directors and external auditors, seeking independent advice, policies and 
procedures on directors' remuneration, business risks and ethical standards. 
Purpose of the research 
The purpose of this study is to examine the annual reports7 of Australian listed 
mining and industrial companies for governance disclosures in the periods prior to 
and after the introduction of the ASX Listing Rule 4.10.3. The financial years for 
1995 to 1997 are examined. Two classifications of governance disclosures are 
considered. 
The first classification comprises governance disclosures suggested by the ASX in 
Appendix 4A of the listing rule. From the list of 8 categories described in Appendix 
4A, an unweighted dichotomous disclosure index comprising 30 items8 of 
governance disclosure was developed. A company receives a score of "I" for 
disclosing an item and zero for non-disclosure. Total scores for each company are 
used in the statistical analysis. 
The second classification combines the 30 items described above, plus an additional 
25 items of actual governance disclosures found in the annual reports of companies 
in the sample and are not referred to by the ASX. This resulted in an unweighted 
dichotomous disclosure index comprising 55 governance items. A company receives 
' The annual report represents one of the most useful mediums for companies to disseminate 
information about the company, and for interested stakeholders in the firm to use this information 
for decision making purposes, (Roberts, 1991; Tilt, 1994; Anderson and Epstein, 1995), 
Table 4.2 details a full list with examples of each governance disclosure item, 
4 
a score of "1" for disclosing an item and zero for non-disclosure. Further details of 
the two models are provided in Chapter 4. 
It should be noted that this governance disclosure list of 55 items is not considered to 
be an exhaustive list of all possible governance disclosures. That is, the current 
study examines those governance disclosure items suggested by the ASX along with 
items of actual disclosure found in the annual reports of companies included in the 
sample. 
Adopting the concepts of political cost theory, the current study will identify if any 
relationship exists between the two models of governance related disclosures and 
selected corporate characteristics acting as proxies for political visibility. Proxies for 
political visibility in this study are, proportion of non-executive directors, gearing, 
ownership diffusion, Big 69 external auditor, and finn size. The two industry groups 
of mining and industrial companies are examined to ascertain if they have 
differential reporting characteristics with regard to governance disclosures. 
This study hypothesises that firms that are more politically visible will be more likely 
to disclose governance related information. Companies wit'· higher political visibility 
are more likely to disclose corporate governance information in accordance with 
Appendix 4A requirements and may also disclose additional information to the 
' 
listing rule suggestions. Increasing disclosure in the annual report allows firms the 
opportunity, and means by which they can increase disclosure in an attempt to reduce 
political cost wealth transfers associated with non-disclosure. Corporate governance 
' At the time of this study the Big 6 audit firms was applicable, however the main audit finns are 
now referred to as the Big 4 due to the merger of Price Waterhouse and Coopers and Lybrand and 
the exclusion of Arthur Anderson. 
5 
information assists stakeholders to determine if the company is operating in an 
ethical manner, and, therefore, encourage them to invest and contribute to the 
continued growth of the company that makes good governance disclosures. 
Significance and contribution of the research 
This study is significant for a number of reasons. Firstly the ASX regulators are 
informed on the degree of governance disclosures being made and areas where 
governance disclosures are abundant and/or scarce are highlighted. Secondly, it may 
be possible to identify areas of opposition should more stringent regulation be 
introduced. Thirdly, this study adds to the body of literature by identifying possible 
reasons for company governance disclosure practices that may be of interest to the 
users of annual reports. 
Fourthly, governance related studies have been undertaken in Australia with most 
being conducted prior to the new listing rule becoming operational The current 
study examines annual reports for governance disclosures for the years 1995 to 1997, 
the periods prior to and after the introduction of the listing rule and also differentiates 
between mining and industrial companies. This approach has not previously been 
undertaken and provides and an indication of the impact of the introduction of the 
listing rule on governance disclosure practices. 
Finally, the current study adds to the literature by applying a more comprehensive 
disclosure index of governance disclosure items, hence providing more useful 
information for assessing the effectiveness of the introduction of this listing rule in 
eliciting new information. Two unweighted dichotomous indexes are developed. The 
6 
first index includes governance disclosure items suggested by the ASX and the 
second index combines the suggested items by the ASX a.Qd additional items of 
actual disclosure. Prior research has not used this methodology. 
Organisation of the research 
This thesis is organised as follows; Chapter 2 summarises directly related studies that 
have provided an insight into Australian companies governance disclosure practices. 
Particular emphasis is placed on studies that have examined listing rule 4.10.3. A 
brief discussion is also provided for some overseas studies that are indirectly related 
to the current study. The theoretical framework and hypothesis development is 
described in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 specifies the methodology employed including the 
methods of sample selection, sources of data, and research design. A detailed 
analysis of governance disclosures is presented in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 provides 
results of regression analysis. Finally, Chapter 7 concl.udes the thesis by listing the 
findings, specifying the limitations, implications of the findings and some 
suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
The purpose of this literature review was to focus on empirical studies that examined 
Australian governance disclosure practices. An examination is made of studies that 
relate directly to governance disclosure practices before and after the introduction of 
ASX listing rule 4.10.3. Gaps and limitations within prior research are identified and 
a discussion is provided on the areas where the current study extend3 upon the 
findings of prior research by eliciting new infonnation. Selected overseas studies 
that indirectly relate to the current study were also noted. 
Australian research directly related 
This section is comprised of three sub sections. Firstly, Australian studies examining 
governance disclosure practices prior to the introduction of the listing rule are 
discussed. This is followed by studies conducted after the introduction of the listing 
rule. Thirdly the limitations of these Australian studies are deliberated along with a 
discussion of how the current study improves upon this prior research. 
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Australian voluntary governance disclosure studies 
Prior research has demonstrated that management display selfRinterest or 
opportunistic behaviour with the provision of voluntary information (Lewel_len, Park 
and Ro, 1996). Verrecchia (1983) proposed th~.t management tend to voluntarily 
disclose favourable infonnation, where the benefit of providing the information 
exceeds perceived proprietary costs. The majority of information about corporate ,. 
governance practices is not of great use to its competitors, therefore the costs of 
providing that infonnation are minimal. Competitors are not the only stakeholders 
interested in governance disclosures. Some governance information such as risk 
related or, and salary arrangements or bonus's of managing directors, are of interest 
to shareholders and subject to discretionary disclosure with favourable information 
more likely to be disclosed. 
Australian studies examining the voluntary disclosure of governance information 
have been conducted by Stapledon, and Lawrence (1996), the Australian Society of 
Certified Practising Accountants (ASCPA's) (1996), Carson and Sirnnett (1997) and 
Evans and Christopher (1999). A summary of the key research questions~ 
methodologies appliJd and principal findings of these studies are provided in Table 
2.1. 
Applying agency theory, the study conducted by Stapledon, and Lawrence (1996) 
examined the board composition and structure of Australia's 100 largest companies 
for the year 1995. In particular the study suggested that an increase in the number 
of independent nonRexecutive directors on company boards would bring about a net 
reduction in agency costs. Answers were sought to the question of whether 
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corporate governance affects corporate perfonnance and the influences tnd may 
affect independent directors' effectiveness. The effect of firm size on board 
composition/structure was also discussed. 
In 1995, the Australian Investment Managers Association (AIMA) 10 published 
guidelines 11 on appropriate corporate governance for its members. Stapledon and 
Lawrence (1996) apply the recommendations and definitions provided by these 
guidelines fundamentally due to the increasing role and influence of institutional 
investors on corporate governance. 
The AIMA guidelines prescribe that the majority of directors should be 
independent12• Contrary to this recommendation, findings by Stapledon and 
Lawrence indicated that only 43% of the 889 seats held by directors in the top I 00 
companies were considered independent non-executives. In addition, only 40% of 
companies had a majority of independent non-executive directors on their board. It 
was also found that, although 83% of companies had a non-executive chairperson, 
only 45% of the top 100 had an independent director serving as chairperson. Audit 
committees were present in all companies. Remuneration committees were present 
in 66% of the top 100 companies and 19% disclosed a nomination committee. 
Stapledon and Lawrence found that larger finns had notable board characteristics. 
These included that the company was likely to have more directors, more non-
executive directors, and more independent directors. Larger firms were also more 
'" 
" 
" 
The AIMA is now IFSA refer footnote 3. 
1 itled "Corporate Gi:,vemance: A guide for investment managers and a statement of 
recommended corpora le practice", 
AIMA guidelines on independent directors are provided in Appendix: E. 
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likely to have an independent chairperson and have a nomination and remuneration 
committee with a majority of non-executive directors on the remuneration 
committee. 
The Australian Society of Certified Practicing Accountants (ASCPA) conducted a 
survey of governance disclosures of 100 of Australia1s top listed companies with a 
year-end in 1995. This study examined the extent to which recommended corporate 
governance practices were being adopted prior to the introduction of the ASX Listing 
Rule 4.10.3 that became operational on 30 June 1996. 
The ASCPA study found that the majority of entities in the sample were providing 
corporate governance disclosures. Specifically, the study found 57% of firms had a 
separate section in their annual report dedicated to governance disclosures. 
Disclosures in relation to board structures v...::re more prominent than disclosures of 
methods. Audit committees were found to be present in 90% of firms, but few had 
nomination cotmnittees. Surprisingly the study highlighted those governance 
disclosures that related to internal controls and reviews were almost non-existent. 
Given that most companies have very comprehensive processes in place to comply 
with ASX and Corporations Law, the ASCPA indicated that firms were probably 
being unnecessarily modest in failing to disclose summaries of these procedures. 
Very few of the entities provided the type of detail suggested by the ASX. 
The ASCPA (1996) study emphasised that users of financial statements could be 
provided with better information. In particular 31 % of entities did not clearly 
identify executive and non-executive directors. Infonnation on the composition of 
board committees was not disclosed. Some entities did not disclose their governance 
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related information in an organised format in one place. For example within a 
governance statement, director or chairman1s report. 
Adopting agency theory, Carson and Simnett (1997) conducted an empirical study 
that applied regression analysis to examine the relationship between voluntary 
governance disclosures and selected corporate characteristics. These characteristics 
included firm size, shareholder dispersion, shareholder concentration, auditor type, 
dominant personality, foreign stock exchange listing, leverage, and percentage of 
ownership by institutional investors, risk and proportion of independent directors. 
The annual reports of a sample of 473 industrial companies as at 30 June 1995 were 
examined for 8 specific items of governance related disclosure as suggested by the 
ASX. Appendix A of the current study lists these items. This list was used to create 
an unweighted governance disclosure index that comprised 3 items each with equal 
weighting. 
Descriptive results indicated a low level of voluntary disclosure with the average 
disclosure score being 1. 7241 out of a possible 8. Descriptive statistics for 
independent variables indicated that the top twenty shareholders held 72% of the 
issued capital, and Big 6 audit firms audit 64% of the companies. Findings showed 
that variables were highly correlated, which supported the use of backward stepwise 
regression to identify the effect of multicollinearity. 
Regression results by Carson and Simnett (1997) found size, shareholder dispersion 
and percentage of ownership by institutional investors to be significantly positively 
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related to the level of voluntary governance related disclosure. Auditor type was not 
found to be significant. 
Evans and Christopher (1999) examined a sample of 72 Australian mining 
companies for 1995, to determine if there was a relationship between voluntary 
governance disclosures and selected firm characteristics. The authors suggested that 
finns voluntarily report governance information to maximise firm value through 
mitigating agency and/or political costs. Five propositions aie tested. The incidence 
of voluntary governance related information is positively associated to firm size, 
leverage, ownership diffusion, return on assets, and negatively associated to 
CEO/Chairman duality. Governance disclosures are measured using an unweighted 
index where disclosure of an item receives a score of "l" and non-disclosure receives 
"O" score. Similar to the Carson and Simnett (1997) study the discloi:ure index was 
derived from the ASX suggested list of items. 
Descriptive results indicate 33.3% of companies had a separate governance statement 
and 88.9% of companies clearly disclosed the break-up of directors into executive 
and non-executive. Few disclosures were made in relation to risk and ethics. 
Findings indicated a positive relationship to firm size, return on assets and CEO 
duality. No significant results were found for leverage and ownership concentration. 
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Table 2.1 
Summary of Australian voluntary governance disclosure studies 
Author(s) Sample Research Quei.tion.,_C,,,) ____ _,M=et,,,h,,,od,,o,,,l,,ogy..,_ ______ P,_n,.,·,,oc,,i.,pa,,,lc,Fc,in,,,d,.,l,,ng.,,s'------
Stapledon, G. and 
Lawrence, J. 
(1996) 
I 00 companies 
ranked by market 
capitalisation, listed 
on the ASX as at 
the 29 December 
1995. 
Agency theory used to 
investigate the question of 
whether corporate 
governance affects 
corporate performance, and 
factors limiting the 
effectiveness of 
independent directors, and 
the effect of finn size on 
board composition and 
structure is examined. 
1995 Aonual report data Compliance with key AIMA 
obtained from the ASX recommendations on board composition 
Datadisc CD-Rom database. and independence of the chairperson were 
Phone calls to the company low with only 43% of companies having 
secretary, investor relations independent non-executive directors. 
office, or both were used to 
confinn any data whose 
accuracy was doubted. 
Applies AIMA guidelines as a 
benchmark, in particular, a 
number of assumptions were 
employed in the study when 
evaluating whether directors 
met the AIMA criteria for 
independence. 
All I 00 companies had audit committees, 
66% had remuneration committees, and 
19% had nomination committees. Only 
56% of companies conformed to the AJMA 
recommendation that the audit committee 
should be comprised solely of non-
executive directors. AIMA guidelines 
require members of remuneration and 
nomination committees to be a majority 
non-executive. Results were consistent 
with this. 
Larger finns were likely to have more 
directors, more non-executive directors, 
more independent directors, an independent 
chairperson, a nomination committee, a 
majority of non-executive directors on sub 
committees, and an independent 
remuneration committee chairperson. 
Table 2.1 ( continued) 
Author(s) 
ASCPA (1996) 
Carson, E. and 
s;mnett, R. (1997) 
Sample 
Top 100 companies 
from top 150 listed 
on ASX by market 
capitalisation. 
A final sample of 
4 73 industrial 
companies for 1995 
with30June 
balance date. 
Research Question(s) 
Survey of voluntary 
governance disclosures 
made as at 30 June ! 995. 
Applying agency theory, 
the relationship of 
corporate governance 
disclosures to selected 
corporate characteristics is 
examined. 
Methodology 
Exploratory study into the 
extent and types of corporate 
governance disclosures being 
made. Uses the indicative list 
provided by the ASX 
Appendix 4A as a basis for 
survey questions on board 
composition, audit, 
compensation and nomination 
conunittees, directors interest, 
ethics and risk management. 
Governance disclosures 
measured using the indicative 
list provided by the ASX 
Appendix 4A. 
Regression analysis is used to 
test the relationship between 
levels of governance 
disclosures and the 
independent variables of size, 
shareholder dispersion, 
shareholder concentration, 
auditor type, dominant 
personality, foreign stock 
exchange listing, leverage, 
percentage of ownership by 
institutional investors, risk and 
proportion of independent 
directors. 
Principal Findings 
The key findings were that the majority of 
entities were providing corporate 
governance disclosures. 
Audit committees were present in 90% of 
finns. Few companies had nomination 
committees. Disclosures in relation to 
internal controls and reviews were almost 
non-existent. Very few of the entities 
provided the type of detail suggested by the 
ASX. 
Governance disclosures found to be 
associated with firm size, institutional 
investors and independent chairperson. 
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Table 2.1 (continued) 
Author(s) 
Evans, R., and 
Christopher, T. 
(1999). 
Sample 
72 Mining 
companies selected 
from the list of Top 
500 listed on ASX 
from the Connect 4 
database for 1995. 
Research Question(s) 
This sturly uses efficient 
contracting and information 
perspective's of economic 
consequence theory to 
examine the incentives 
motivating Australian listed 
mining companies to 
voluntarily report 
governance related 
vrocedures in their annual 
report. 
Methodology 
Multivariate analysis to 
detemtine if a positive 
relationship exists between 
governance disclosures and 
firm size, leverage, ownership 
diffusion, return on assets and 
a negative relationship to 
CEO/Chairman duality. 
Principal Findings 
Voluntary disclosure of corporate 
governance information was positively 
related to firm size, CEO duality and return 
on assets. 
No significant relationship was found for 
leverage and ownership diffusion. 
Australian governance studies after the introduction of listing rule 
4.10.3. 
Studies examining the impact of the listing rule were by Ramsay and Hoad ( 1997) 
and Evans and Christopher (2001) who provide a descriptive analysis on the extent 
of governance related disclosures. Carson (1999) conducted an empirical based study 
that applied regression analysis to examine the relationship of governance 
disclosures to selected firm characteristics. A summary of the key research questions, 
methodologies applied and principal findings of these studies is shown in Table 2.2. 
Ramsay and Hoad (1997) examined the 1996 annual reports of 268 companies listed 
on the ASX for governance related disclosures. The list of suggested items by the 
ASX in Appendix 4A of the ASX Listing Rule 4.10.3 provided a basis to examine 
the extent and types of governance disclosures made. The items included were 
modified to make them more manageable for analysis and discussion and focussed 
on the following four areas; Board composition, access to independent advice, 
remuneration for management and directors and audit, risks and ethics. A total of 11 
items were examined. 
Companies in the study were divided into small medium and large based on market 
capitalisation along with industry classifications being recorded. The intention was to 
enable comparisons between companies of varying sizes and to highlight variances in 
disclosure practices for the different industry groups. A sample of 100 companiei; 
was drawn from each grouping. After discarding some companies because data were 
not available or they were foreign listed companies a final sample of 68 large, 100 
medium and 100 smalJ companies were included. The extent of governance 
disclosures was expected to favour larger companies as larger companies have more 
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resources to prepare detailed disclosure statements and are more likely to be 
influenced by international trends and shareholder pressures especially where large 
institutional shareholders have an impact. 
Disclosure practices of listed Australian companies indicate that all large companies, 
98% of medium and 97% of small companies had a separate governance statement 
with an average length of 1.75 pages. The bankiug and finance companies disclosed 
noticeably more than all other companies disclosing on average 3.56 pages. This 
above average result was to be expected given the stringent legal implications 
surrounding the industry along with higher levels of financial risk. 
An attempt was made by Ramsay and Hoad (1997) to highlight that the quality of 
disclosures is more important than the quantity. However, quantitative results 
provide a focus for comparatives. In examining Board composition, 60% of 
company's boards were found to contain non-executive directors and 57% had a non-
executive chairperson. However, the AIMA guideline that the majority of the board 
members should be independent is not the case, with only 7% stating that their 
boards contained a majority of independent directors. This result was to be expected 
given that the list of governance related items provided by the ASX is only an 
indicative list and refers to non-executive directors, not independent directors and 
differences between the two are substantia113• Only 57% vf companies reported 
having a non-executive chairperson and 4% had an independent chairperson. It was 
also noted that 25% of all companies chose not to disclose anything on the status of 
the chairperson. 
" 
Refer to Appendix E for a summary of AIMA guidelines on independent directors. 
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The findings indicated that numbers of disclosures on the procedures for the 
nomination of directors and criteria for board membership were limited. The most 
common disclosure of criteria for board membership was the requirement to ensure 
an appropriate "mix of skill and experience" with only 10% of companies disclosing 
something more than this. Nomination committees were found to be present in 22% 
of companies. 
The disclosure of procedures for reviewing performance of directors was made by 
21 % of companies. Management performance related information was disclosed by 
23% of companies. Sixty-nine percent of large companies disclosed information on 
the retirement of directors. Disclosure in relation to remuneration levels varied 
widely between the company groups. Of the large companies, 75% had 
remuneration committees compared to 71% of medium companies and 26% of small 
companies. 
Audit committees were prevalent throughout, with all 68 of the large companies, 
95% for medium and 68% from small companies. A high proportion of companies, 
84% acknowledged the importance of risk management, however, the disclosure of 
any policies and procedures in this regard was very limited except for the banking 
and finance industry that provided very detailed information of various risks 
affecting the particular company. Ethical standards were acknowledged by 72% of 
companies as being important, but only 15% outlined their policies. 
In summary the Ramsay and Hoad (1997) study was conducted soon after the 
introduction of the new listing rule. The purpose was to highlight the adequacy of 
corporate governance practices at the time and provide some initial benchmarks for 
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continued improvement for future governance disclosure practices. Further to this, 
interested stakeholders can identify the extent of disclosures being made by other 
companies. The study also highlighted that the quality of governance disclosure was 
clearly better for larger companies than for smaller companies. The study identified 
a key area of concern, in that 65% of companies at this time failed to discuss 
procedures for reviewing the performance of management and directors. 
Carson (1999) examined the relationship of board sub-committees namely audit, 
remuneration and nomination committees to selected corporate characteristics, 
including auditor characteristics (Big 6), shareholder characteristics and director 
characteristics, firm size and board size. The study aimed to provide a "model of 
development of committee structures which reconciles differences in prior research 
into audit committee formation and also provides a guide as to the future 
development of remuneration and nomination committees" (p. 3). 
A sample of 363 Australian companies listed on the Connect 4 (C4) 14 database were 
examined by Carson (1999). Dichotomous scoring was applied to companies. 
Where an applicable item was disclosed, the company received a scored of "I". Non 
disclosure received a score of "O". Applicable items related specifically to the 
presence of an audit, remuneration and audit committee. Investigations found that 
audit committees were highly developed and associated with Big 6 auditors, 
institutional investment and firm size. Remuneration committees were found to be 
associated to the Big 6 auditors and firm size. Nomination committees were only 
found to be associated to board size. 
" 
The C4 database includes the Top 500 companies by market capitalisation listed on the ASX for 
a particular year. 
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Evans and Christopher (2001) examined the extent of governance related disclosures 
in the annual reports of61 mining companies listed on the ASX for 1995 and 1997. 
The suggested list of items by the ASX provided a basis for measuring governance 
disclosures. An unweighted index comprising the items detailed in the ASX 
suggested list was adopted. A score of "1" was given for the presence of an item of 
voluntary disclosure in the annual report and a score of "O" for non-disclosure. The 
study hypothesised that there was a positive increase in corporate governance 
disclosures in the 1995 to 1997 annual reports of Australian listed mining companies. 
The hypothesis was supported with the research showing that all disclosure items 
increased from 1995 to 1997. The presence of a separate governance statement 
increased from 32.8% in 1995 to 95.1% in 1997. The four lowest ranked items of 
disclosure for both 1995 and 1997 were nomination committee in place, director's 
appointment and retirement procedures, statement relating to risk management and a 
statement of ethical conduct. The ability of directors to seek independent advice 
increased from 24.6% to 86.9%. 
Limitations of Australian studies 
Studies conducted prior to the introduction of ASX Listing Rule 4.10.3 have 
provided useful insights into governance related disclosures, however, some 
limitations are evident. Firstly, these studies (summarised in Table 2.1) were 
conducted prior to the introduction of the new Lisf 1g Rule 4.10.3 and the focus was 
for one time period namely 1995. Studies by Stapledon and Lawrence (1996) and the 
ASCPA ( 1996) are both limited by studying only the top I 00 companies. The results 
are, therefore, not generalisable to the wider population. 
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Stapledon and Lawrence ( 1997) limit their study to some items of board 
composition, namely non-executive and or independent chairperson, and majority of 
non-executive and or independent directors, and the presence of audit, remuneration 
and nomination committees. Other items of governance related disclosures such as 
risk and ethics information are neglected. In addition, this study examined prima,ily 
the extent of disclosures and empirical analysis was limited to examining the 
relationship of firm size to governance disclosures, other variables that may have an 
impact on disclosures were not examined. Similarly, the ASCPA focused on the 
extent of disclosures and no empirical analysis is conducted. 
The studies by Carson and Simnett (1997) and Evans and Christopher (1999) have 
limitations inherent with the subjectivity in scoring the governance related disclosure 
items. Each study adopted an unweighted disclosure index ofitems suggested by the 
ASX. An examination of the list shown in Appendix A of the current study, suggests 
that some of these items or categories contain more than one key item. Prior studies 
have not attempted to extend or separate the individue1l items contained within this 
list. An example within Appendix A, is item 6 that relates to auditor information and 
has several separate items that could be scored. Separate items include commentary 
on the adequacy of the audit, presence of an audit committee, and the main functions 
of the committee. The current study separates these 3 items and each receives a 
score of "I" if disclosed and "O" if not disclosed. 
Carson and Simnett (1997) examined only industrial companies and Evans and 
Christopher (1999) examined only mining companies. The current study includes 
both mining and industrial companies in the same study. Comparisons are made to 
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determine if there are differential reporting characteristics between the two industry 
groups. 
' Studies conducted after the introduction of the listing rule have limitations similar to 
those mentioned above. Firstly, Ramsay and Hoad (1997) focussed on the extent and 
types of governance disclosures oflarger companies. This study did not empirically 
examine if a relationship existed between governance disclosures and selected 
corporate characteristics. 
Evans and Christopher (2001) examined only a sample of large mining companies. 
Similar to previous studies Evans and Christopher adopt an unweighted disclosure 
index comprising 9 items suggested by the ASX. No attempt was made to broaden 
this list to each individual item that could be disclosed and may cause some 
subjectivity in scoring. In addition, this study focused on the extent of disclosures 
for 1995 and 1997, allowing an analysis of the impact of the listing rule. However, 
this study did not apply any empirical analysis to determine if a relationship exists 
between corporate characteristics and governance disclosures. The study did find 
that companies in the sample that had lower market capitalisation (measure of size) 
had a lower governance disclosure level. 
The Carson (1999) study provides a valuable insight into board sub committees and 
the relationship of selected corporate characteristics to the presence of these 
committees. However, this study is limited in that other areas of governance such as 
risks and ethics are neglected. 
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The current study attempted to overcome some of the above mentioned limitations 
by adopting the following enhancements. Firstly, the current study examined the 
annual reports of 100 mining and 100 industrial companies over the periods prior to 
and after the introduction of the listing rule, namely 1995, 1996 and 1997. This 
facilitates a direct examination of the voluntary disclosures made in 1995 and the 
impact of the introduction of the listing rule in eliciting more governance infonnation 
in 1996 and 1997. By examining the two industry groups differential governance 
disclosure practices can be ascertained. The key contribution of the current study is 
the adoption of an extensive disclosure list of 55 items of governance related 
infonnation that combine to fonn an unweighted dichotomous index of disclosure. 
This approach was introduced in an attempt to reduce some of the subjectivity in 
scoring evident in previous studies. Of the 55 items, 30 of them relate directly to the 
suggested items contained in Appendix 4A. The additional 25 items are items of 
actual disclosure, found in the annual reports of companies included in the sample. 
To date previous studies have not included additional items of achlal disclosure in 
their analysis. Chapter 4 pro.vides a detailed description of this index. 
, 
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Table 2.2 
Summary of Australian corporate governance literature after the ASX listing rule introduction 
Author(s) 
Ramsay, I. M. 
and Road, R 
(1997) 
Sample 
268 listed divided 
into Large (68), 
Medium (100) and 
Small (I 00), based 
on market 
capitalisation. 
Annual reports for 
companies with a 
financial year 
ended on or after 
30 June 1996 are 
used. 
Reseuch Question(s) 
This study examines the 
governance disclosure 
practices of Australian 
companies after the 
introduction of listing rule 
4.10.3. 
Methodology 
Content analysis is used to 
examine the extent of 
disclosure of the 8 items 
detailed in Appendix 4A of the 
ASX listing rules. 
Examination was also made 
for the position of the 
statement, for example, the 
directors report or separate 
governance statement. The 
length of are also obtained. 
Industry classifications are 
also used to compare 
disclosure patterns. 
Principal Findings 
In summary larger companies tend to 
disclose more than smaller companies. The 
banking and finance industry tended to 
have more detailed disclosures. 
• 25% of companies not disclosing 
criteria for board membershlp 
• In addition 65% of the companies did 
not discuss procedures for reviewing 
performance of managers and directors 
• Non-executive directors present in 60% 
of companies, 7% independent 
directors 
• 57% had non-executive chairpernon, 
4% independent chairperson 
• Nomination committee present in 22% 
of companies 
• 21 % stated regularly reviewed 
performance of board directors and 
23% reviewed performance of 
management 
• All large companies had an audit 
committee 
• 84% acknowledged importance of risk 
management and 72% acknowledge 
importance of ethical standards 
however only 15% actually outlined 
their policies 
Table 2.2 ( continued) 
Author(s) 
Evans and 
Christopher 
(2001) 
Carson, E. (1999) 
Sample 
61 Australian mining 
companies listed on 
the ASX for 1995 
and 1997 available 
on the connect 4 
database. 
363 Australian 
companies from the 
Top 500 on the 
Connect 4 database 
for 19% and 1997. 
Research Question(s) 
Hypothesises that there is 
a positive increase in 
governance related 
disclosures in the 1995 to 
1997 annual reports of 
listed Australian mining 
companies. 
Examines the factors 
associated with board sub 
committees: Factors 
divided into auditor, 
director and investor 
related. 
Methodology 
Used an unweighted 
dichotomous index comprising 
9 items of indicative disclosure 
described in Appendix 4A of 
the ASX listing rules. 
A score of"l" is given for the 
presence of an item of 
voluntary disclosure in the 
arnmal report and a score of 
"O" for non-disclosure. 
Logistic regression used to test 
propositions. 
Dependent variable - presence 
of audit, remuneration and 
nomination conunittees 
Independent variables Big 6 
external auditor, proportion of 
non-executive directors, non-
executive chairman, number of 
directorships of other listed 
companies, % of shares owned 
by investment managers, % 
shares owned by nominee 
shareholders, % shares owned 
by other shareholders). 
Control variables- finn size, 
and board size. 
Principal Findings 
Disclosures increased over the periods. 
Presence of separate governance 
statements increased from 32.8% to 95.1 %. 
Ability of directors to seek independent 
advice increased from 24.6% to 86.9%. 
The 4 lowest ranked items of disclosure in 
1995 and 1997: 
• Presence of nomination committee 
• Directors appointment and retirement 
procedures 
• Statement relating to risk management 
• Statement of ethical conduct 
Audit committees found to be in an 
advanced stage of development. 
Positive association to Big 6 auditor and 
inter-corporate relationships was found. 
Remuneration committees also found to be 
related to Big 6 auditor and inter-corporate 
relationships and institutional investtnent. 
Results indicated nomination conunittees 
still in the early stages of development and 
are likely to be associated when board size 
becomes unmanageable. 
Selected indirectly related overseas studies 
The purpose of the current study was to examine the impact of Australian listing rule 
4.10.3 on governance related disclosures. The specific nature of this study precludes 
the inclusion of most overseas studies within the literature review. However, due to 
the large body of overseas studies on various governance issues a brief discussion is 
provided on the contributions of some selected overseas research that examine 
various aspects of board composition, firm performance and presence of an audit 
committee. 
Non-executive/independent directors act as both adviser and watchdog, and have the 
important role of influencing internal control mechanisms and accountability. 
Overseas studies examining the importance of non-executive directors in their role of 
monitoring managerial opportunism include Lefwich,Watts and Zimmerman (1981), 
Fama and Jensen, (1983), Forker (1992). Further, in the United States (US), Byrd 
and Hickman ( 1992) suggest that non-executive directors appear to improve 
accountability in crisis situations. However, Baysinger and Butler (1985) suggest 
that boards dominated by non-executive directors' place too much emphasis on 
monitoring at the expense of decision making and advisory roles. Additional studies 
that examine the drawbacks of having non-executive directors on the company board 
of directors include Goodstein, Gautum, and Beeker (1994), who suggest that too 
many non-executive directors stifle strategic actions. Patton and Baker (1987) 
suggest that non-executive directors lack necessary business knowledge to be 
effective. Demb and Nuebauer, (1992), Short, (1996), Kosnik, (1987) and Singh and 
Harianto, (1989) suggest that non-executive directors lack real independence. 
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Included within the board composition related studies is the argument that the role of 
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or managing director, and chairman should be 
separated. Arguments in favour of separating the role of CEO and chairman of the 
board include Argenti, (1976), Rechner and Dalton (1991), Forker, (1992) Shamsher 
and Annuar (1993), Stiles and Taylor (1993) and Blackburn (1994). Contrary to this, 
Eisenhardt, (1989)i Dahya, Lonie Power, (1996); Rechner and Dalton, (1991) apply 
arguments based on stewardship theory which implies that managers act in the best 
interest of the firm and shareholders and suggest the separation of the roles is 
unimportant as role duality may enhance board effectiveness. 
Further studies, primarily from the US examine the relationship of board 
effectiveness and independence. Results found have been mixed. Dalton, Daily, 
Ellstrand, and Johnson (1998) found no relationship between board composition and 
firm performance, whilst Wagner, Stimpert and Fubara (1998) found evidence of 
firm performance being enhanced by either having a majority of executives of 
majority of non-executives. Some overseas studies have found a negative 
relationship between firm performance and board size including Yermack (1996) in 
the US, Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998) in Finland and Canyon and Peck 
(1998) who examined a number of European economies. Rosenstein and Wyatt 
(1990) found evidence of positive share price reactions when independent directors 
are appointed. Weisbach (1988) found support for boards dominated by non-
executive directors are more likely to remove the CEO based on poor earnings or 
share price performance than boards dominated by management. 
Agency literature highlights the role of directors' remuneration in providing 
incentives for directors to promote long-term performance and enterprise. There is 
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weak evidence in the United Kingdom (UK) and US that suggest a link between pay 
and performance in particular remuneration appears to be related to firm size 
(Conyon, Gregg, and Machin, 1995). Kren and Kerr (1997) found that the number of 
non-executive directors had no effect on the relationship between CEO remuneration 
and finn performance. 
Audit committees are mandatory or heavily advocated in a number of countries 
around the world, including US, UK, Canada, and Malaysia. The notion that audit 
committees should be comprised solely of non-executive directors has been 
acknowledged by Treadway, (1987); Cadbury, (1992): and Toronto Stock Exchange 
(1994) (cited in Carson, 1999). Few studies have examined the effectiveness of audit 
committees, but one such study was by Beasley (1996) who found evidence that 
suggested board composition, rather than audit committee presence is more 
important for reducing the likelihood of fraud. Mixed results were found on factors 
influencing audit committee fonnation where Eichenseher and Shields (1985) found 
a relationship to Big 8 external auditors. Pincus, Rusbarsky and Wong (1989) found 
lower managerial ownership, higher leverage, larger size Big 8 external auditors and 
higher proportion of non-executive directors were all positively related to audit 
committee formation. Contrary to these finding, Bradbury, (1990) in NZ did not find 
any significant relationships. Collier (1993) in the UK found lower director 
shareholdings, higher gearing and a higher number of non-executive directors are 
positively associated with audit committee formation. 
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Summary 
The introduction of Listing Rule 4.10.3 has had a positive impact on the extent of 
govemance disclosures. Deficiencies in prior research do exist, with subjectivity 
being present in disclosure indexes, and with few studies applying empirical analysis. 
The current study aims to add to the literature by empirically examining the 
relationship of governance disclosures, measured by a more extensive less subjective 
disclosure index, to selected corporate characteristic:.- of mining and industrial 
companies. The periods prior to and after the introduction of the listing rule and 
items of actual disclosure will be considered. The following chapter examines 
political cost theory and discusses the hypotheses to be tested. 
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CHAPTER3 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT 
Introduction 
The current study adopts political cost theory to explain firm governance disclosure 
practices. The disclosure of governance information in the annual report represents a 
means by which companies can improve their reputation and minimise political costs 
associated with the operations of their companies. This chapter discusses political 
cost theory and highlights five proxies for political visibility, namely, proportion of 
non-executive directors, gearing, ownership diffusion, external auditor, and firm size. 
The findings of previous research are outlined to support the hypotheses to be tested. 
Political cost theory 
The topic of corporate governance and related disclosure has been receiving more 
publicity and attention. The large number of corporate failures in the 1980's 
heightened awareness and companies became more subject to public scrutiny. 
Significant governance changes resulted in the ways boards were structured, in 
particular the role of independent and non-executive directors in the monitoring 
process. Major public corporations acknowledge that they have no choice but to 
make management more accountable to shareholders and by strengthening the hand 
of outside directors is a means by which they can do this (Harvard Business Review 
on Corporate Governance, 2000). 
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The corporate governance process has received unprecedented public attention and 
investor activism, primarily due to the wave of board restructuring that peaked in the 
1980's, and has resulted in numerous proposals for refonn. The increase in 
shareholder lawsuits and escalating costs of directors and officers liahility insurance 
has resulted in board members feeling the pressure of increased risk. More 
importantly, board members are facing increasing pressure from holders of large 
blocks of stock (such as pension and mutual funds), from judicial and regulatory 
authorities, and from the financial press, all of whom are calling for boards to be 
more active. "This attention has had an impact in the nations public corporations and 
has brought about a change in boardroom behaviour that is significant". (Harvard 
Business Review on Corporate Governance, 2000, p. 54). 
Political costs are referred to as the costs that groups external to an organisation can 
impose upon a firm. For example, organisations can be influenced by governments 
who can impose increases in taxes, trade unions can influence wage claims and lobby 
groups can instigate product boycotts ( Deegan, 2002). These external groups may 
be affected by the accounting results of the firm (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978, 
Wong, 1988, and Deegan and Hallam, 1991). The extent to which a firm is subject 
to potential wealth transfers in the political process provides management with 
differential incentives to apply accounting techniques to reduce the potential for 
these wealth transfers (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Key, 1997). An example of 
political costs imposed upon companies is provided by the recent failures of 
Worldcom, Enron in the United States and HIH in Australia. Governments have 
responded strongly with major proposed changes to legislation and fines imposed on 
directors seen to be acting contrary to the best interest of shareholders. 
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Watts and Zimmerman (1978), and Holthausen and Leftwich (1983), Whittred and 
Zimmer (1990), and Deegan and Carroll (1993), have argued that accounting 
numbers may be used in the wealth transferring process. The use of accounting 
techniques to reduce political costs has been demonstrated by the disclosure of value""' 
added statements to reduce the likelihood of unions justifying further wage claims 
against the firm, (Deegan and Hallam, 1991). Similarly, management can make 
choices with regard to the governance disclosures made within their annual report to 
reduce potential political cost wealth transfers. 
The rise of informed institutional investors and shareholder committees have resulted 
in these groups influencing corporate policy and making demands on corporate 
disclosure. For example, in Australia IFSA (fonnerly AIMA) have published 
guidelines on appropriate governance policies and procedures and have influenced 
the introduction of governance legislation and ASX listing rules. A study by 
ASCP A's (1996) found that increasing publicity and attention were influencing an 
upward trend for the extent of governance related disclosure. Four times as many 
companies in 1995 were disclosing governance related information since 1994. 
Research has also demonstrated that users of financial statements regard governance 
disclosures as having information value in the decision making process. A study 
conducted in the United States indicated that institutional investors are willing to pay 
a premium to own shares in a company that demonstrates good corporate governance 
(Editorial Staff, 2000, Investor Relations Business). 
Political cost studies have traditionally been conducted in an unregulated market. 
This current study applies a political cost framework to examine the motivations of 
Australian listed companies to disclose governance information prior to and after the 
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introduction of listir.g rule 4.10.3. With reference to Appendix 4A of the listing rules 
and Appendix A of the current study, companies are provided with an indicative list 
of eight governance related items that may be disclosed. However, these disclosures 
are not clearly defined, therefore, the disclosure of governance related infonnation is 
still essentially voluntary and disclosure patterns between companies may differ. 
The following section details the hypotheses indicating governance disclosures will 
be associated to selected corporate characteristics acting as proxies for political 
visibility. 
Hypotheses development 
Using a political cost framework, the current study examines the relationship of 
governance disclosures of Australian listed companies to a number of explanatory 
variables. The aim of this section will be to highlight those empirical studies that 
have identified corporate characteristics that may influence or motivate firms to 
engage in corporate governance disclosures within their annual report. Testable 
hypotheses are then developed, where all hypotheses are expected to have a positive 
relationship to governance disclosures. The following proxies for political visibility 
are examined, proportion of non-executive directors, gearing, ownership diffusion 
Big 6 external auditor, and firm size. 
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Proportion of non-executive directors 
The board of directors has been described as the highest level of internal control 
mechanism within an organisation (Fama and Jensen, 1983). In Australia, both the 
Bosch Committee and the Australian Investment Managers Association (AIMA)1s-
have recommend that the Board of Directors be composed of a majority of non-
executive directors. Further to this a majority should also be independent (Pinder, 
1998, cited in Goodwin and Seow, 2000) and possess skills, knowledge and expertise 
to enhance firm performance through an effective board (Baysinger and Butler, 1985, 
cited in Goodwin and Seow, 2000). 
Support from overseas for increasing the number of non-executive directors has 
come from the Cadbury Report (1992) and the Hampel Committee (1998) in the UK. 
Each has proposed that a balance of executive and non-executive directors brings an 
element of independent judgement to the boards decision making. Clapman, (2000) 
suggests that an independent board will be more willing to press management and 
prove to be more valuable when it comes to contentious board decisions. 
Conversely, some authors have argued that non-executive and or independent 
directors may have a negative effect on board cohesiveness, corporate 
entrepreneurship and firm performance (Perry, 1995; Hoskisson, '1990; Klein, 1998; 
Yermack, 1996; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, all cited in Goodwin and Seow, 2000). 
Fama and Jensen (I 983), discuss the notion that non-executive directors are high 
reputation members of society who view their responsibilities as a means of 
developing their reputations in corporate decision making. Similarly, Carson and 
15 The AIMA is now !FSA. 
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Simnett (1997) contend that independent directors, like auditors, have high 
reputational capital at stake and would want to be associated with high disclosure 
companies or would use their influence to make the companies so. A recent 
Canadian study by Labeile (2002), suggested that internal control devices such as 
non-executive directors are believed to enhance monitoring and reduce agency costs 
and are important features of the Toronto Stock Exchange directives. Although 
logistic regression did not find the proportion of non-executive directors to be 
significant when examining the disclosure qu'llity of the statement of corporate 
governance practices, it is still worthy of inclusion in the current study due to the 
emphasis placed on the importance of non-executive directors. 
Several studies provide empirical support for the importance of outside directors. 
Leftwich, Watts and Zimmerman, (1981), found a significant relationship between 
non-executive directors and the voluntary disclosure of interim reports for companies 
in the US. Results of a study by Mak and Roush (2000), were consistent with the 
argument that firms associated with agency costs are likely to use relatively more 
outside directors for monitoring purposes. Using logistic regression to examine the 
relationship of percentage of non-executive directors to governance related 
disclosures, Carson and Simnett (1997) did not find this variable to be significant in 
Australian industrial companies. Similarly, results found by Malone, Fries and Jones 
(1993) and Forker (1992) were not significant. 
Research has demonstrated that shareholders regard governance disclosures as 
having information value in the decision making process. In particular, the 
appointment of non-executive directors has influenced the share market. Rosenstein 
and Wyatt (1990), have documented significantly positive share price returns around 
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the announcement of non-executive director appointments. Clearly this highlights 
how firms management can make disclosure choices to minimise political costs by 
executing good governance practices and disclosing presence of non-executive 
directors that may be perceived positively by outside parties thereby reducing 
political costs. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
HI: The proportion of non-executive directors is positively associated with 
governance disclosures. 
The current study examines mining and industrial companies for the years 1995, 
1996 and 1997 and governance disclosures include those suggested by the ASX and 
additional items of actual disclosure. Consequently the above hypothesis can be 
broken down into the following 12 sub hypotheses; 
H!(a): 
Hl(b): 
Hl(c): 
Hl(d): 
Hl(e): 
Hl(f): 
The proportion of non-executive directors in mining companies in 1995 
is positively associated with governance related disclosures suggested by 
the ASX. 
The proportion of non-executive directors in mining companies in 1995 
is positively associated with ASX and additional actual governance 
related disclosures. 
The proportion of non-executive directors in mining companies in 1996 
is positively associated with governance related disclosures suggested by 
the ASX. 
The proportion of non-executive directors in mining companies in 1996 
is positively associated with ASX and additional actual governance 
related disclosures. 
The proportion of non-executive directors in mining companies in 1997 
is positively associated with governance related disclosures suggested by 
the ASX. 
The proportion of non-executive directors in mining companies in 1997 
is positively associated with ASX and additional actual governance 
related disclosures. 
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Hl(g): 
Hl(h): 
Ht(i): 
Ht(i): 
Ht (k): 
Ht(!): 
The proportion of non-executive directors in industrial companies in 
1995 is positively associated with governance related disclosures 
suggested by the ASX. 
The proportion of non-executive directors in industrial companies in 
1995 is positively associated with ASX and additional actual governance 
related disclosures. 
The proportion of non-executive directors in industrial companies in 
1996 is positively associated with governance related disclosures 
suggested by the ASX. 
The proportion of non-executive directors in industrial companies in 
1996 is positively associated with ASX and additional actual governance 
related disclosures. 
The proportion of non-executive directors in industrial companies in 
1997 is positively associated with governance related disclosures 
suggested by the ASX. 
The proportion of non-executive directors in industrial companies in 
1997 is positively associated with ASX and additional actual governance 
related disclosures. 
Gearing 
Gearing measures the degree to which a firm uses debt capital. As debt capital 
increases, creditors need assurance from companies that the firm is being managed 
properly and in such a way that debts can be repaid. Firms with lower gearing in 
their capital structure would be less likely to be approaching default on debt 
covenants (Daly and Vigeland, 1983). There is potential for wealth transfers to 
occur and creditors to call in their debts or to reduce future loans when companies 
arc not seen to be acting in the best interest of creditors. The disclosure of 
governance related infonnation, in particular policies and procedures for assessing 
various risks, management can demonstrate to creditors that funds are being used 
appropriately, thereby reducing the likelihood of creditors increasing interest rates 
and thereby helping to mitigate potential political costs. 
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It has been suggested by Jensen and Meckling, (1976) (cited in Deegan and Gordon, 
1994), that increases in the amount of capital, causes agency costs to increase. In a 
similar context political costs will increase. Creditors concern will be heightened if a 
firm is seen to be misusing funds. Creditors can then monitor the firms operations 
and protect their loans by adding various conditions to their contracts including 
changing interest rates and the like. 
Prior studies that have examined gearing lack consistency. Selected research has 
found a significant relationship between gearing and company disclosure. Notably, 
these studies have all been conducted overseas. Studies by Leftwich, Watts and 
Zimmerman,1981; Bradbury, 1992; and Malone et al, I 993, all found significant 
results. 
On the other hand several Australian studies have not found gearing to be significant. 
Carson and Simnett, (1997) conducted a study that examined the association of 
gearing to governance disclosures of industrial companies in Australia, gearing was 
found to be insignificant. Evans and Christopher (1999), have conducted a more 
recent study directly related to corporate governance disclosures prior to the 
introduction of the ASX Listing Rule 4.10.3. This study examined the voluntary 
disclosure of governance related disclosures for Australian mining companies. A 
positive association between governance related disclosures and gearing was 
predicted. However no significant relationship was found. Further studies that 
support this result include Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Craswell and Taylor, 1992; 
McKinnon and Dalimunthe, 1993; Carlon and Morris, I 995, Eng and Mak (1999). 
Ho and Wong (2000) when examining companies in Hong Kong using regression 
analysis, found gearing to be insignificant. 
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Despite the previous insignificant results, the study by Carson and Simnett (1997) is 
limited to only the industrial companies and Evans and Christopher examined only 
mining companies which limits the generalisability of results. These studies also 
focussed on the period before the introduction of the listing rule. Lonsequently as 
the current study examines both mining and industrial companies and surveys the 
periods before and after the listing rule became operational, this leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
H2; Firm gearing is positively associated with governance disclosures. 
This hypothesis is broken down into the following 12 sub hypotheses: 
H2(a): 
H2(b): 
H2(c): 
H2(d): 
H2(e): 
H2(f): 
H2(g): 
H2(h): 
H2(i) : 
Mining companies gearing in 1995 is positively associated with 
governance disclosures suggested by the ASX. 
Mining companies gearing in 1995 is positively associated with ASX and 
additional actual governance related disclosures. 
Mining companies gearing in 1996 is positively associated with 
governance disclosures suggested by the ASX. 
Mining companies gearing in 1996 is positively associated with ASX and 
additional actual governance related disclosures. 
Mining companies gearing in 1997 is positively associated with 
governance disclosures suggested by the ASX. 
Mining companies gearing in 1997 is positively associated with ASX and 
additional actual governance related disclosures. 
Industrial companies gearing in 1995 is positively associated with 
governance disclosures suggested by the ASX. 
Industrial companies gearing in 1995 is positively associated with ASX 
and additional actual governance related disclosures. 
Industrial companies gearing in 1996 is positively associated with 
governance disclosures suggested by the ASX. 
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H2(i): 
H2(k): 
H2(1): 
Industrial companies gearing in 1996 is positively associated with ASX 
and additional actual governance related disclosures. 
Industrial companies gearing in 1997 is positively associated with 
governance disclosures suggested by the ASX. 
Industrial companies gearing in 1997 is positively associated with ASX 
and additional actual governance related disclosures. 
Ownership diffusion 
Ownership diffusion refers to the dispersion of shareholdings in a company and is a 
variable that provides evidence of the degree of control shareholders have over the 
firm. Increases in separation of ownership and control increases managements 
pressure to provide shareholders with information to meet their information 
demands. Agency theory suggests that where there is separation of ownership and 
control potential agency costs exist and directors have more incentive to enforce 
disclosure policies to mitigate these risks. Within the same context there are political 
incentives for firms to increase disclosure to mitigate potential political costs. 
Wealth transfers may result from shareholders that may create negative publicity by 
lobbying against and choosing not to invest in companies without good corporate 
governance practices. It may be implied that there is incentive for management to 
disclose more governance information so as to improve shareholders perceptions of 
managements' decisions and policy choices. Thereby reducing agency and political 
costs associated with non-disclosure. 
The current study defines ownership diffusion as proportion of shareholders other 
than the top twenty shareholders. This measurement is consistent with studies 
conducted by Evans and Christopher (1999). 
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It has been noted in previous research by Frost, 1996 (cited in Carson and Simnett, 
1997), that major shareholders are likely to have access to private information about 
the firms that they hold large investments in. Consequently, the agency/political cost 
is not as evident as with more dispersed ownership. Therefore, the need to reduce 
this cost not as great, and disclosure in the annual report not as likely. Disclosing 
governance information in the annual report represents the primary and most cost 
effective means of attempting to reduce wealth transfer-.;. 
Craswell and Taylor (1992) suggest that ownership diffusion appeared to be related 
to the extent of disclosure of reserves by oil and gas companies, similarly ownership 
diffusion could be related to the extent and types of corporate governance 
disclosures. That is, as ownership becomes more dispersed, it is more likely that 
more corporate governance information will be disclosed to the larger number of 
shareholders that have an interest in the firm. 
Previous Australian research by Carson and Simnett (1997), hypothesised that 
"Firms with a higher concentration of shares held by a few shareholders will disclose 
voluntarily less corporate governance information than firms with a lower 
concentration of shares held by a few shareholders'' (p. 11 ). This was measured using 
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the top twenty shareholders and was found to be insignificant. As the top twenty 
shareholders have such a large interest in the firm, they may be privy to information 
that shareholders that are not in the top twenty may not have access to. 
Results on this variable are mixed. Craswell and Taylor (1992) and Carson and 
Simnett (1997) and Evans and Christopher (1999) did not find this variable to be 
significant. These studies were all conducted in an unregulated market prior to the 
introduction of the listing rule. Taking into consideration that the current study 
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examines a different time period with new rules in place and that a study conducted 
by McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) did find this variable significant, this variable 
is considered relevant to the current study. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H3: Ownership diffusion is positively associated with governance disclosures. 
This hypothesis is broken down into the following 12 sub hypotheses: 
H3(a): 
H3(b): 
H3(c): 
H3(d): 
H3(e): 
H3(t): 
H3(g): 
H3(h): 
H3(i): 
H3(j): 
Ownership diffusion of mmmg companies in 1995 is positively 
associated with governance disclosures suggested by the ASX. 
Ownership diffusion of mining companies in 1995 is positively 
associated with ASX and additional actual governance related 
disclosures. 
Ownership diffusion of mmmg companies in 1996 is positively 
associated with governance disclosures suggested by the ASX. 
Ownership diffusion of mining companies in 1996 is positively 
associated with ASX and additional actual governance related 
disclosures. 
Ownership diffusion of mmmg companies in 1997 is positively 
associated with governance disclosures suggested by the ASX. 
Ownership diffusion of mining companies in 1997 is positively 
associated with ASX and additional actual governance related 
disclosures. 
Ownership diffusion of industrial companies in 1995 is positively 
associated with governance disclosures suggested by the ASX. 
Ownership diffusion of industrial companies in 1995 is positively 
associated with ASX and additional actual governance related 
disclosures. 
Ownership diffusion of industrial companies in 1996 is positively 
associated with governance disclosures suggested by the ASX. 
Ownership diffusion of industrial companies in 1996 is positively 
associated with ASX and additional actual governance related 
disclosures. 
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H3(k): 
H3(1): 
Ownership diffusion of industrial companies in 1997 is positively 
associated with governance disclosures suggested by the ASX. 
Ownership diffusion of industrial companies in 1997 is positively 
associated with ASX and additional actual governance related 
disclosures. 
Auditor (Big 6) 
The inclusion of auditor type as a determinant of corporate disclosure is based on the 
notion that larger auditors such as the Big 6 16 in Australia, will influence companies 
to disclose as much as possible. Auditors incur costs when entering into contracts 
with clients and therefore are unlikely to enter into contracts with clients that don't 
have a positive track record with disclosure as it may reflect badly on them as the 
auditor (Watts and Zimmennan, 1986). As discussed by Carson and Simnett, (1997), 
auditors may perceive that improvements in corporate governance disclosures is 
likely to improve the quality of financial reports produced, thereby reducing risks of 
litigation. 
Previous research has not been conclusive, Carson and Sirnnett, (1997), did not find 
auditor type to be significant. A suggested reason for this "may be because the Big 
6 firms did not include a corporate governance disclosure in their proforma accounts 
for listed companies, as the listing rule did not apply at this stage. This study looked 
at the financial year ending 30 June 1995 and the rule did not apply until 30 June 
1996. In a further study by Carson, 1999, Big 6 auditors were found to be influential 
in the formation of audit and remuneration committees. 
JO In Australia we now have the Big 4, however, at the time of the study the Big 6 audit finns was 
still applicable. 
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This study examines governance related disclosure before and after the listing rule 
introduction and therefore, it is expected that auditors associated with the Big 6 will 
have a positive relationship to the disclosure of governance related information. This 
leads to the following hypothesis: 
H4: Big 6 external auditor is positively associated with governance disclosures. 
This hypothesis is broken down into the following 12 sub hypotheses: 
H4(a) 
H4(b) 
H4(c) 
H4(d) 
H4(e) 
H4(f) 
H4(g) 
H4(h) 
H4(i) 
The presence of Big 6 external auditors in mining companies for 1995 is 
positively associated with governance disclosures suggested by the ASX. 
The presence of Big 6 external auditors in mining companies for 1995 is 
positively assodated with ASX and additional actual governance related 
disclosures. 
The presence of Big 6 external auditors in mining companies for 1996 is 
positively associated with governance disclosures suggested by the ASX. 
The presence of Big 6 external auditors in mining companies for 1996 is 
positively associated with ASX and additional actual governance related 
disclosures. 
The presence of Big 6 external auditors in mining companies for 1997 is 
positively associated with governance disclosures suggested by the ASX. 
The presence of Big 6 external auditors in mining companies for 1997 is 
positively associated with ASX and additional actual governance related 
disclosures. 
The presence of Big 6 external auditors in industrial companies for 1995 
is positively associated with governance disclosures suggested by the 
ASX. 
The presence of Big 6 external auditors in industrial companies for 1995 
is positively associated with ASX and additional actual governance 
related disclosures. 
The presence of Big 6 external auditors in industrial companies for 1996 
is positively associated with governance disclosures suggested by the 
ASX. 
45 
H4G) The presence of Big 6 external auditors in industrial companies for 1996 
is positively associated with ASX and additional actual governance 
related disclosures. 
H4(k) The presence of Big 6 external auditors in industrial companies for 1997 
is positively associated with governance disclosures suggested by the 
ASX. 
H4(l) The presence of Big 6 external auditors in industrial companies for 1997 
is positively associated with ASX and additional actual governance 
related disclosures. 
Firm Size 
Firm size has consistently been found to be positively associated with various firm 
disclosures. The suggestion is that larger firms may consider their size to be a 
variable which encourages the public to take notice, pay more attention or scrutinise 
their operations, (Dierkes and Coppock, 1978; Eilbert and Parker, 1973). Similarly? 
the larger the firm, the greater the incentive to disclose information to reduce 
perceived political costs and improve the finn image to shareholders (Deegan and 
Gordon, 1994). There are various measurement techniques employed to measure 
firm size. Measures include the use of market capitalisation and total assets and total 
sales. Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) have argued that no measure of size is 
necessarily superior to another. The present study will use total assets as a proxy for 
firm size. 
According to Watts and Zimmerman (1978) the extent of political costs impacting on 
a firm is highly dependent on firm size. Furthermore, it is also argued that lobby 
groups target larger size companies due to their political visibility and are at a greater 
risk of negative publicity and wealth transfers away from the company. Therefore 
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increasing corporate governance disclosures may assist in reducing the potential 
wealth transfers associated with non-disclosure. 
Baxter and Pragasam (1999), found that; 
11the only factor that appeared to have a significant impact on audit 
committee disclosures was the size of the company. This would be 
consistent with the view that only larger listed companies disclose audit 
committees to enhance their corporate image, as these companies are 
more likely to be subject to costly political attention from the 
government, the media and the investing public" (p. 42). 
Firm size has consistently been found to be associated with the disclosure of 
corporate governance information. Carson and Sinmett (1997) found that firm size, 
as measured by market capitalisation was significantly associated with the voluntary 
disclosure of corporate governance information. Stapledon and Lawrence (1996) also 
found firm size to have a significant relationship to the proportion of independent 
directors. In addition, Evans and Christopher (1999) using regression analysis, found 
company size to be a major determinant of governance related disclosures. Ho and 
Wong (2000) similarly found firm size to be significant. Dolley and Monroe (2000) 
found firm size to be significantly related to the voluntary formation of ~:Udit 
committees. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
HS: Firm size is positively associated with governance disclosures. 
This hypothesis is broken down into the following 12 sub hypotheses: 
HS(a) Firm size of mining companies in 1995 is positively associated with 
governance disclosures suggested by the ASX. 
HS(b) Firm size of mining companies in 1995 is positively associated with ASX 
and additional actual governance related disclosures. 
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H5(c) 
H5(d) 
H5(e) 
H5(f 
H5(g) 
H5(h) 
H5(i) 
HSU) 
H5(k) 
H5(1) 
Summary 
Firm size of mining companies in 1996 is positively associated with 
governance disclosures suggested by the ASX. 
Firm size of mining companies in 1996 is positively associated with ASX 
and additional actual governance related disclosures. 
Firm size of mining companies in 1997 is positively associated with 
governance disclosures suggested by the ASX. 
Firm size of mining companies in 1997 is positively associated with ASX 
and additional actual governance related disclosures. 
Firm size of industrial companies in 1995 is positively associated with 
governance disclosures suggested by the ASX. 
Firm size of industrial companies in 1995 is positively associated with 
ASX and additional actual governance related disclosures. 
Firm size of industrial companies in 1996 is positively associated with 
governance disclosures suggested by the ASX. 
Firm size of industrial companies in 1996 is positively associated with 
ASX and additional actual governance related disclosures. 
Firm size of industrial companies in 1997 is positively associated with 
governance disclosures suggested by the ASX. 
Firm size of industrial companies in 1997 is positively associated with 
ASX and additional actual governance related disclosures. 
This chapter has discussed political cost theory. Previous research was examined to 
determine those explanatory variables likely to be associated to corporate governance 
disclosures. Proxies for political visibility examined were size, percentage of non-
executive directors, gearing, ownership diffusion, and Big 6 external auditor. The 
following chapter details the research methodology. The method of sample selection, 
sources of data, measurement of variables, and statistics to be employed are outlined. 
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CHAPTER4 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the method of data collection and 
measurements employed to examine company governance disclosures within a 
political cost framework. The method of sample selection and sources of data are 
described followed by dependent and independent variable measurements employed. 
Finally, statistical analysis applied to test the hypotheses detailed within Chapter 3 
are elaborated. 
Sampk selection 
Mining and industrial companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), for 
the years 1995, 1996 and 1997 are included in the sample of this study. These years 
were chosen to examine governance disclosures prior to and after the introduction of 
the ASX listing rule 4.10.3, which became operational from 30 June 1996. 
Table 4.1 summarises the sources of 100 annual reports for the mining companies 
included in this study. The Connect 4 database provided the primary source for the 
annual reports for mining companies listed on the ASX. Additional annual reports 
were obtained from various sources to make up the 100 companies included in the 
final sample for each of the 3 years. These included the Australian Graduate School 
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of Management (AGSM) Annual Report Files17 Global Access (GA) 18 database, 
hard copies available at ECU library and seven annual reports were purchased from 
the ASX. The final sample was limited by the following criteria 19• 
1) No liability companies are excluded, 
2) Trusts are excluded, and 
3) Annual reports were required to be available for all years. 
Table 4.1 
Sources of annual reports for mining companies 
1995 1996 1997 
Total number available on C4 database 75 77 75 
Hard copy ECU Library 13 8 4 
AGSMfile 2 3 5 
Global Access Database 4 II 15 
Hard copies purchased from ASX 6 0 1 
Hard copy obtained from company 0 I 0 
Final sample of mining companies 100 100 100 
The sample of 100 industrial companies was randomly selected from a list of 225 
companies available from the C4 database for all years of the study, using a random 
numbers table. A full list of all mining and industrial companies used in the sample 
is provided in Appendix B. 
17 AGSM annual report files were available on CD-Rom at the Churchlands Campus of Edith 
Cowan University (ECU). 
18 GA is maintained in the United Kingdom and is made available on the Internet to subscribers -
various company data can be downloaded including full annual reports. 
19 No liability companies and trusts are excluded as they are subject to differential stock exchange 
listing rules in relation to director disclosures and corporate governance. This is consisttmt with 
Carson (1999) Evans and Christopher (1999). 
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Data Sources 
Company annual reports provide the primary source of the data to be used in 
statistical analysis. Annual reports are widely acknowledged as being the principal 
means of corporate communication of company intentions, and is therefore a 
valuable instrument for analysing governance disclosures (Roberts, 1991; Tilt, 1994; 
Anderson and Epstein, 1995). Carson and Simnett (1997) highlight that the annual 
report is used by shareholders when making investment decisions and therefore a 
useful tool for management to disclose governance related information that may 
affect investment decisions. 
Governance disclosure items were extracted from each company's annual report and 
recorded against a list of dichotomous items 20. A disclosed item received a score of 
"1" and a score of"zero" ifno disclosure was present. As it was not expected that all 
information would be disclosed in a single place, all pages in the annual report of 
each company were examined for governance disclosure items. 
The annual report also provided the source for the following items used to calculate 
values for the independent variables for each of the years of the study; total debt, 
total assets, proportion of shareholders other than the top 20, total number of 
directors, total number of non-executive directors, and company external auditors. 
Some items were reported in foreign currency and required translation into 
Australian dollars. Relevant exchange rates were obtained from those published by 
20 A more detailed discussion of how this list was developed is discussed under the measurement of 
the dependent variable. 
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The Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin. Appendix B highlights the companies that 
required foreign currency translation and Appendix C details the relevant rates used 
to translate into Australian dollars. 
Measurement of the dependent variable- Governance disclosure index 
The current study uses an unweighted dichotomous index comprising 55 items of 
governance disclosure developed using the 8 suggested categories provided by the 
ASX listing rule 4.10.3 within Appendix 4A21 and adding additional items of actual 
disclosure found in the annual reports of companies in the sample. The eight 
categories of governance disclosure were: disclosure of directors (EXEC), 
membership on board of directors (BMEM), appointment and retirement of directors 
(APRET}, directors ability to seek independent advice (INDADV}, remuneration 
(REM), external auditors (AUD), business risk (RSK) and ethical standards 
(ETHIC). TOtal. governance disclosure (TGD) is the sum of all the above categories. 
The wording of the 8 categories shown in Appendix 4A suggested a number of 
possible items in each of these categories. A thorough investigation revealed 30 
separate items of governance disclosure within these 8 categories. Applying content 
analysis, a further 25 items of actual disclosure were added to the list when annual 
reports were examined. Table 4.2 details the items and gives examples of the 55 
items that combine to form TGD. Items highlighted by shading are the 25 items 
made in addition to those suggested by the ASX. 
" 
Refer Appendix A of the current study for a copy of the listing rule and related Appendix 4A. 
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Dichotomous indexing is applied to objectively measure the information disclosed 
and to provide a consistent numerical basis for evaluating governance related 
disclosures. Given that each item is ranked equally the misranking of items can be 
avoided (Marston and Shrives, 1991). However, by treating each governance item 
equally this method is perceived to be a limitation of the study (Coy, Tower and 
Dixon, 1991 ). When an item was disclosed, the company received a score of 1, non-
disclosure received a zero score. Total gC"vemance disclosure score was calculated 
by summing all the items disclosed by each company. 
The current study applies 2 indexes of governance related disclosures. The first 
measure of governance disclosure, TGDAsx comprises the sum of the 30 governance 
disclosures as suggested by the ASX listing rule. The second measure TGD+ASX 
comprises the sum of all 55 items of governance disclosure including the 30 items 
suggested by the ASX, plus the 25 items of a<Jpitional actual disclosure. 
The first category EXEC is represented by 2 items22 of governance related disclosure 
namely disclosure of the break-up of directors into executive and non-executive and 
whether the chairman of the board is a non-executive director. The second category 
BMEM is made up of 12 disclosure items23. In summary, the items relate to the 
criteria for board membership, nomination of directors and performance of directors. 
Category 3 APRET comprises 2 items relating to the appointment and retirement of 
directors24• The fourth category INDADV comprises 2 items relating to the ability of 
directors to seek independent advice25 • The fifth category REM refers to 
" 
" 
" 
" 
Refer to it:~ms 2.1 and 2.2 in Table 4.2. 
Refer to items 3.1 to 3.12 in Table 4.2. 
Refer to items 4.1 and 4.2 in Table 4.2. 
Refer to items 5.1 and 5.2 in Table 4.2. 
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remuneration of directors and comprises 9 items26• Category 6 AUD relates to the 
audit function and comprises 9 items27• Category 7 RISK relates to the 
acknowledgment and disclosure of business risk information and comprises 10 
items28 . Category 8 ETHIC refers to business ethics and comprises 9 items29• Items 
shaded in Table 4.2 are the 25 additional items of actual disclosure found in the 
annual reports of companies included in the sample. 
,. 
" 
'" 
" 
Refer to items 6,1 to 6.9 in Table 4.2. 
Refer to items 7.1 to 7,9 in Table 4.2. 
Refer to items 8.1 to 8.10 in Table 4.2. 
Refer to items 9.1 to 9.9 in Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2 
Corporate governance disclosure items 
Items highlighted by shading are the 25 items provided in addition to the ASX Listing Rule 
4.10.3 items. When an item is disclosed in the annual report, the company will receive a 
score of I, while non-disclosure receives a score of zero. 
TYPE OF DISCLOSURE DESCRIPTION 
A, Corporate Governance Statement (GSTA T) 
1,1 Separate Corporate Governance 
Statement. 
B. Categories of Disclosure 
The purpose of this item is to detennine if companies 
had a separate section in their annual report that 
detailed corporate governance disclosures. The ASX 
Listing requirement does not specify where corporate 
governance disclosures should be detailed. A study by 
the ASCPA (1996) indicated that shareholders could be 
better served as "some entities provided dispersed 
disclosures, rather than collecting them in a location 
where they would be expected, such as a corporate 
governance statement" (p.4). This variable is collected 
for descriptive statistics only and not used in multiple 
regression analysis. 
CATEGORY I: Disclosure of Directors (EXEC) 
2.1 Disclosure of the break-up of 
directors into executive or non-
executive directors. 
Appendix 4A item 1 indicates that companies should 
disclose the break-up of directors into executive and 
non-executive. The presence of more non-executive 
directors on the board of directors is perceived as good 
governance. For example, the Cadbury Code section 1.4 
indicates the board should include non-executive 
directors of sufficient calibre and number for their 
views to carry significant weight in the boards' 
decisions. This type of disclosure would be seen as 
favourable. Non-executive directors have some 
important contributions to make to the governance 
process as a consequence of their independence from 
executive responsibility. Firstly in the review of the 
perfonnance of the board and of executive, the second 
is taking the lead when possible conflicts arise. 
(Stapledon, 1996). 
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Table 4.2 (continued) 
TYPE OF DISCLOSURE 
2,2 Is the Chainnan of the Board of 
Directors an executive or non-
executive director? 
TGDASX=2 
TGD+ASX=2 
DESCRIPTION 
Consistent with 2.1 above, Appendix 4A indicates that 
companies should disclose if the chainnan of the board 
of directors is executive or non-executive. Authorities 
have long seen having the Chairman as a non-executive 
director as a good governance practice. This has been 
recommended by various committees in Australia and 
overseas. The Cadbury Report ( 1992) indicated that the 
chairman should be divorced from the day today 
activities of the company and was an important control 
to ensure that the shareholders interests are better 
served by somebody who is not directly involved in the 
management of the firm. 
CATEGORY 2: Membership on Board of Directors (BMEM) 
3.1 Acknowledgment of existence of 
criteria for board membership. 
3.2 Disclosure of the main 
procedures for devising criteria 
for board membership. 
Within Appendix 4A of the ASX listing rules, item 2(ii) 
outlines that companies should disclose criteria for 
board membership. This item focuses on the 
acknowledgment of criteria for board membership, 
rather than more specific information on procedures. 
In addition to item 3.1, disclosure of this item indicates 
that the company has gone further than acknowledge 
criteria for board membership, it has disclosed the main 
procedures for criteria for board membership. This is 
applicable if a firm has given a clear indication as to the 
specific procedures and items they consider when 
determining the membership of the board. 
An example of this is the criteria for board membership 
is provided by Arthur Anderson (2001) "The board 
seeks to consist of directors with an appropriate range 
of experience, skill knowledge and vision to enable it to 
operate the Companies with business with excellence" 
(p. 37). 
lfthe company receives a score of 1 for this item 3.2, 
they will receive a score of I for item 3.1 as well, 
meaning that companies that acknowledge and provide 
a greater extent of disclosure will receive a higher score 
for this category. 
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Table 4.2 ( continued) 
TYPE OF DISCLOSURE 
3.3 Disclosure of the main 
procedures for reviewing the 
membership of rhe board. 
3.4 Disclosure of procedures for 
nominating directors. 
\j 
3.5 Disclosure of presence of 
nomination committee. 
3.6 Disclosure or the names and 
positions of nomination 
committee members. 
3. 7 Disclosure of the 
responsibilities of nomination 
committee members. 
DESCRIPTION 
Appendix 4A under item 2(ii) the ASX highlight that a 
company should disclose the main procedures for 
reviewing the membership of the board. 
An example of this is "Executive directors should serve 
at least 3 years. At the completion of the first 3 years, 
the position of director is reviewed to ascertain if 
circumstances warrant further term. The director is 
required to relinquish the directorship after 10 years." 
(Arthur Anderson, 2001, p.37). 
Appendix 4A under item 2(ii) the ASX suggest that a 
company should disclose the procedures for nominating 
directors. 
An example of this is disclosure that "The board has the 
option to use either a nomination committee or an 
external consulting finn to identify and approach 
possible new candidates for directorships." "The 
selection of the directors must be approved by the 
majority of the shareholders" (Arthur Anderson 200 I, 
p.37). 
The disclosure of the presence of a Nomination 
committee on its own is not enough, further disclosure 
on specific procedures is required to receive a score of 
one with this item. 
Appendix 4A indicates that r 'Tlpanies should disclose 
if it has a nomination committee. 
Appendix 4A indicates that compenies should disclose 
members of its nomination committee. 
Appendix 4A indicates that companies should disclose 
the responsibilities of the nomination committee 
members. 
An example of nomination committee responsibilities is 
"Formulates policy and criteria for appointment of the 
directors to the Board, and identifies potential 
candidates. Specific activities include the review of the 
Boards required status, experience, mix of skills and 
education (Arthur Anderson, 200 l, p.39). 
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Table 4.2 (continued) 
TYPE OF DISCLOSURE 
3.8 Disclosure that chairperson of 
the nomination committee is a 
non-executive director. 
3.9 Are the majority of the 
nomination committee members 
non-executive directors? 
3.10 Disclosure of the 
responsibilities of the board of 
directors. 
3.11 Disclosure of acknowledgment 
ofa formal review of the 
perfonnance of the board of 
directors. 
DESCRIPTION 
This item is in addition to the ASX Listing rule 
Appendix 4A requirements. As with item 2.2, having a 
non-executive director as chainnan of a committee is 
seen as good governance practice. The chairman should 
be independent from the day today activities of the 
company and provides an important control mechanism 
to ensure that the shareholders interests are better 
served. 
This item is in addition to the ASX Listing rule 
Appendix 4A requirements. Having a majority of non-
executive directors on the nomination committee 
ensures the nomination process is divorced from the 
normal operations. 
This item is in addition to the ASX Listing rule 
Appendix 4A requirements. An example is, "The board 
of directors is responsible for setting the strategic 
direction and establishing the policies of AA Ltd. It is 
responsible for overseeing the financial position, and 
for monitoring the business affairs of the company on 
behalf of the shareholders. It also addresses issues 
relating to internal controls and approaches to risk 
management" (Arthur Anderson, 2001, p.37). 
This item is in addition to the ASX Listing rule 
Appendix 4A requirements. This variable was to 
determine if company's had indicated a fonnal review 
of the boards perfonnance. This does not refer to 
individual director perfonnance. 
An example is provided by the annual report of Ghana 
old Mines 1996, " The membership of the board, its 
activities and composition is subject to periodic review'' 
(p.11). 
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Table 4.2 (continued) 
TYPE OF DISCLOSURE 
3.12 Disclosure of procedures for 
reviewing performance 
outlined. 
TGDASX=7 
TGD+ASX=12 
DESCRIPTION 
This item is in addition to the ASX Listing rule 
Appendix 4A requirements. An example is provided by 
the annual report of Macmahon Holdings Ltd, 1996 
"The Board assesses its performance no less than once a 
year. The intent of the assessment is to gauge the 
effectiveness of the Board and not to necessarily focus 
on individual performance. However, it will be 
necessary for the Board, in open forum, to focus on the 
appropriate skills and characteristics required of Board 
members. This assessment should include issues of 
diversity, age, skills, background and other matters 
necessary to achieve the Company's objectives and 
should be viewed in the context of the perceived needs 
of the Board and the current make-up of the Board at 
that point in time" (p.53). 
CATEGORY 3: Appointment and retirement of directors (APRET) 
4.1 Disclosure of policies on the 
terms and conditions relating to 
the appointment of non-
executive directors. 
4.2 Disclosure of policies on the 
term~ and conditions relating to 
the retirement of non-executi'Je 
directors. 
TGDASX-2 
TGD+ASX=2 
Within Appendix 4A item 3, the ASX indicates that 
firms should disclose policies on the terms and 
conditions relating to the appointment of Non-
Executive directors. 
An example is "The company shareholders are 
responsible for voting on the appointment of directors." 
"Non-executive directors must spend at least 50 days 
per annum to appropriately deal with their 
responsibilities, including attendance at Board and 
Committee meetings" (Arthur Anderi,on, 2001, p.37). 
Within Appendix 4A item 3, the ASX indicates that 
firms should disc lose policies on the terms and 
conditions relating to the retirement of Non-Executive 
directors. 
An example is .. the maximum retirement age or 
directors is 65 years ... The director is required to 
relinquish the directorship after 10 years" (Arthur 
Anderson, 2001, p.37). · 
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Table 4.2 ( continued) 
TYPE OF DISCLOSURE DESCRIPTION 
CATEGORY 4: Directors ability to seek independent advice (INDADV) 
5.1 Acknowledgment of directors 
ability to seek independent 
advice. 
S.2 Disclosure of procedures by 
which directors can seek 
independent professional advice 
at the company's expense in the 
furtherance of their duties. 
TGDASX=2 
TGD+ASX=2 
Within Appendix 4A item 4, the ASX outlines that 
companies should disclose directors' ability to seek 
independent advice. This item focuses only on the 
acknowledgment of ability to seek independent advice, 
rather than procedures by which directors can do this. 
It is now impossible for directors to be expert on all the 
matters about which they are likely to be accountable 
and if they are to feel safe they will frequently have to 
obtain specialist advice. (Bosch, (1996). 
An example is stating that the company directors can 
seek independent advice in pursuance of their duties as 
director. 
This item goes further than item 5.1 above and 
highlights disclosure of actual procedures followed by 
directors to seek independent advice in the furtherance 
of their duties. 
The Cadbury committee under section 1.5, indicates 
that there should be an agreed procedure for directors in 
the furtherance of their duties to take independent 
advice from professionals at the expense of the 
company, if necessary. Further to this, Bosch (1996) 
indicates that Australian companies should make clear 
when and how a director can seek independent advice. 
An example is stating that company directors can seek 
independent advice in the pursuance of their duties, 
with prior approval from the chainnan of the board. 
CATEGORY 5: Remuneration (REM) 
6.1 Acknowledgment that 
procedures exist for determining 
remuneration of executive and 
non-executive directors. 
Within Appendix 4A, item 5 highlights that a company 
should disclose procedures for detennining 
remuneration. This item is included to detennine if the 
company has acknowledged that they have procedures 
for detennining remuneration of executive and non-
executive directors. 
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Table 4.2 (continued) 
TYPE OF DISCLOSURE 
6.2 The main procedures for 
establishing and reviewing the 
compensation arrangements for 
the CEO and other senior 
executives. 
6.3 The main procedures for 
establishing and reviewing the 
compensation arrangements for 
the non-executive members of 
the board. 
6.4 Disclosure of the presence of a 
remuneration committee. 
6.5 Disclosure of the main 
responsibilities and core rights 
of the remuneration committee. 
6.6 Disclosure of the names and 
positions of committee 
members. 
DESCRIPTION 
Further to item 6.1 above, this item reflects disclosure 
of actual procedures and relates to item S(i) of 
Appendix 4A. This item is looking at the procedures 
for establishlng and reviewing the compensation 
arrangements for the CEO, and other senior executives. 
Therefore a company that scores I for item 6.2 will 
score 1 for item 6.1 indicating a greater extent of 
disclosure for the particular company. 
An example is "The nomination and remuneration 
committee determines the fees paid to non-executive 
directors and executive remuneration. Executive 
remuneration is determined as a part of an annual 
review, which includes performance evaluation, regard 
to comparative remuneration and independent advice" 
(Arthur Anderson, 2001, p.39). 
This item relates to Appendix 4A item 5(ii) and is 
similar item 6.2 above with the difference being that the 
focus is on procedures for remuneration of Non-
Executive directors, rather than the CEO or other senior 
executives. 
Again relating to item 5 of Appendix 4A has the 
company disclosed in the annual report, that it has a 
remuneration committee. 
Further to item 6.4 above, if a remuneration committee 
is present, are the responsibilities and core rights 
disclosed. An example is provided by the annual report 
of Acacia Resources 1996. The annual report discloses 
that "the duties of the committee are to ensure that a 
competitive and equitable remuneration policy is 
maintained which will attract and retain high calibre 
people... To review and recommend remuneration of 
the chairman, non-executive directors, the Managing 
Director, Executive Director Exploration and Mining 
and senior executives" (p.26). 
Are the names and positions of the remuneration 
committee members disclosed in the annual report. 
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Table 4.2 ( continued) 
TYPE OF DISCLOSURE 
6. 7 Are fees paid to members of the 
remuneration committee 
disclosed. 
6.8 Is chairperson of the 
remuneration committee a non-
executive director. 
6.9 Are the majority of the 
remuneration committee 
members non-executive 
directors. 
TGDASX-6 
TGD+ASX=9 
DESCRIPTION 
This item is in addition to disclosure requirements of 
Appendix 4A and highlights additional disclosure of 
amounts paid to remuneration committee members. 
An example is provided in the annual report of CSR Ltd 
1996 (p.46), where the company discloses additional 
yearly fees of A$5,000 are paid to members of each 
committee with A$7 ,500 paid to directors who chair a 
committee, and no additional fees are payable to 
members of the remuneration committee". 
This item is in addition to disclosure requirements of 
Appendix 4A. As described under item 2.2, having a 
non-executive director as chainnan of a committee is 
seen as good governance practice. The chairman should 
be independent from the day today activities of the 
company and provides an important control mechanism 
to ensure that the shareholders interests are better 
served. 
This item is in addition to disclosure requirements of 
Appendix 4A. Having a majority of non-executive 
directors on the remuneration corr"Uittee ensures the 
remuneration process is divorced from the normal 
operations. 
CATEGORY 6: External Auditors (AUD) 
7.1 Acknowledgment of existence of 
procedures for nominating 
external Auditors 
7.2 Disclosure of main procedures 
for nominating external 
Auditors. 
This item relates to item 6(i) of Appendix 4A and 
highlights if the company has acknowledged that 
procedures exists for nominating external auditors. 
Similar to item 7.1, but, this item goes further to 
acknowledge the disclosure of actual procedures for 
nominating external Auditors, rather than just 
acknowledging existence of procedures. For example, 
does the board make a decision on whom to appoint and 
what considerations do they take into account when 
nominating the external auditors. 
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Table 4.2 (continued) 
TYPE OF DISCLOSURE 
7.3 Reviewing the adequacy of 
existing external Audit 
arrangements with particular 
emphasis on the scope and 
quality of the Audit. 
7.4 Disclosure of an Audit 
committee. 
7.5 Disclosure of main 
responsibilities and core rights 
of the Audit committee. 
7.6 Disclosure of the names and 
positions of audit committee 
members. 
7,7 Are Fees paid to members of the 
Audit Committee disclosed? 
DESCRIPTION 
This item relates to Appendix 4A 6(ii) and 
acknowledges that the company reviews the adequacy 
of existing external Audit arrangements. 
Has the company disclosed existence of an audit 
committee? 
This item again is a requirement of Appendix 4A, item 
6 and requires the main responsibilities of the audit 
committee to be disclosed? 
The purpose of this item is not to score on all the audit 
committee responsibilities, but rather to see if some of 
these have been disclosed. 
An example is provided by Acacia resources, (1996 
p.25) where the company discloses that the audit 
committee's duties include the review of external audit 
plans and activity, overseeing of external financial 
reporting, monitoring of corporate risk and the 
assessment of internal controls. 
In Australian, the presence of an audit committee must 
be disclosed in the annual report, and if the company 
doesn't have an audit committee, reasons as to why. 
This is enforced by Listing Rule 4.10.2 that applied 
from 30 June 1993. 
Also included within item 6 of Appendix 4A, are the 
names and positions of audit committee members 
disclosed? 
This item is in addition to the requirements of Appendix 
4A and highlights those companies that disclose 
separate fees paid to members of the audit committee. 
An example is provided by CSR Ltd, (1996, p.46) 
where they disclose that additional yearly fees of 
A$5000 are paid to members of each committee with 
A$7500 paid to directors who chair a committee. 
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Table 4.2 (continued) 
TYPE OF DISCLOSURE 
7.8 Is the chairpel'son of the Audit 
committee a non-executive 
director?. 
7.9 Are the majority of the Audit 
committee members non-
executive directors 
TGDASX=6 
TGD+ASX:,9 
DESCRIPTION 
This item is in addition to the requirements of Appendix 
4A. As with item 2.2 above, having a non-executive 
director as chairman of a committee are seen as good 
governance practice. The chairman should be 
independent from the day today activities of the 
company and provides an important control mechanism 
to ensure that the shareholders interests are better 
served. 
This item is in addition to the requirements of Appendix 
4A. Having a majority of non-executive directors on 
the audit committee assists in ensuring that the Audit 
process is divorced from the normal operations. 
CATEGORY 7: Business Risk (RSK) 
8.1 Acknowledgment that risk exists 
8.2 Boards approach to identifying 
areas of significant business 
risk. 
8.3 Arrangements in place to 
manage those risks. 
Within Appendix 4A, item 7, the ASX highlights that 
companies should disclose items of risk. This item 
highlights that the company has acknowledged in their 
annual report that risk exists. This may be in the form 
of a single statement such as ~ the board has procedures 
in place to manage risks, but does not require specific 
disclosure. 
Item 7 in Appendix 4A, the ASX identifies the 
importance of the disclosure of the boards approach to 
identifying areas of significant business risk. 
An example " The company has in place the following 
specific arrangements to identify risk areas; business 
risk analysis of all major activities of the group, updated 
on a periodic basis" (Arthur Anderson, 2001, p.40). 
This item is addressed under item 7 of Appendix 4A 
and requires arrangements the company has in place to 
manage risks to be disclosed. An example is that 
approval is required by the Board of directors for the 
annual budget, and that the firm has a regulatory 
compliance program, and that the finn has a 
comprehensive annual insurance program, which is 
reviewed by the audit committee, (Arthur Anderson, 
2001, p.40). 
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Table 4.2 (continued) 
TYPE OF DISCLOSURE 
8.4 Acknowledgment of specific 
areas of risk. 
8.5 Separate risk management 
committee - other than audit 
committee, including 
committees for specific areas of 
risk includes environmental 
committee, occupational health 
and safety, financial risks. 
8,6 Disclosure of the main 
responsibilities and core rights 
of the committee. 
8.7 Disclosure of names and 
positions of separate risk 
committees. 
8.8 Fees paid to risk committee 
members 
8.9 Is the chairperson of the risk 
committee a non-executive 
director? 
8.10 Are the majority of the risk 
committee members non-
executive directors 
TGDASX=3 
TGD+ASX= 10 
DESCRIPTION 
This item of disclosure is in addition to Appendix 4A 
and item 8.2 in that the firm goes further than to just 
acknowledge risk, but it also gives more detail on the 
types of risks the company tries to manage. For 
example, has the company disclosed environmental 
risks, other risks include financial risks, currency risks 
and the like. 
This item is in addition to the disclosure requirements 
of Appendix 4A and is used to determine if the firm has 
a separate committee specifically to manage risks. This 
included evidence of an environmental committee. The 
annual report of Central Norseman Gold Corporation 
provides an example in 1996, where the Board receives 
regular reports from the Risk Management Committee 
(p.11). 
This item is in addition to the requirements of Appendix 
4A and refers to the main responsibilities of the 
committee being disclosed. 
This item is in addition to the requirements of Appendix 
4A. If the company bas a risk committee have they 
disclosed the names and positions of its members. 
This item is in addition to the requirements of Appendix 
4A. Has the company disclosed any fees paid to the 
separate risk committee members. 
As with item 2.2, having a non-executive director as 
chainnan of a committee is seen as good governance 
practice. The chairman should be independent from the 
day today activities of the company and provides an 
important control mechanism to ensure that the 
shareholders interests are better served. 
Having a majority of non-executive directors on the risk 
committee ensures the risk management process is 
divorced from the normal operations. 
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Table 4.2 (continued) 
TYPE OF DISCLOSURE DESCRIPTION 
CATEGORY 8: Ethical Standards (ETHIC) 
9.1 Acknowledgment of existence of 
ethical standards. 
9,2 Disclosure of policies on the 
establishment of ethical 
standards. 
9.3 Finns Approach to the buying 
and selling of shares by 
directors and other employees 
9,4 Separate code of conduct 
committee-other than audit 
committee 
9,5 Disclosure of the main 
responsibilities and core rights 
of the committee. 
9,6 Disclosure of the names of 
members of the separate code of 
conduct committee 
9.7 Disclosure of any Fees paid to 
the code of conduct committee 
members 
This item examines the acknowledgment or the 
company having ethical standards and relates to item 8 
of Appendix 4A. 
Again under Appendix 4A, item 8, the ASX requires 
the company to disclose policies on ethical standards. 
This item is in addition to Appendix 4A and looks 
specifically at the company acknowledging policy on 
the directors and employees ability to buy and sell 
shares of the company. An example is where a 
company discloses that Directors and senior executives 
are not pennitted to engage in short tenn trading shares 
and the buying and selling of shares may only occur 
within a period of 30 days following the announcement 
of the company's annual or half yearly results of the 
holding of the annual general meeting. 
This item is in addition to Appendix 4A item 8 and 
identifies if the company has a separate code of conduct 
committee. An example is provided by MIM Holdings 
Ltd (1996, p.39) where the company highlights the 
appropriateness of policies and systems is monitored on 
an ongoing basis by the Board Compliance Committee. 
Following on from item 9.4, has the company disclosed 
the main responsibilities of the code of conduct 
committee. 
If the firm has a code of conduct committee has the 
company disclosed the names of the members of this 
committee? 
If the firm has a code of conduct committee, has the 
firm further detailed any fees paid to the committee 
members? 
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Table 4.2 (continued) 
TYPE OF DISCLOSURE 
9.8 Is the chairperson of the risk 
committee a non-ex,:cutive 
director? 
9.9 Are the majority of the risk 
committre members non-
executive directors 
TGDASX=3 
TGD+ASX= 10 
OVERALL TGDASX = 30 
OVERALL TGD+ASX = 55 
DESCRIPTION 
As with item 2.2, having a non-executive director as 
chainnan of a committee is seen as good governance 
practice. The chairman should be independent from the 
day today activities of the company and provides an 
important control mechanism to ensure that the 
shareholders interests are better served. 
Having a majority of non-executive directors on the risk 
committee ensures the process is divorced from the 
normal operations. 
Measurement of independent variables 
This section describes the measurement methods employed for each of the 
independent variables. Table 4.3 summarises the independent variables definitions. 
The relevant values for each variable were extracted from each of the annual reports 
for the years 1995, 1996 and 1997. 
Proportion of non-executive directors (NEXDR) 
To measure the proportion of non-executive directors the number of non-executive 
directors will be divided by the total number of directors. This variable is useC to 
test Hypothesis I. 
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Gearing (GEAR) 
The current study measures gearing as total debt divided by total assets. This 
variable is used to test Hypothesis 2. This measure is consistent with Evans and 
Christopher (1999) and Dolley and Monroe (2000). 
Ownership diffusion (OWND) 
Companies are required to disclose the top twenty largest shareholders in their 
company in the annual report. This variable is measured as the percentage of shares 
held by shareholders other than the top twenty shareholders. This variable is used to 
test Hypothesis 3. This measurement is consistent with Evans and Christopher 
(1999). 
Auditor-Big 6 (AUD6) 
Each annual report will be examined to determine the firm's external auditor. This 
variable is used to test Hypothesis 4. If the company uses one of the Big 6 auditors, 
they will receive a score of 1, otherwise 0. 
The Big 6 auditors are Price Waterhouse (PW), Arthur Anderson (AA), Coopers and 
Lybrand (CL), Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (DTT), Ernst and Young (EY), and 
KPMG (KP). 
Firm size(SZTA) 
There are various measurement techniques employed to measure firm size. Measures 
include the use of market capitalisation and total assets and total sales. Hagerman 
and Zmijewski (1979) have argued that no measure of size is necessarily superior to 
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another. The present study will use the log of total assets. Hypothesis 6 will be tested 
using this variable. 
Table 4.3 
Variable definitions 
Variable Measurement 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Governance related disclosures 
MODEL I 
Governance disclosures suggested by ASX listing rule 
I) Total disclosure (TGDASx) 
MODEL2 
Aggregate of dichotomous index. scores for 30 
governance related disclosure items. 
1 = Presence of disclosure item 
0 = Non-disclosure 
Governance disclosures suggested by ASX listing rule and additional items or disclosure. 
II) Total disclosure (TGD+ASx) 
Variable 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
I. Proportion of Non- (NEXDR) 
Executive Directors 
2. Gearing (GEAR) 
3. Ownership Diffusion (OWND) 
4. Auditor (AUD6) 
S. Size (SZT A) 
Aggregate of dichotomous inde,; scores for 55 
governance related disclosure items. 
1 = Presence of disclosure item 
0 = Non-disclosure 
Expected Measurement 
SI D 
Type of 
Data 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
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Total# Non-Exec Directors/ 
Total# Directors 
Interval 
Total Debt/Total Assets Interval 
% of shares held by shareholders Interval 
other than the top twenty 
shareholders 
Aud:tor Big 6 = I, Categorical 
Non Big 6=0 
(Big 6 = Price Waterhouse (PW) 
Arhtur Anderson (AA), 
Coopers and Lybrand (CL) 
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (DTT) 
Ernst and Young (EY) 
KPMG (KP). 
LoglO (Total Assets) Interval 
Research Design 
The purpose of the current study is to analyse the extent and types of governance 
related disclosures made by mining and industrial companies over the years 1995, 
1996 and 1997. Following this an examination is made of various corporate 
characteristics and if these characteristics influence governance related disclosures. 
Data analysis comprises a number steps. To begin, the dependent variable 
governance related disclosures are examined for the different types of disclosure over 
the three year period for mining and industrial companies. A distinction is made 
between governance related disclosures suggested by the listing rule, and additional 
items of actual disclosure. Following this Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) multiple 
regression is employed to detennine if a relationship exists between governance 
related disclosures and sr1 - ~ted corporate characteristics acting as proxies for 
political visibility for each year separately. Time series analysis is not employed as 
the present study is examines governance disclosure pre and post the introduction of 
ASX listing rule 4.10.3. 
Multiple Regression 
Where a dependent variable is explained by more than one independent variable, it is 
inefficient to run univariate tests (Porkorny, 1991). Consequently multiple 
regression is utilised in this study as governance related disclosures are explained by 
a number of variables. Further to this, multiple regression provides an objective 
means of assessing the predictive power of the explanatory variables (Hair, 
Anderson, Tatham and Black, 1995). One of the problems that can emerge with 
multiple regression is that of multicollinearity. Multicollinearity is a potential 
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problem in multiple regression applications arising when some or all independent 
variables are highly correlated. Chapter 6 provides a more detailed description of 
multicollinearity and the tests undertaken to ensure that multicollinearity does not 
pose a problem with regression analysis. 
The foliowing two multiple regression models are constructed to determine· if a 
relationship exists with total governance disclosures and selected corporate 
characteristics for mining and industrial companies. The first model examines the 
relationship of governance disclosures suggested by the ASX to the selected 
corporate characteristics. Governance disclosures are the 30 items detailed in Table 
4.3. The second model comprises the 30 items suggested by the ASX, plus the 
additional 25 items of actual governance disclosure resulting in 55 items of 
governance disclosure. 
Both models are applied to the three years of the study and for the two industry 
groups, therefore a total of 12 regressions ar~ executed. As the hypotheses are 
directional, the tests are all one~tailed. 
The two regression models are expressed as follows: 
MODEL l 
TGDcAsXJ = ex + P1 (NEXDR) + p, (GEAR) + p,(OWND) + p, (AUD6) + 
Po(SZTA) +e 
MODEL2 
TGDc+ASXJ = ex + P1 (NEXDR) + p, (GEAR) + Pi(OWND) + p, (AUD6) + 
Po(SZTA) + e 
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Where 
TGD(ASX) 
TGD(+ASX) 
NEXDR 
GEAR 
OWND 
AUD6 
SZTA 
~n 
e 
Summary 
is the dependent variable analysing the total or sum of the 
categories of governance related disclosures as suggested by the 
ASX Listing Rule 4.10.3. A total of 30 items are included and 
measured by an unweighted dichotomous index. 
is the dependent variable analysing the total or sum of the 
categories of governance related disclosures as suggested by the 
ASX Listing Rule 4.10.3 plus additional items of actual 
disclosure. A total of 55 items are included and measured by an 
unweighted dichotomous index. 
is a constant value. 
proportion of non-executive directors as measured by the total 
number of non-executive directors divided by the total number of 
directors. 
gearing as measured by total debt divided by total assets. 
ownership diffusion as measured by the percentage of shares held 
by the shareholders other than the top twenty shareholders. 
Big 6 external auditor, auditors classified as external receive a 
score of one, otherwise zero. Big 6 external auditors are PW, AA, 
CL, DTT, EY and KP. 
size as measured by the Jog of total assets. 
represents the coefficient of the explanatory variables. 
is the residual or prediction error. 
This chapter has described the method of sample selection, the ,F' ... urces of data, 
defined the dependent and independent variables and identified the statistical 
methods to be employed. The following chapter provides an analysis of governance 
disclosures made in 1995, 1996 and I 997. 
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CHAPTERS 
ANALYSIS OF GOVERNANCE DISCLOSURES 
t 
Introduction 
The research methodology was outlined in the previous chapter. This chapter 
presents the results of governance disclosures made in annual reports for 1995 to 
1997 by mining and industrial companies. A discussion on the presence ofa separate 
governance statement in firms' annual reports is followed by a detailed analysis of 
each of the categories of governance disclosures. Mining company results are 
examined first, followed by industrial companies. A discussion of the two industry 
groups is then provided. 
Corporate Governance Statement 
Prior studies have highlighted that keeping governance related infonnation in a 
central location is preferable to enable shareholders and other annual report users 
ease of access to the relevant infonnricion. <.For example, within the guidelines 
·. 
provided by the AIMA (1995), reference is mide that companies should disclose 
relevant corporate governance practices prominently and clearly in a separate 
section. 
Results of companies disclosing a separate section in their annual report on 
corporate governance matters, such as a "Corporate Governance Statement" are 
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presented in Table 5.1. In 1995, the year prior to the introduction of the listing 
rule, 34 mining and 34 industrial companies disclosed a separate governance 
statement in their annual report. The impact of the introduction of the listing rule 
4.10.3 in 1996 is evident with the increase in the disclosure of a separate 
governance statement to 91 for mining companies and 98 for industrial companies. 
The presence of corporate governance statements remained consistent in 1997 
with 93 mining and 98 industrial companies having a separate section. On average 
the presence of a separate governance statement increased 181 % from 1995 to 
1997 for both industry groups. 
Table 5.1 
Companies disclosing a separate Statement of Corporate Governance 
Industry Sample 1995 1996 1997 % increase 
1995 to 1997 
Mining 100 34 91 93 173% 
Industrial JOO 34 98 98 188% 
TOTAL 200 68 189 191 181% 
The results are consistent with the findings of Evans and Christopher (2001) who 
found 32.8% of mining companies in 1995 and 95.1 % in I 997 disclosed a separate 
governance statement. Results are also consistent with Ramsay and Hoad (1997) 
who examined annual reports after the introduction of the listing rule and found 
100% of large companies, 98% of medium and 97% of small companies disclosed 
a separate governance statement30• 
30 Companies were classified as small medium and large by market capitalisation. 
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Governance disclosures by mining companies 
The following section presents the results of the survey of governance disclosures 
made by mining companies in 1995 to 1997. Table 5.2 summarises overall 
governance disclosures by category. Each category of disclosure has increased 
over the period of the study. Total governance disclosures have increased 
significantly from 1995 to 1997. The mean number of governance disclosures 
suggested by the ASX has increased from 9.82 in 1995, to 16.27 in 1996 and 
17.54 in 1997. Additional items of disclosure have also increased, being 14.26 in 
1995, 22.66 in 1996 and 24.31 in 1997. As shown in Table 5.2 the most 
prominent disclosures are in relation to audit and remuneration information. The 
frequency of disclosures are discussed next, followed by the results of each 
category of governance information. 
Table 5.2 
Summary of mining company governance disclosures by category for 1995 to 
1997 
ITEM OF DISCLOSURE 1995 1996 1997 1995 1996 1997 
(na/00) 
·------- ea----·- ·----- ···------ -----!------·-ASX* ASX* ASX* +ASX** +ASX** +ASX** 
Directors (EXEC) 168 177 176 168 
~!-~ _i..,_!7£_ ___ 
-------- --·--·--- -------Board Membership (BMEM) 80 223 261 147 375 410 i---:::: ·---· ---·-- ·-·-·--- ·--···--· ~--·- -----· Appointment and Retirement 40 101 117 40 101 117 
(APRET) 
----- ------ ·--·-··-- ---·--·-
l-----
Independent Advice (INDADV) 47 145 142 47 145 142 
------ --·-··-- -·---Remuneration (REM) 192 
~-1~!... 354 .-17J_ ~±34_ 462 
----·· ·----- ------Auditors (AUD) 219 324 341 350 
.1.- 480 --- 503 
---·- ·----- ---·-··-- ·-----· Risk (RSK) 155 207 234 309 385 437 
Ethical Standards (ETHIC) ·----· --·-- ·----1------ ---------81 126 129 94 169 184 
TOTAL GOVERNANCE 
DISCLOSURES 982 1627 1754 1426 2266 2431 
Mean 9.82 16.27 17.54 14.26 22.66 24.31 
Median 8.00 17.00 19.00 12.00 24.00 25.00 
Standard deviation 6.37 5.82 5.58 9.66 8.71 8.73 
Minimum 0 2 3 0 3 4 
Maximum 24 26 29 35 39 43 
"' ASX represents the governance disclosures suggested by the Auslralian Stock Exchange 
*"' + ASX represe/1/s the governance disclosures suggested by the Australian Stock exchange plus 
additional items of octual disclosure. 
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Frequency of governance disclosures by mining companies 
Table 5.3 details the frequency of governance disclosures suggested by the ASX 
for mining companies for the years 1995 to 1997. The maximum number of 
disclosures per company is 30 items of disclosure. In --l-995 the most number of 
disclosures as suggested by the ASX was 24 items out of the total 30 items, and 
was disclosed by 2 companies. This increased to 26 items in 1996, disclosed by 5 
companies and 29 items in 1997, disclosed by one company. The least number of 
disclosures in 1995 by one company was no disclosures. In 1996 and the least 
number of disclosures was 2 items by one company and in 1997, 3 items by one 
company. 
Table 5.4 shows the frequency of governance disclosures for the additional items 
of actual governance disclosures for mining companies in 1995 to 1997. In 1995, 
the most number of additional items of actual disclosure items was 16, out of a 
maximum 25, and was disclosed by one company. The most number of disclosures 
by 2 companies in 1996 was 15 items. In 1997 the most number of disclosures by 
one company was 18 items. 
The most number of disclosures overall out of the total 55 items in 1995 was 35 
items, disclosed by 2 companies. In 1996, the most number of disclosures was 39 
and was disclosed by one company. In 1997 the most number of disclosures by 
one company was 43. (These results are not shown in the accompanying tables). 
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Table 5.3 
Frequency of governance disclosure items suggested by the ASX for mining 
companies in 1995 to 1997 
ASX Disclosure Items 
Disclosure Frequency Cumulative Percent 
Score n=lOO 
1995 1996 1997 1995 1996 1997 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
1 4 0 0 5 0 0 
2 5 1 0 10 1 0 
3 7 1 1 17 2 1 
4 4 1 0 21 3 1 
5 8 1 1 29 4 2 
6 10 3 2 39 7 4 
7 7 3 2 46 10 6 
8 5 0 2 51 10 8 
9 6 3 1 57 13 9 
10 6 9 4 63 22 13 
11 4 3 6 67 25 19 
12 2 1 1 69 26 20 
13 3 3 3 72 29 23 
14 0 6 5 72 35 28 
15 6 5 2 78 40 30 
16 3 3 4 81 43 34 
17 1 9 10 82 52 44 
18 4 6 3 86 58 47 
19 5 12 12 91 70 59 
20 1 8 12 92 78 71 
21 2 2 8 94 80 79 
22 3 7 5 97 87 84 
23 1 2 4 98 89 88 
24 2 5 3 100 94 91 
25 0 1 2 100 95 93 
26 0 5 2 100 100 95 
27 0 0 3 100 100 98 
28 0 0 1 100 100 99 
29 0 0 1 100 100 100 
30 0 0 0 100 100 100 
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Table 5.4 
Frequency of ASX nod additional items of governance disclosure for mining 
companies in U.95 to 1997 
Additional items of Actual Disclosure 
Dis· Jsure Frequency Cumulative Percent 
Score n= 100 
1995 1996 1997 1995 1996 1997 
0 14 0 0 14 0 0 
I 14 7 6 28 7 6 
2 10 13 12 38 20 18 
3 10 3 4 48 23 22 
4 8 13 II 56 36 33 
5 13 3 6 69 39 39 
6 10 17 16 79 56 55 
7 3 14 10 82 70 65 
8 3 6 6 85 76 71 
9 I 2 5 86 78 76 
10 2 3 4 88 81 80 
11 4 7 5 92 88 85 
12 3 4 3 95 92 88 
13 3 5 4 98 97 92 
14 I 1 4 99 98 96 
15 0 2 3 99 100 99 
16 I 0 0 100 100 99 
17 0 0 0 100 100 99 
18 0 0 I 100 100 100 
19 0 0 0 100 100 100 
20 0 0 0 100 100 100 
21 0 0 0 100 100 100 
22 0 0 0 100 100 100 
23 0 0 0 100 100 100 
24 0 0 0 100 100 100 
25 0 0 0 100 100 100 
Disclosure of directors (EXEC) 
As shown in Table 5.5, EXEC category comprises 2 items of governance 
disclosure suggested by the listing rule. These include disclosures relating to the 
break-up of individual directors into executive and non-executive directors and 
whether the chairman of the board is a non-executive director. 
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Disclosure of the break-up of directors (Item 2.1) has remained quite high over the 
periods examined, where 94 companies disclosed this item in 1995, 99 companies in 
both 1996 and 1997. Non-executive chairpersons were present in 74 companies in 
1995, this increased to 78 companies in 1996 and declined to 77 companies in 1997. 
Of the 100 mining companies a total of84% made EXEC related disclosures in 1995 
compared to 88% in 1997. Item 2.1 was ranked first overall out of the 55 disclosure 
items in 1995 and 1996, and ranked 2'' in 1997. Item 2.2 was ranked 6"' in 1995, 9"' 
in 1996 and ll"'in 1997. 
Table 5.5 
-. 
Summary of EXEC information by mining companies in 1995 to 1997 
YEAR Overall Ranking 
n=JOO 
NO. ITEM OF DISCLOSURE 1995 1996 1997 1995 1996 1997 
2.1 Break-up of individual directors into 94 99 99 2 
executive and non-executive 
2.2 Chairman is a non-executive 74 78 77 6 9 11 
director 
TOTAL EXEC 168 177 176 
% of companies disclosing this category 84% 89% 88% 
Membership on Board of Directors (BMEM) 
v 
Table 5.6 summarises results of the 12 items that co~bine to form the BMEM 
category. Item 3.1 to item 3.7 relate are items suggested by the ASX and item 3.8 to 
item 3.12 (highlighted by shading in the table) are additional items of actual 
disclosure. 
In 1995, 31 companies acknowledged the existence of criteria for board membership 
(item 3.1) with only 7 of these companies providing some additional detail on what 
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their procedures were for devising criteria for board membership (item 3.2). 
Disclosures increased in 1996 with 82 companies acknowledging criteria for board 
membership and 62 of these provided some additional detail on what these 
procedures were. In 1997 disclosures increased marginally again with 87 companies 
disclosing item 3.1 and 62 of these companies provided additional detail on what 
these procedures were (item 3.2). 
Nomination committees were present in 14 companies in 1995 with 2 of these 
companies providing some additional detail on nomination procedures and IO 
companies provided details on the responsibilities of nomination committee 
members. In 1996 nomination committees were present in 22 companies with 18 of 
these companies providing detail on the procedures for nominating directors and 
responsibilities of nomination committee members. In 1997 nomination c0mmittees 
were present in 21 companies with 19 companies providing additional detail on 
procedures for nominating directors and 17 companies disclosed responsibilities of 
nomination committee members. 
The additional items of actual disclosure relate to the chairperson and the majority of 
the nomination committee members being non-executive directors, responsibilities of 
the board of directors, and acknowledging and providing procedures for a review of 
the board and directors performance. 36 companies disclosed responsibilities of the 
board of directors in 1995, increasing to 94 companies in 1996 and reducing to 86 
companies in 1997. Few companies acknowledged a review of the board/directors 
perfonnance, only 8 companies in 1995, 18 in 1996 and 20 companies in 1997. This 
highlights that in 1997, 80% of mining companies did not disclose that a review of 
the boards' perfonnance is undertaken. 
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Table 5.6 
Summary of BMEM information by mining companies in 1995 to 1997 
YEAR Overall Ranking 
n=/00 
NO. ITEM OF DISCLOSURE 1995 1996 1997 1995 1996 1997 
No. No. No. No. No. No. 
BOARD MEi\lBERSIIIP(BMI:i\1) · , ·, ,, , 
3.1 Acknowledgment of existence of JI 82 87 16 8 5 
criteria for board membership 
3.2 Main procedures in place for 7 42 62 28 20 13 
devising criteria for board 
membership. 
3.3 Procedures for reviewing the J 19 35 29 29 21 
membership of the board. 
3.4 Procedures for nominating directors. 2 18 19 JO JO 28 
3.5 Presence of a nomination 14 22 21 23 27 26 
committee 
3.6 Names arid positions of nomination 13 22 20 24 27 27 
committee members 
3.7 Responsibilities of nomination JO 18 17 26 30 29 
committee members 
TOTAL ASX 80 223 261 
% companies disclosing ASX ll% 32% 37% 
requiremenls 
Additional actual items 
3.8 Non-executive chairperson of JO 18 20 26 30 27 
Nomination Committee 
3.9 Majority of the nomination 13 20 22 24 28 25 
committee members non-executive 
directors 
3.10 Responsibilities of the board of 36 94 86 15 3 6 
directors 
3.11 Acknowledgment of formal review 8 18 20 27 30 27 
of boards/directors perfonnance 
3.12 Procedures for reviewing 0 2 32 36 36 
nerfonnance 
TOTAL ACTUAL 67 152 149 
% of companies dl~closing 13% 30% 30% 
additional information 
TOTALBMEM 147 375 410 
% of companies dl,;c/osing this 12% 31% 34% 
catel!o= 
The highest rankf'd item for category BMEM in 1995 (ranked l 51h) and 1996 (ranked 
3rd) was item 3.10 that examines disclosures in relation to the responsibilities of the 
board of directors. The highest ranked item for 1997 was item 3.1 (ranked 5th) which 
highlights that the company has acknowledged the existence of criteria for board 
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- :se==' .. , ;-------------------------
membership. An examination of all the categories of disclosure shows that BMEM 
disclosures are ranked the lowest. 
Appointment and retirement of directors (APRET) 
APRET outlines govem,,nce disclosures in relation to the policies on the terms and 
conditions of the appointment and retirement of non-executive directors. The ASX 
suggests 2 items related to APRET and these are summarised in Table 5. 7. 
Overall, 20% of companies disclosed information on the appointment and retirement 
of directors in 1995. This increaseU to 51 % in 1996 and 59% in 1997. In 1997 a 
total of 62 companies disclosed information on the appointment of directors and 55 
companies provided disclosures on the retirement of directors. 
Individually items 4.1 and 4.2 were both ranked 19th in 1995 and progressively 
increased to be ranked 17th and 18th in 1996 and 13th and 16th in 1997 respectively. 
Table 5.7 
Summary of APRET information by mining companies in 1995 to 1997 
NO. ITEM OF DISCLOSURE 
YEAR Overall Ranking 
n=/00 
1995 1996 1997 1995 1996 1997 
No. No. No. No. No. No . 
.\PPOJN:rMtNTmf.TIRF.1\JEN'f (APRlff) . \. , 
4.1 Policies on the terms and conditions 20 52 62 19 17 13 
relating to the appointment of non-
executive directors. 
4.2 Policies on the terms and conditions 20 49 55 19 18 16 
relating to the retirement of non-
executive directors. 
TOTALAPRET 40 IOI 117 
% of companies disclosing this 20% 51% 59% 
cate o 
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Directors ability to seek independent advice (INDADV) 
Prior research has highlighted the importance of non-executive directors being able 
to seek independent advice at the expense of the company (Ramsay and Hoad, 1997). 
Tab:ie 5.8 summarises the number of companies disclosing INDADV information. 
The current study has found that overall disclosure has increased from 24% in 1995 
to 73% in 1996 and decreased to 71 % in 1997. In 1995, 29 companies acknowledged 
the ability to seek independent advice with 18 ?fthese providing some procedures by 
which this advice could be sought. In 1996 this increased to 84 companies that 
acknowledged directors ability to seek independent advice and 61 of these companies 
provided some of the procedures for seeking this advice. In 19971 85 companies 
acknowledged the ability to seek independent advice and 57 companies provided 
disclosures on procedures. Acknowledgment of directors having the ability to seek 
independent advice has increased its ranking from Ii11 in 1995 to 7ili in 1996 and 
1997. 
Table 5.8 
Summary of IND ADV information by mining companies in 1995 to 1997 
YEAR Overall Ranking 
n=JOO 
NO. ITEM OF DISCLOSURE 1995 1996 1997 1995 1996 1997 
No. No • ~o. No. No. No. 
. INDEPENDENT AD\'ICE (IND.:\O\') · ' .. 
5.1 Acknowledgment of ability to seek 29 84 85 17 7 7 
independent advice 
5.2 Procedures by which directors can 18 61 57 21 13 15 
seek independent professional 
advice at the company's expense in 
the furtherance of their duties. 
TOTAL INDADV 47 145 142 
% of companies diiclosing this 24% 73% 71% 
cate o 
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Remuneration (REM) 
REM combines 9 items of remuneration related governance disclosures. Items 6.1 to 
6.6 are items suggested by the ASX. These items focus on the presence of procedures 
for determining the remuneration of board members, along with having a 
remuneration committee and the committees' purpose. Items 6. 7 to 6.9 (highlighted 
by shading in Table 5.9) are additional items of actual disclosure. Additional items 
that could be disclosed relate to fees paid to members of the remuneration 
committee, and if the committee members and chairperson are non-executive. 
Results are summarised in Table 5.9. 
In 1995 32% of companies made REM disclosures suggested by the ASX. This 
increased to 54% in 1996 and 59% of companies in 1997. 26% of companies in 
1995, 37% in 1996 and 36% in 1997 made additional items of disclosure. 
In 1995, 55 companies acknowledged that procedures existed for determining the 
remuneration of directors. Of these, 15 companies outlined what these remuneration 
procedures were for executives and 12 companies outlined procedures for non-
executives. In 1996, 85 companies acknowledged procedures for determining 
remuneration. This increased marginally in 1997, where 87 companies acknowledged 
that procedures for determining remuneration existed. 
Remuneration committees were present in 49 companies in 1995, and 20 of these 
disclosed the some information on the main procedures of this committee. In 1996 
remuneration committees increased to 63 with 4P, of these companies disclosing the 
main responsibilities of the committee. In 1997, the number of remuneration 
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committees decreased to 61 companies, however 54 companies provided more detail 
on the responsibilities of their committee. 
Table 5.9 
Summary of REM information by mining companies in 1995 to 1997 
NO. ITEM OF DISCLOSURE 
YEAR 
n=JOO 
1995 1996 1997 
No. No. No. 
Overall Ranking 
1995 
No. 
1996 
No. 
1997 
No. 
" RF:I\IIINERATION.(REi\l) . • , . 
6.1 Acknowledgment that procedures 
exist for determining remuneration 
of executive and non-executive 
directors 
6.2 The main procedures for 
establishing and reviewing the 
compensation arrangements for the 
CEO and other senior executives. 
(Includes receipt of external advice) 
6.3 The main procedures for 
establishing and reviewing the 
compensation arrangements for the 
non-executive members of the 
board. 
6.4 Presence of a remuneration 
committee 
6.5 Main responsibilities and core rights 
of the committee. 
6.6 Names and positions of committee 
members. 
TOTAL ASX 
% companies disclosing ASX 
reouirements 
Items in addition to ASX 
6.7 Fees paid to members of the 
Remuneration Committee 
6.8 Non-executive chairperson of the 
remuneration committee 
6.9 Majority of non-executive directors 
on the remuneration committee 
TOTAL ACTUAL 
% of companies disclosing 
additional information 
TOTAL REM 
% of companies disclosing this 
category 
55 
15 
12 
49 
20 
41 
192 
32% 
38 
40 
79 
26% 
271 
30% 
85 
85 87 9 6 5 
36 51 22 22 19 
33 44 25 23 20 
63 61 IO 12 14 
48 54 19 19 17 
59 57 11 15 15 
324 354 
54% 59% 
2 4 :11 36 33 
54 53 14 16 18 
54 51 12 16 19 
110 108 
37% 36% 
434 462 
48% 51% 
The highest ranked item for the REM in 1995 to 1997 is the acknowledgment that 
procedures exist for detennining the remuneration of executive and non-executive 
directors (Item 6.1). This item was ranked 9th in 1995, 6th in 1996 and 5th in 1997. 
The lowest ranked item was the disclosure of any fees paid to the remuneration 
committee members (Item 6.7) which was ranked 31st in 1995, 36th in 1996 and 3yd 
in 1997. Overall 30% of companies in 1995, 48% in 1996 and 51% in 1997 made 
REM disclosures. This highlights that in 1997 49% of companies were not making 
REM related governance disclosures. 
External auditors (AUD) 
AUD category includes 9 items of audit related governance information and is 
summarised in Table 5.10. Item 7.t' to Item 7.6 are the items suggested by the ASX. 
Items include procedures for nominating external auditors, audit committee 
information and the adequacy of external auditors. Item 7. 7 to 7.9 are the additional 
items of actual governance disclosure and are highlighted by shading in Table 5.10. 
The three additional items relate to fees paid to audit committee members and 
whether the chairperson and majority of members of the audit committee are non-
executive. 
The benefits of having an audit committee are well documented. As a result 
disclosure within this category is particularly high compared to other categories. 
Overall in 1995 39% of companies disclose AUD infonnation. This increased to 
53% in 1996 and 56% in 1997. 81 companies in 1995, 87 in 1996 aud 89 in 1997 
disclosed the presence of an audit committee. 39 companies in 1995, 77 in 1996 and 
82 in 1997 disclosed the main responsibilities and core rights of this audit committee. 
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The chairperson of the audit committee was a non-executive director for 65% of the 
companies in 1995 and 78% in 1997. Fees paid to audit committee members were 
not common, being disclosed by only one company in 1995, 4 companies in 1996 
and increased to 7 companies in 1997. 
Table 5.10 
Summary of AUD information by mining companies in 1995 to 1997 
YEAR 
n=/00 
NO. ITEM OF DISCLOSURE 1995 1996 1997 
No. No. 
••. Al'DIT (AlJD) . , ' • - • 
7.1 Acknowledgment of existence of JO 
procedures for nominating external 
auditors 
7.2 Main procedures for nominating 
external auditors. 
7.3 Reviewing the adequacy of existing 12 
external audit arrangements with 
particular emphasis on the scope 
and quality of the audit. 
7.4 Presence of an audit committee 81 
7,S Main responsibilities and core rights 39 
of the audit committee. 
7.6 Names and positions of audit 76 
committee members. 
TOTAL ASX 219 
31 
4 
40 
87 
77 
85 
324 
31 
55 
89 
82 
83 
341 
% companies disclosing ASX 
requirements 
.5'7% 54% 59% 
Items l:i addition to ASX 
7. 7 Fees paid to members of the audit 
committee 
7,8 Non-executive chairperson of the 
audit committee 
7,9 Majority of non-executive directors 
on the audit committee 
TOTAL ACTUAL 
% of companies disclosing 
additional in ormation 
TOTAL AUD 
% of companies disclosing this 
cate o 
it 
ii 
65 
65 
131 
44% 
350 
39% 
87 
4 7 
76 78 
76 77 
156 162 
52% 81% 
480 503 
53% 56% 
Overall Ranking 
1995 
26 
31 
25 
3 
13 
5 
31 
8 
8 
1996 
24 
34 
21 
5 
IO 
6 
34 
11 
II 
1997 
23 
36 
16 
4 
9 
8 
30 
10 
II 
A total of 10 companies in 1995 and 31 companies in 1996 and 1997 acknowledged 
that procedures existed for nominating external auditors. However only one of these 
companies in 1995 and 1997 and 4 in 1996 gave more detail on the main procedures 
for nominating external auditors. 
The highest ranked item within AUD category over all three years 1995 to 1997 is 
the disclosure of an audit committee (Item 7.4) which is ranked 3rd in 1995, 5th in 
1996 and 4th in 1997. The high disclosure in this category is evidence of the 
requirements of listing rule 4.10.2 that requires companies to disclose the presence of 
an audit committee and if they don't have one, reasons as to why. 
The lowest ranked items are procedures for nominating external auditors (Item 7.2) 
and fees paid to audit committee members (Item 7.7). Both items are equally ranked 
31 "in 1995 and 34<h in 1996, and 36th and 30" in 1997 respectively. 
Business risk (RSK) 
Items within RSK category focus on acknowledging and identifying various business 
risks and if the company has disclosed details of a separate risk management 
committee other than an audit committee. The 10 items that make up the RSK 
category of disclosures are summarised in Table 5.11. Items 8.1 to 8.3 are the items 
suggested by the ASX. Items 8.4 to 8.10 are seven additional items of actual 
disclosure that are highlighted by shading. Overall 52% of companies in 1995 
disclosed RSK related information suggested by the ASX, this increased to 69% in 
1996 and 78% in 1997. 22% of companies in 1995,25% in 1996 and29% in 1997 
made additional items of actual disclosure. 
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Table 5.Jl 
Summary of RSK information by mining companies in 1995 to 1997 
YEAR Overall Ranking 
n=JOO 
NO. ITEM OF DISCLOSURE 1995 1996 1997 1995 1996 
No. No. No. No. No. 
; H.ISK (R!,;Kt' ' .. , . . . ~ ',' ',,:,, ,, 
. ' 
8.1 Acknowledgment that risks at exists 91 98 JOO 2 2 
8.2 Boards approach to identifying 28 60 67 18 14 
areas of significant business risk. 
8.3 Arrangements in place to manage 36 49 67 15 18 
those risks. 
TOTAL ASX 155 207 234 
% companies disclosing ASX 52% 69% 78% 
reauirements 
Items in addition to ASX 
8.4 Acknowledgment of specific areas 78 84 83 4 7 
of risk 
8.5 Separate Risk management 19 25 32 20 26 
Corrunittee - Other than Audit 
committee, including committees 
for specific area's of risk includes 
environmental committee, hedging 
committee, occupational health and 
safety committee 
8.6 Main responsibilities and core rights 15 20 29 22 28 
of the risk committee. 
8.7 Names of members of the separate 14 16 22 23 32 
risk committees 
8.8 Fees paid to Risk Management 1 0 1 31 37 
Committee members 
8.9 Nonwexecutive chairperson of the 13 17 19 24 31 
risk committee 
8.10 Majority of nonwexecutive directors 14 16 17 23 32 
on the risk committee 
TOTAL ACTUAL 154 178 203 
% of companies disclosing 22% 25% 29% 
additional ieformation 
TOTALRSK 309 385 437 
% of companies disclosing this 31% 39% 44% 
cateiwru 
1997 
No. 
12 
12 
8 
22 
24 
25 
36 
28 
29 
A significant number of companies acknowledged that risk existed, 91 companies in 
1995, 98 companies in 1996 and 100 companies in 1997. Notably, 78 companies 
in 1995, 84 companies in 1996 and 83 companies in 1997 disclosed some specific 
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areas of risk. Mining companies have particular risks in relation to the environment 
and the majority of specific disclosures referred to this. 
Separate risk management committees (other than an audit committee) were present 
in 19 companies for 1995. This increased to 25 companies in 1996 and 32 
companies in 1997. The highest ranked item within the RSK category is Item 8.1, 
which examines acknowledgment that risk exists (ranked 2nd in 1995 and 1996 and 
I st in 1997). The lowest ranked item was item 8.8 that examines disclosure of fees 
paid to risk management committee members. This item was ranked 31 81 in 1995, 
37" in 1996 and 36" in 1997. 
Ethical standards (ETHIC) 
ETHIC disclosures are summarised in Table '5.12. These disclosures relate to 
providing evidence of ethical standards along with policies on the establishment of 
these standards, the firm's approach to buying and selling of shares and if the 
company had a separate code of conduct committee. ETHIC comprises 9 items, of 
which items 9.1 and 9.2 were suggested by the ASX and items 9.3 to 9.9 are 
additional items of actual disclosure highlighted by shading in the Table 5.12. 
41% of companies in 1995, 63% in 1996 and 65% in 1997 made ETHIC disclosures 
as suggested by the ASX. 2% of companies in 1995, 6% in 1996 and 8% in 1997 
made additional items of disclosure. Overall, 10% of companies made ETHIC related 
disclosures in 1995, 19% in 1996 and 20% in 1997. 
In 1995 a total of 73 companies acknowledged the existence of t;thical standards with 
8 of theses companies providing additional information on any particular policies on 
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the establishment of these ethical standards. This increased in 1996 to be 93 
companies acknowledging ethical standards and 35 companies provided some 
additional information on policies on the establishment of ethical standards. In 1997 
94 companies acknowledged ethical standards, and 35 of these provided more 
detailed infonnation on the policies on the establishment of ethical standards. 
Table 5.12 
Summary of ETHIC information by mining companies in 1995 to 1997 
YEAR Overall Ranldng 
n=/00 
NO. ITEM OF DISCLOSURE 1995 1996 1997 1995 199• 1997 
No. No. No. No. No. No. 
, r ETIIIOi(ETlll(~f,;'., · -• ' , · < I :' ·• : , , 1 ' 
9.1 Acknowledgment of existence of 73 93 94 7 4 3 
ethical standards 
9.2 Policies on the establishment of 8 33 35 27 23 21 
ethical standards 
TOTAL ASX 81 126 129 
% companies disclosing ASX 41% 63% 65% 
re uiremenls 
Items in addition to ASX 
9.3 Firms Approach to the buying and 7 26. ,JI 28 25 23 
selling of shares by directors and 
other employees (specific and 
acknowledgment - Insider dealing) 
9.4 Separate code of conduct 2 6 7 JO 33 30 
committ:ee-other than Audit 
committee 
· .. 
9.5 Main responsibilities and core rights 3 6· 31 35 JI 
of the code of conduct committee. 
9.6 Names of members of the separate 
.. 
3 5 31 35 32 
code of conduct committee 
9.7 Fees paid to code of conduct 0 0 32 37 36 
committee members 
9.8 Non-executive chairperson of the 3 3. 31 35 34 
code of conduct committee 
9.9 Majority of non-executive directors 1 "2 2 31 36 35 
on the code of conduct committee 
TOTAL ACTUAL 13 43 SS 
% of companies d.~'iclosing 2% 6% 8% 
additional in ormalion 
TOTAL ETHIC 94 169 184 
% of companie.'i dl'iclosing th1'.'i 10% 19% 20% 
cale o 
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7 companies in 1995, 26 companies m 1996 and 31 companies m 1997 made 
disclosures on the firms' approach to buying and selling shares. A separate code of 
conduct committee that was not an audit committee was present in only 2 companies 
in 1995 increasing to 6 companies in 1996, and 7 companies in 1997. 
The highest ranked item within the ETHIC category for the three years 1995 to 1997 
was item 9.1 that examines the acknowledgment of the existence of ethical standards. 
This item was ranked 7th in 1995, 4th in 1996 and 3rd in I 997. 
The lowest ranked item was item 9.7, which surveys the disclosure of fees paid to a 
separate code of conduct committee. This item had no disclosures in J 995 and 1996 
and only I company disclosed this item in 1997. OveraH this item was ranked 32nd 
in 1995, 37•in 1996and36• in 1997. 
Governance disclosures by industrial companies 
This section presents the survey results of governance disclosures made by 
industrial companies. Table 5.13 summarises overall governance disclosures by 
category. Consistent with disclosure practices of mining companies governance 
disclosures have more than doubled over the period 1995 to 1997. The mean 
number of disclosures suggested by the ASX has increased from 9.29 disclosures 
in 1995 to 16.62 disclosures in 1996 and 17.45 disclosures in 1997. Consistent 
with mining companies, the disclosure of audit information is most prominent. 
The following sections detail the frequency of disclosures by industrial companies, 
followed by the results of governance disclosures shown separately under each of 
the eight categories. 
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Table 5.13 
Summary of industrial company governance disclosure by category for 1995 to 
1997 
ITEM OF DISCLOSURE 1995 1996 19~7 1995 1996 1997 
(n=100) 
-·----- -·--·-----· ---·------· !---:------ -------r:j:AsX** ASX* ASX* ASX* +ASX** +ASX** 
Directors (EXEC) 
l-:6: --1-:::-
185 166 183 185 
-----·--·-· r------·- ------· ------
Board Membership 239 152 379 406 
(BMEM) 
--------···-· -----·-·-·· ---·--·--· -------·--
Appointment and 114 28 108 114 
Retirement (APRET) 
--------- -----·-· -------- ·--------
Independent Advice r·· 38 --T·· 142 --·· 148 38 142 148 
(INDADV) I ' 
----·-··-···--
.____ _____ 
------- ---·-·--·--
Remuneration (REM) r ···········c·· ·-····· 351 240 437 477 __ 174 ... L .. 328 ___ 
------···-·-
i-------=---'-.C. ____ 
---·-·-· -------
Auditors (AUD) I 240 I 343 356 392 521 539 
\ .. -.. ~~o -+---~~:-- -·-·-··-·--- -·------- ---------· ·---·---Risk (RSK) 224 267 367 386 -·--·-·-·--- ---------- -···--·--- -·-·----Ethical Standards (ETHIC) 128 76 164 174 
I I TOTAL GOVERNANCE I 929 
I 
1662 1745 1359 2301 2429 
DISCLOSURES ! 
' 
Mean 9.29 16.62 17.45 13.59 23.01 24.29 
Median 7.50 17.00 18.00 11.00 22.00 23.50 
Standard deviation I 5.70 5.13 5.07 8.68 7.87 7.92 
Minimum 
I 
1 5 5 1 6 6 
Maximum 25 
' 
29 29 37 41 42 
• ASX repre:1enls the governance disc/o,rnres sugge.~ted by the Australian Stock Exchange 
•• + ASX represents the governance disclosures suggested by !he Australian Stock exchange plus 
additional items of actual disclosure. 
Frequency of governance disclosures by industrial companies 
Table 5.14 details the frequency of governance disclosures as suggested by the 
ASX for industrial companies. The maximum number of disclosures is 30 items, 
no company disclosed all these items. The results show that the most number of 
disclosures by one company, as suggested by the ASX in 1995 is 25 items. In 
1996 and 1997 the most number of disclosures by one company is 29 items. In 
1995 the least amount of disclosures was by 3 companies who disclosed one item. 
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In 1996 and 1997, the least number of disclosures was 5 items, and was made by 2 
companies. 
Table 5.14 
Frequency of governance disclosure items suggested by the ASX for industrial 
companies foo 1995 to 1997 
ASX Disclosure items 
Disclosure Frequency Cumulative Percent 
Score n= 100 
1995 1996 1997 1995 1996 1997 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
I 3 0 0 3 0 0 
2 2 0 0 5 0 0 
3 5 0 0 10 0 0 
4 11 0 0 21 0 0 
5 15 2 2 36 2 2 
6 8 0 0 44 0 2 
7 6 2 I 50 4 3 
8 4 2 3 54 6 6 
9 5 4 3 59 10 9 
IO 5 4 I 64 14 IO 
II 4 3 I 68 17 II 
12 I 6 5 69 23 16 
13 6 5 6 75 28 22 
14 5 5 3 80 33 25 
15 2 3 9 82 36 34 
16 3 12 6 85 48 40 
17 6 7 9 91 55 49 
18 1 11 10 92 66 59 
19 2 4 4 94 70 63 
20 1 7 6 95 77 69 
21 2 6 9 97 83 78 
22 2 4 6 99 87 84 
23 0 3 3 99 90 87 
24 0 5 8 99 95 95 
25 1 I I 100 96 96 
26 0 2 1 100 98 97 
27 0 1 2 100 99 99 
28 0 0 0 100 99 99 
29 0 1 1 100 100 100 
30 0 0 0 100 100 100 
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Table 5.15 summarises the frequency of disclosures for the additional items of 
actual disclosure. The maximum number of disclosures is 25, no company made 
25 disclosures. The most number of additional disclosures was 18 items in 1995 
and 20 items in 1996 and 1997. The least amount of disclosures in 1995 was no 
disclosures, made by seven companies. In 1996, the least number of disclosures 
was one disclosure, made by 6 companies. In 19971 the least number of 
disclosures was one disclosure made by four companies. 
Table 5.15 
Frequency of ASX and additional items of governance disclosure for industrial 
companies for 1995 to 1997 
Additional items of Actual Disclosure 
Disclosure Frequency Cumulative Percent 
Score n= 100 
1995 1996 1997 1995 1996 1997 
0 7 0 0 7 0 0 
I 12 6 4 19 6 4 
2 18 6 4 37 12 8 
3 17 9 11 54 21 19 
4 9 10 9 63 31 28 
5 11 15 11 74 46 39 
6 7 14 16 81 60 55 
7 2 4 7 83 64 62 
8 5 8 9 88 72 71 
9 3 11 7 91 83 78 
10 I 5 7 92 88 85 
11 3 4 3 95 92 88 
12 I 2 3 96 94 91 
13 I 4 5 97 98 96 
14 I I 2 98 99 98 
15 0 0 0 98 99 98 
16 0 0 I 98 99 99 
17 I 0 0 99 99 99 
18 I 0 0 100 99 99 
19 0 0 0 100 99 99 
20 0 I I 100 100 100 
21 0 0 0 100 100 100 
22 0 0 0 100 100 100 
23 0 0 0 100 100 100 
24 0 0 0 100 100 100 
25 0 0 0 100 100 JOO 
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The most number of disclosures overall out of the total 55 items in 1995 was 3 7 
items, disclosed by one company. In 1996, the most number of disclosures by one 
company was 41 items. In 1997 the most number of disclosures by one company 
was 42 items of disclosure. (These results are not shown in the accompanying 
tables). 
Disclosure of directors (EXEC) 
This section summarises results of governance disclosures relating to the break-up of 
individual directors into executive and non-executive directors and whether the 
Chairman of the Board is a non-executive director. Both disclosure items are 
suggested by the ASX. Results are summarised in Table 5.16. 
Table 5.16 
Summary of EXEC information by industrial companies for 1995 to 1997 
YEAR Overall Ranking 
n=JOO 
NO. ITEM OF DISCLOSURE 1995 1996 1997 1995 1996 1997 
No. No. No. No. No. No. 
DIRECTORS (EXEC) . . • · . : / .' . . . '.,. . 
2.1 Break-up of individual directors into 93 JOO JOO 
executive and non-executive 
2.2 Chairman is a non-executive 73 83 85 6 7 9 
director 
TOTAL EXEC 166 183 185 
% of companies disdosing this 83% 92% 93% 
cate o 
Disclosure in relation to directors has remained fairly consistent from 1995 to 
1997. A total of 93 companies in 1995 and 100 companies in 1996 and 1997 
disclosed the break-up of directors into executive and non-executive. In 1995, 73 
companies had a non-executive chairperson, increasing to 83 companies in 1996 
and 85 companies in 1997. Overall 83% of companies in 1995 disclosed some 
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information with regard to EXEC. This increased to 92% in 1996 and 93% in 
1997. Item 2.1 is ranked 1st overall of all the 55 items of disclosure for each of the 
years examined. Disclosure of the chairman being a non-executive director is 
ranked 6• in 1995, 1• in 1996 and 9th in 1997. 
Membership on Board of Directors (BMEM) 
BMEM category highlights governance disclosures relating to board membership. 
Procedures for board me:-- 1bership and the presence of a nomination committee and 
the responsibilities of the board of directors are the key items of disclosure within 
this category. Table 5.17 summarises results for the 12 items that make BMEM 
category. Items 3.1 to 3.7 are items suggested by the ASX and items 3.8 to 3.12 
(highlighted by shading) are additional items of actual disclosure. 
As shown in Table 5.17, disclosures suggested by the ASX were made by 11 % of 
companies in 1995, 31% of companies in 1996 and increasing to 34% in 1997. 
15% of companies in 1995, 32% in 1996 and 33% in 1997 disclosed additional 
items of actual disclosure. 
28 companies in 1995, 79 companies in 1996 and 82 companies in 1997 disclosed 
the acknowledgment of criteria for board membership, item 3.1. Few companies 
disclosed the main procedures in place for devising criteria for board membership, 
12 companies in 1995, 42 companies in 1996 and 44 companies in 1997. 
Nomination committees were present in 13 companies in 1995, 24 companies in 
1996 and 26 companies in 1997. 
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The most disclosed item within the BMEM category is Item 3. IO and relates to 
responsibilities of the board of directors. This item was disclosed by 44 companies 
in 1995 (ranked 10•), 94 companies in 1996 (ranked 2'') and 95 companies in 1997 
(ranked 3rd). 
Table 5.17 
Summary of BMEM information by industrial companies for 1995 to 1997 
NO, ITEM OF DISCLOSURE 1995 
No. 
YEAR 
n=JOO 
1996 
No, 
1997 
No. 
Overall Ranking 
1995 1996 1997 
No. No. No. 
!JOARD·MEMBERSHI]' (BMEM) · . . . 
3.1 Acknowledgment of existence of 28 79 82 17 8 10 
criteria for board membership 
3.l Main procedures in place for 12 42 44 25 20 23 
devising criteria for board 
membership. 
3.3 Procedures for reviewing the 4 20 23 32 27 28 
membership of the bo&rd, 
3.4 Procedures for nominating directors. 2 11 12 34 33 34 
3.5 Presence of a nomination 13 24 26 24 24 26 
committee 
3.6 Names and positions of nomination 10 22 26 27 26 26 
committee members 
3.7 Responsibilities of nomination 9 22 26 28 26 26 
committee members 
TOTAL ASX 78 220 239 
% companies disclosing ASX 11% 31% 34% 
re uirements 
Items in addition to ASX 
3;3 :·Non•exeCUtive chairperson of . JO• 19. .. 22' 27. '28' ''29 
-Nomination Committee .. ,., .. 
Majority of the nomitmtion· 3,9 10. 20 ,·, . 23 27 27 . 28 
'cOmmittee members non-executive 
:.,". 'diredors 
3;10 Responsibilities of the board of 44 94 · 95 · .10 . 2 3 
directors •, , . 
3,U ·Acknowledgment of formal r¢view_ 
... 
9 24 
', 
.24 · ?8 . ._'' 24. 27 ·.· 
of boards/directors perfonnance 
' 
.-.-,,· 
3,12 Procedwes for reviewing 1 2. 3· 35 36 . 37 
erformance 
TOTAL ACTUAL 74 159 167 
% of companies disclosing 15% 32% 33% 
additional inf_grmation 
TOTALBMEM 152 379 406 
% of companies disclosing this 13% 32% 34% 
categp~ 
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Few disclosures were made in relation to procedures for reviewing board 
membership (Item 3.3) and procedures for nominating directors (Item 3.4). In 
1995, 4 and 2 companies disclosed these items respectively. Although disclosures 
increased by about five times in 1997 disclosures were still low with these items 
being ranked 28th and 34t1t in 1997. 
Appointment and retirement of direetors (APRE1) 
APRET provides a summary of the governance disclosures on the appointment and 
retirement of non-executive directors. Both items were suggested by the ASX. 
Results are shown in Table 5.18. 
Table 5.18 
Summary of APRET information by industrial companies for 1995 to 1997 
YEAR Overall Ranking 
n=/00 
NO. ITEM OF DISCLOSURE 1995 1996 1997 1995 1996 1997 
No, No. No. No. No. No. 
APPOINTMENT/RETIREMENT(APRET . : : ';,: :, ,:. · .. ·. . :. · 
4.1 Policies on the tenns and conditions 15 64 69 22 11 13 
relating to the appointment of non-
executive directors. 
4.2 Policies on the tenns and conditions 13 44 45 24 19 22 
relating to the r~foement of non-
executive directors. 
TOTALAPRET 28 108 114 
% of companies disclosing this 14% 54% 57% 
cate o 
Disclosures relating to the appointment of directors are marginally higher than for 
the retirement of non-executive directors. Policies on the appointment of directors 
are disclosed by 15 companies in 1995, 64 companies in 1996 and 69 companies in 
1997. 13 companies in 1995, 44 companies in 1996 and 45 companies in 1997 
disclosed policies on retirement of directors. 14% of companies in 1995 increasing 
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to 54% in 1996 and 57% in 1997 made APRET disclosures. As shown in Table 5.18 
the ranking's for these two items has increased from 22nd and 24th in 1995 to 13th and 
22nd in 1997. 
Directors ability to seek independent advice (IN.DADV) 
As illustrated in Table 5.19 the current study has found that overall disclosure for 
INDADV has increased dramatically. In 1995 19% of companies made disc!osures, 
this increased to 71% in 1996 and 74% of companies in 1997. A total of 24 
companies in 1995 acknowledged the director could seek independent advice 
increasing to 83 companies in 1996 and 85 companies in 1997. Some companies 
went further and disclosed some of the procedures for seeking advice. 14 companies 
in 1995, 59 companies in 1996 and 63 companies in 1997 disclosed these procedures. 
Table 5.19 
Summary of INDADV information by industrial companies 
YEAR Overall Ranking 
n=IOO 
NO. ITEM OF DISCLOSURE 1995 1996 1997 1995 1996 1997 
No. No. No. 
INDEPENDENT ADVICE (INDADV) 
5.1 Acknowledgment of ability to seek 24 83 85 
independent advice 
5.2 Procedures by which directors can 14 59 63 
seek independent professional 
advice at the company's expense in 
the furtherance of their duties. 
TOTAL INDADV 38 142 148 
% of companies disclosing this 
cate o 
19% 71% 74% 
100 
No. No. No. 
18 7 9 
23 13 17 
Remuneration (REM) 
REM examines the governance disclosures related to the remuneration of executive 
and non-executive directors. Table 5.20 summarises the 9 governance items that 
comprise this category. Items 6.1 to 6.6 are items suggested by the ASX and items 
relate to procedures for determining remuneration, the presence and purpose and 
members of a remuneration committee. Items 6.7 to 6.9 are additional items of 
actual disclosure (highlighted by shading in Table 5.20), items relate to fees paid to 
remuneration committee members and if the committee chairperson and majority of 
members are non-executive. 
In 1995 51 companies surveyed acknowledged that procedures existed for 
determining the remuneration of executive and non-executive dire~tors. However 
only 7 of these companies provided some additional information on procedures for 
establishing and reviewing remuneration arrangements of the CEO and other 
executives. A further 12 companies disclosed some procedures for reviewing 
compensation arrangements of non-executive directors. In 1996 92 companies 
acknowledged that procedures for determining remuneration existed, with 26 
companies providing additional information on CEO remuneration arrangements and 
31 providing some information on non-executive directors remuneration 
arrangements. In 1997, the acknowledgment of procedures increased to 93 
companies, with 28 companies providing additional information on executive's 
remuneration arrangements and 33 companies provided information for non-
executives remuneration. 
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Table 5.20 
Summary of REM information by industrial companies for 1995 to 1997 
YEAR Overall Ranking 
n=lOO 
NO, ITEM OF DISCLOSURE 1995 1996 1997 1995 1996 1997 
No. No. No. No. No. No. 
REMlJNERATION" REMf -- - " · '-• , ,•" "/ :_ . ,.·• . , . 
6.1 Acknowledgment that procedures 51 92 93 9 3 5 
exist for determining remuneration 
of executive and non-executive 
directors 
6.2 The main procedures for 7 26 28 30 23 25 
establishing and reviewing the 
compensation arrangements for the 
CEO and other senior executives. 
(Includes receipt of external advice) 
6.3 The main procedures for 12 31 33 25 21 24 
establishing and reviewing the 
compensation arrangements for the 
non-executive members of the 
board. 
6.4 Presence of a remuneration 43 62 68 II 12 14 
committee 
6.5 Main responsibilities and core rights 22 58 65 19 14 15 
of the committee. 
6.6 Names and positions of committee 39 59 64 13 13 16 
members. 
TOTAL ASX 174 328 351 
% companies diw/osing ASX 29% 55% 59% 
re uirements 
Items in addition to ASX 
6.7 .· :Fees paid to members of the L,, '2.: .·.' s. . 35,. .. 36. . '.,}6,.:· 
,•', Remuileration Committee ,, ', 
' 
'_ ... 
'<;o' .6.8 .. ·Non-executive chairperson of the 32 ... · '"_sl' 15 · · .. 16 ·. ,' 19 
. ,·, -- , ... 
·remuneration conunittee I; ' .. .. ... ,33 . : ·_', ··is> 6;9 Majority of non-executive direc'tOrs, . ·54, 61 .. ,il4 ·.· 
·on the remuneration committee 
TOTAL ACTUAL 66 109 126 
% of companies disclosing 22% 36% 42% 
additional in ormation 
TOTAL REM 240 437 477 
% of companies disclosing this 27% 49% 53% 
cate o 
Remuneration committees were present in 43 companies in 1995. This increased to 
62 companies in 1996 and 68 companies in 1997. In 1995 22 disclosed the core 
responsibilities of the remuneration committee, this increased to 58 companies in 
1996 and 65 companies in 1997. 32 companies in 1995, 53 companies in 1996 and 
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60 in 1997 had a non-executive chairperson of the remuneration committee. Fees 
paid to committee members were limited to one in 1995, 2 in 1996 and 5 in 1997. 
The highest ranked item of disclosure for REM in 1995 was Item 6.1, which relates 
to companies acknowledging that procedures exist for determining the remuneration 
of executive and non-executive directors. This item is ranked 9th in 1995, 3rd in 1996 
and 5th in 1997. The lowest ranked item is Item 6.7 which is the disclosure of fees 
paid to members of the remuneration committee and is ranked 35!h in 1995, 36!h in 
1996 and 1997. In summary a total of 27% of companies disclose REM related 
information in 1995. This increased to 49% in 1996 and 53% in 1997. 
External Auditors (AUD) 
Table 5.21 summarises results for AUD category. Items 7.1 to 7.6 are items 
suggested by the ASX and items are in relation to procedures for nominating and 
reviewing the adequacy of external auditors and the presence and purpose of an audit 
committee. Items 7.7 to 7.9 are additional items of actual disclosure and survey fees 
paid to audit committee members and whether the chairperson and majority of 
members of the audit committee are non-executive. 
Disclosures within AUD are higher compared to other categories with a total of 91 
companies disclosing the presence of an audit committee in 1995, 91 companies in 
1996 and 94 companies in 1997. A total of 40 companies in 1995 went further to 
highlight the main responsibilities of the audit committee. This more than doubled in 
1996 to be 83 companies and·87 companies in 1997. In addition to this in 1995, 
75% of companies disclosed that the chairperson and majority of audit committee 
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members were non-executive directors, this increased to 88% in 1996 and 89% in 
1997. Disclosure of fees paid to audit committee members increased from 3 
companies in 1995 to 4 companies in 1996 and 6 companies in 1997. 
Table 5.21 
Summary of AUD information by industrial companies for 1995 to 1997 
YEAR OveraU Ranking 
n=IOO 
NO. ITEM OF DISCLOSURE 1995 1996 1997 1995 1996 1997 
No. No. No. No. No. No. 
AUDIT (,\llD) . . . · 
7.1 Acknowledgment of existence of 5 29 28 31 22 25 
procedures for nominating external 
auditors 
7.2 Main procedures for nominating 4 2 35 34 38 
external auditors. 
7.3 Reviewing the adequacy of existing 13 45 52 24 18 21 
external audit arrangements with 
particular emphasis on the scope 
and quality of the audit. 
7,4 Presence ofan audit committee 91 91 94 2 4 4 
7.5 Main responsibilities and core rights 40 83 87 12 7 8 
of the audit committee. 
7.6 Names and positions of audit 90 91 93 3 4 5 
committee members. 
TOTAL ASX 240 343 356 
% companies disclosing ASX 40% 57% 59% 
re uirements 
Items in addition to ASX 
.7.7 . Fees paid to members' of the aU4i(':/ ... j•' 34'..'· :J's . 
Committee .. · .. ;,·-
• 
• 
°7.8 · :Non-executive chairperson of the._. 75 ';"it/· ... ,._ 
auditcommittee · · ' ... . , .. -
7.9 -Majority ofn0n-executive directOrS,. .... 74 isB .. 
on the audit committee 
TOTAL ACTUAL 152 183 
% of companies disclosing 51% 59% 61% 
additional in ormation 
TOTAL AUD 392 521 539 
% of companies disclosing this 44% 58% 60% 
cate o 
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Although some companies acknowledged the existence of procedures for nominating 
external directors (5 companies in 1995, 29 in 1996 and 28 in 1997) disclosures in 
relation to what these procedures were limited, with 1 company disclosing in 1995, 4 
in 1996 and 2 in 1997. 
The highest ranked item within category AUD is Item 7.4, which details disclosure 
of an audit committee. This item is ranked 2"' in 1995 and 4ili in 1996 and 1997. 
The lowest ranked item is item 7.2, which examines the disclosure of procedures for 
/' 
nominating external auditors. This item is ranked 35th in 1995, 34th in 1996, and 38th 
in 1997. Overall, for category AUD, 44% of companies in 1995, 58% in 1996 and 
60% in 1997 made AUD related disclosures. 
Business risk (RSK) 
Table 5.22 summarises results of RSK governance related disclosures for industrial 
companies. Items 8.1 to 8.3 are items suggested by the ASX and relate to the 
acknowledgment of risk approach to identifying and managing those risks. Items 8.4 
to 8.10 are additional items of actual governance disclosure and examine specific 
areas of risk, the presence responsibilities ad members of a risk management 
committee, other than an audit committee. 
In 1995, 90 companies acknowledged that risk existed. This increased to 98 
companies in 1996 and 99 companies in 1997. Despite this large number 
acknowledging the existence of risk fewer companies provided additional 
information of identifying and managing theses risks. For example in 1995, 19 
companies provided some information on identifying risks, 51 companies in 1996 
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and 54 in 1997. 31 companies in 1995, 65 companies in 1996 and 71 companies in 
1997 provided some information on arrangements in place to manage risks. 
Table 5.22 
Summary ofRSK information by industrial companies for 1995 to 1997 
YEAR Overall Ranking 
NO. ITEM OF DISCLOSURE 
n=JOO 
1995 1996 
No, No, 
1997 
No. 
1995 
No. 
1996 
No. 
1997 
No. 
RISl((RSI<) i .· ' · 
. .. 
8.1 Acknowledgment that risks at exists 90 98 99 3 2 
8.2 Boards approach to identifying 19 SI 54 20 17 20 
areas of significant business risk. 
8.3 Arrangements in place to manage 31 65 71 16 10 12 
those risks. 
TOTAL ASX 140 214 224 
% companies disclosing ASX 47% 71% 75% 
re uirements 
Items In addition to ASX 
8.4 Acknowledgment of specific areas 65 74 .78 7 ·9 .. • ·11 
of risk 
8.5 Separate Risk management 17 20 22 21 27 .29 
Committee - Other than Audit 
committee, including committees 
for specific area's of risk includes 
environmental committee, hedging 
committee, occupational health and .. 
··,, 
safety committee 25 •· .. 8.6 Main responsibilities and core rights 12 14 ',14 31 · 32 
of the risk committee. 
32 8.7 Names of members of the separate 11 12. •13 ; 26···· :33 
risk committees ·}' .. 
8.8 Fees paid to Risk Management 1 ··-;. o; 0 35 3T 39 
Committee members 
'3o 9;9 Non-executive chairperson of the 11 17' '18. 26 .· 29. 
risk committee 
.-,,,-
8.10 Majority of non-executive directors 10 16 17 . 27 . jp "J 1 
on the risk committee 
TOTAL ACTUAL 127 153 162 
% of companies dLw:losing 18% 22% 23% 
additional in ormation 
TOTALRSK 267 367 386 
% of companies disclosing this 27% 37% 39% 
cate o 
Risk management committees were present in 17 companies in 1995, 20 companies 
in 1996, and 22 in 1997. This highest ranked item with RSK category is Item 8.1, 
that identifies companies acknowledge that risk exists. This item is ranked 3rd in 
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1995, first in 1996 and 2nd in 1997. The lowest ranked item within the RSK category 
is item 8.8 which identifies the disclosure of fees paid to separate risk management 
committee. This item is ranked 35th in 1995, 37th in 1996 and 39th in 1997. 
In summary for category RSK disclosures suggested by the ASX have increased 
from 47% of companies disclosing in 1995 to 71% in 1996 and 75% in 1997. 
Additional items of disclosure were made by 18% of companies in 1995, 22% in 
1996 and 23% of companies in 1997. Overall 27% of companies made RSK 
disclosures in 1995 increasing to 39% of companies in 1997. Importantly, this 
highlights that 25% of companies in 1997 are not disclosing adequate RSK related 
infonnation in accordance with the ASX listing rule. 
Ethical Standards (ETHIC) 
Table 5.23 summarises the ETHIC related governance disclosures. Items 9.1 and 9.2 
are items suggested by the ASX and examine the acknowledgment of the existence 
of ethical standards and policies on the establishment of ethical standards. Items 9.3 
to 9. 9 are additional items of actual disclosure and look at the disclosure of the firm's 
approach to buying and selling shares, presence, responsibilities and members of a 
separate code of conduct committee, other than an audit committee. 
In 1995 a total of 57 companies acknowledged the existence of ethical standards with 
8 companies providing :mme information on particular policies on the establishment 
of ethical standards. This increased to 95 companies acknowledging ethical 
standards with 29 of these providing information on ethical policies. In 1997, 95 
companies provided information of the existence of ethical standards, with 33 
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companies making more detailed disclosures on policies on the establishment of 
these standards. 
Table 5.23 
Summary of ETHIC information by industrial companies for 1995 to 1997 
YEAR Overall Ranking 
n=IOO 
NO. ITEM OF DISCLOSURE 1996 1995 1996 1997 
9.1 Acknowledgment of existence of 57 95 95 8 2 3 
ethical standards 
9.2 Policies on the establishment of 8 29 33 29 22 24 
ethical standards.- specific areas of 
code of conduct 
TOTAL ASX 65 124 128 
% companies disclosing ASX 33% 62% 64% 
re uirements 
Items in addition to ASX 
Finns approach to the buying and· 23 26 31 
'' 
25 26 •. 9,3 5 
selling of shares by directors and 
other employees (specific and 
acknowledgment - Insider dealing) 
9.4 Separate code of conduct 1 4 5 35 34 36 
committee-other than audit 
,, 
committee 
9,5 Main responsibilities and core rights 1 2 2· 35 36 .·. 38 
of the code of conduct committee. 
9.6 Names of members of the separate 2 3 3 34.' 35 ' 37 
code of conduct committee 
9.7 Fees paid to code of conduct 0 0 .·.· 0 36, 37'.' 39. 
committee members 
9.8 Non-executive chairperson of the 1 4 5 , 35 34 36 
code of conduct committee 
9.9 Majority of non-executive directors -. 1 4 5. .35 ,34 36 
on the code of conduct committee 
TOTAL ACTUAL 11 40 46 
% of companies disclosing 2% 6% 7% 
additional in ormation 
TOTAL ETHIC 76 164 174 
% ofcompanie,~ disclosing thlf 8% 18% 19% 
cate o 
Additional ETHIC disclosures are few, with only 2% of companies providing 
information in 1995, 6% in 1996 and 7% in 1997. Disclosures focus on the firms' 
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approach to the buying and selling of shares with 5 companies in 1995, 23 in 1996 
and 26 in 1997 providing details of the firms approach share trading. Few companies 
have a separate code of conduct committee, only 1 on 1995, 4 in 1996 and 5 in 1997. 
The highest ranked item within the ETHIC category is Item 9.1, which acknowledges 
that the company has ethical standards. This item ranked 8th in 1995, 2nd in 1996 and 
3rd in 1997. The lowest ranked item for all three years is Item 9.7 which looks at the 
disclosure of fees paid to code of conduct committee members. No industrial 
companies have disclosed this item. 
Summary of governance disclosures(,·, mining and industrial companies 
Governance related disclosures have increased consistently from 1995 to 1997 for 
both mining and industrial companies. Table 5.24 summarises the governance 
disclosures suggested by the ASX through listing rule 4.10.3. Prior to the 
introduction of the listing rule in 1995, overall governance disclosure for both 
industry groups was 1901. This increased to 3289 disclosures in 1996 and 3499 
disclosures in 1997. Mining company governance disclosures are higher in 1995 and 
1997, while industrial companies disclosed more in 1996. 
As shown in Table 5.24, audit and remuneration related disclosures are the most 
prevalent items of governance disclosure in 1995 prior to the introduction of the 
listing rule, for both industry groups. These tvvo categories remain the most 
prominent after the listing rule became applicable in 1996 and 1997. Audit related 
disclosures are marginally higher for industrial companies than for mining 
companies while remuneration information was marginally higher for mining than 
for industrial companies. 
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Table 5 .25 '.mmmarises the governance disclosures suggested by the ASX plus the 
additional items of actual l.!isclosure. Disclosures have consistently increased over 
the period. In 1995, the two industry groups made a total of 2785 disclosures. This 
increased to 4567 disclosures in 1996 and 4860 in 1997. The number of disclosures 
in 1995 and 1997 were higher for mining companies and in 1996 industrial 
compa:des was higher. 
As shown in Table 5.25 prior to the introduction of the listing rule in 1995, the most 
prominent governance disclosures were audit, remuneration and risk infonnation for 
both mining companies and industrial companies. Audit information is ranked first 
for both industry groups with industrial companies disclosing more audit information 
than mining companies. Risk information is ranked znd for both industry groups in 
1995 with mining companies disclosing more than industrial companies. 
Remuneration disclosures are ranked 3rd in 1995 with mining companies disclosing 
more than industrial companies. After the introduction of the listing rule, audit, 
remuneration, risk and board membership disclosures were most prominent. For 
mining companies in 1996 and 1997 audit information was ranked first followed by 
remuneration (ranked 2nd) and risk information (ranked 3rd). For industrial companies 
in 1996 and 1997 the most prominent disclosures were audit (ranked first), 
remuneration (ranked znd) and board membership information (ranked third). As 
demonstrated risk information has decreased its ranking for both mining and 
industrial companies. 
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Table 5.24 
Summary of the number of governance disclosures suggested by the ASX for 
mining and industrial companies for 1995 to 1997 
YEAR Overall Ranking 
n=200 
NO ITEM OF DISCLOSURE 1995 1996 1997 1995 )j96 1997 
No. % No. % No. % No. No. No. 
1 DIRECTORS (EXEC) 
Mining 168 17.11 177 10.88 176 10.03 3 5 5 
Industrial 166 17.87 183 11.01 185 10.60 3 5 5 
Total 334 17.49 360 10.95 361 10.32 
2 BOARD MEMBERSHIP 
(BMEM) 
Mining 80 8.15 223 13.71 261 14.88 6 3 3 
Industrial 78 8.40 220 13.24 239 13.70 5 3 3 
Total 158 8.23 443 13.48 500 14.29 
3 APPOINTMENT AND 
RETIREMENT (APRET) 
Mining 40 4.07 101 6.21 117 6.67 8 8 8 
Industrial 28 3.01 108 6.50 114 6.53 8 8 8 
Total 68 3.54 209 6.36 2JI 6.6 
4 INDEPENDENT ADVICE 
(INDADV) 
Mining 47 4.79 145 8.91 142 8.10 7 6 6 
Industrial 38 4.09 142 8.54 148 8.48 7 6 6 
Total 85 4.44 287 8.73 290 8,29 
s REMUNERATION (REM) 
Mining 192 19.55 324 19.91 354 20.18 2 I I 
Industrial 174 18.73 328 19.74 351 20.11 2 2 2 
Total 366 19.14 652 19.83 705 20.15 
6 AUDIT(AUD) 
Mining 219 22.30 324 19.91 341 19.44 I 1 2 
Industrial 240 25.83 343 20.64 356 20.40 I I I 
Total 459 24.07 667 20.28 696 19.92 
7 RISK(RSK) 
Mining 155 15.78 207 12.72 234 13.34 4 4 4 
Industrial 140 15.07 214 12.88 224 12.84 4 4 4 
Total 295 15.43 421 12.8 458 1109 
8 ETIDCS (ETHIC) 
Mining 81 8.25 126 7.75 129 7.36 5 7 7 
Industrial 65 7.00 124 7.45 128 7.34 6 7 7 
Total 146 7.63 :so 15.2 257 7.35 
OVERALL TOTAL 
Mining 982 100 1627 100 1754 100 
Industrial 929 100 1662 100 1745 100 
TOTAL 1901 3289 3499 
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Tables 5.26 and 5.27 summarise the highest ranked items for mining and industrial 
companies. The highest ranked item for mining companies is item 2.1 that examined 
the break-up of directors into executive and non-executive directors. This item is 
also ranked highest for industrial companies. Item 8.1 that shows the number of 
companies that have acknowledged that risk exists and the presence of an audit 
committee, item 7 .4 were also ranked highly for both mining and industrial 
companies. 
Item 3.12 that examines the disclosure of procedures for reviewing the performance 
of directors is the lowest ranked item (not shown in summary tables) for mining 
companies in 1995. In 1996 and 1997 the items 3.12, 7.2, 8.8 and 9.7 are ranked 
lowest. These items examined procedures for reviewing performance, procedures for 
nominating directors, fees paid to risk management committee members and fees 
paid to code of conduct committee members. Item 9. 7 that looked at fees paid to 
code of conduct committee members was ranked the lowest for industrial companies 
over the three years of the study. 
The results clearly indicate that the introdvction of the ASX listing rule has 
influenced governance related disclosures by mining and industrial companies. In 
most cases, disclosures suggested by the ASX have more than doubled in number 
from 1995 to 1996 when the listing rule was introduced on the 30th of .lune. 
Moderate increases in disclosures were present from 1996 to 1997. Additional items 
of actual disclosure have also increased. A notable increase for mining companies 
and industrial companies was an increase in the number of companies disclosing the 
responsibilities of the board of directors. 36 mining companies disclosed this item in 
1995 and 86 companies in 1997. 44 industrial companies in 1995 and 95 companies 
in 1997 disclosed this item. 
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Although disclosures are increasing, the findings have highlighted some areas where 
disclosures are lacking. Firstly in 1997, 80% of mining companies and 76% of 
industrial companies don't acknowledge that they have a formal review of the boards 
or directors performance. In addition 65% of mining companies and 77% of 
industrial companies fail to highlight any procedures for reviewing the membership 
of the board of directors. 23% of mining companies and 15% of industrial 
companies don't have a non-executive director as chairman. 41% of mining 
companies and 43% of industrial companies disclose no information on the 
appointment and retirement of directors. 56% of mining companies and 67% of 
industrial companies provide no information of the main procedures for establishing 
and reviewing the compensation airangements for non-executive directors. Finally, 
in 1997 only one mining company and 2 industrial companies provided some 
information on the procedun>:s for nominating external auditors. 
Summary 
This chapter has shown the results of governance disclosures being made by mining 
and industrial companies in 1995, 1996 and 1997. The next chapter presents the 
results of regression analysis that seeks to establish if a relationship exists between 
governance related disclosures and corporate characteristics of firm size, gearing, 
ownership diffusion, proportion of non-executive directors and Big 6 external 
auditor. 
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Table 5.25 
Summary of mining and industrial companies governance disclosures as 
suggested by the ASX and additional items of governance disclosure 
YEAR Overall Ranking 
n=200 
ITEM OF DISCLOSURE 1995 1996 1997 1995 1996 1997 
No. % No. % No. % No. No. No. 
I DIRECTORS (EXEC) 
Mining 168 11.78 177 7.81 176 7.24 4 5 6 
Industrial 166 12.21 183 7.95 185 7.62 4 5 5 
Total 334 12.00 360 7.88 361 7.43 
2 BOARD MEMBERSHIP 
(BMEM) 
Mining 147 10.31 375 16.55 410 16.87 5 4 4 
Industrial 152 11.18 379 16.47 406 16.71 5 3 3 
Total 299 10.75 754 16.51 816 16.79 
3 APPOINTMENT AND 
RETIREMENT (APRET) 
Mining 40 2.81 IOI 4.46 117 4.81 8 8 8 
Industrial 28 2.06 108 4,69 114 4.69 8 8 8 
Total 68 2.44 209 4.58 231 4.75 
4 INDEPENDENT ADVICE 
(INDADV) 
Mining 47 3.30 145 6.40 142 5.84 7 7 7 
Industrial 38 2.80 142 6.17 148 6.09 7 7 7 
Total 85 3.05 287 6.29 290 5,97 
5 REMUNERATION (REM) 
Mining 271 19.00 434 19.15 462 19.00 J 2 2 
Industrial 240 17.66 437 18.99 477 19.64 J 2 2 
Total 511 18.33 871 19.07 939 19.32 
6 AUDIT(AUD) 
Mining 350 24.54 480 21.18 503 20.69 I I I 
Industrial 392 28.84 521 22.64 539 22.19 I I I 
Total 742 26.7 1001 21.9 1042 21.4 
7 RJSK(RSK) 
Mining 309 21.67 385 16.99 437 17.98 2 J 3 
Industrial 267 19.65 367 15.95 386 15.89 2 4 4 
Total 576 20.7 752 16.S 823 16.9 
8 ETHICS (ETHIC) 
Mining 94 6.59 169 7.46 184 7.57 6 6 s 
Industrial 76 5.60 164 7.14 174 7.17 6 6 6 
Total 170 6.1 333 7,3 358 7.4 
OVERALL TOTAL 
Mining 1426 100 2266 100 2431 100 
Industrial 1359 100 2301 100 2429 100 
TOTAL 2785 4567 4860 
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Table 5.26 
Summary of highest ranked items for mining companies for 1995 to 1997 
Category Item Overall Rankin!! 
1995 1996 1997 
No No No 
Directors (EXEC) 2.I Break-up of individual directors 
into executive and non- 2 
executive directors. 
Risk(RSK) 8.1 Acknowledgment that risks at 2 2 
exists 
Audit(AUD) 7.4 Where these procedures involve 3 5 4 
an audit committee 
Risk(RSK) 8.4 Acknowledgment of specific 4 7 8 
areas of risk 
Board Membership 3.10 Responsibilities of the board of 15 3 6 
(BMEM) directors 
Ethics (ETHIC) 9.1 Acknowledgment of existence 7 4 3 
of ethical standards 
* Items highlighted by shading are those disclosures made in addition to the ASX listing 
rule Appendix 4A. 
Table 5.27 
Summary of highest ranked items for industrial companies for 1995 to 1997 
Category Item Overall Rank.Jog 
1995 1996 1997 
No No No 
Directors (EXEC) 2.1 Break-up of individual directors 
into executive and non-
executive directors. 
Audit (AUD) 7.4 Where these procedures involve 2 4 4 
an audit committee 
Risk (RSK) 8.1 Acknowledgment that risks 3 2 
exists 
Audit(AUD) 7.6 Disclosure of the names and 3 4 5 
positions of audit committee 
members. 
Audit (AUD) 7.8 Is the chaitperson of the audit 4 5 6 
committee a non-executive 
director 
Ethics (ETHIC) 9.1 Acknowledgment of existence 8 2 3 
of ethical standards 
Remuneration 6.1 Acknowledgment that 9 3 5 
(REM) procedures exist for determining 
remuneration of executive and 
non-executive directors 
Board Membership 3.10 Responsibilities of the board of 10 2 3 
rBMEMl directors 
• Items highlighted by shading are those disclosures made in addition to the ASX listing 
rule Appendix 4A. 
115 
CHAPTER6 
REGRESSION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
This chapter presents and discusses the results of the regression analysis for the 
models discussed in Chapter 4 and provides support for the hypotheses formulated in 
Chapter 3. Descriptive results and correlation analysis of independent and dependent 
variables for mining and industrial companies for 1995 to 1997 are presented first. 
This is followed by regression results for mining companies and industrial companies 
respectively. A discussion of the main findings incorporating an analysis of 
governance disclosures suggested by the ASX and the additional governance related 
disclosures is provided. 
Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive results of independent variables for 1995, 1996 and 1997 are provided in 
Tables 6.1 to 6.6. Relevant data were collected for all variables in 1995, except for 
three mining companies who did not disclose percentage of shares held by the top 
twenty shareholders and six mining companies that did not provide adequate 
information in their annual report to determine the number of non-executive 
directors. In 1996 and 1997, 3 mining companies did not provide percentage of 
shares held by the top twenty shareholders. All relevant data were collected for 
industrial companies except for three industrial companies who did not disclose 
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percentage of shares held by the top twenty shareholders for 1995, 1996 and 1997. 
In addition, 6 companies that did not provide enough information to determine if 
directors were executive or non-executive in' 1995. Statistical analysis was performed 
using the statistical software package .. SPSS" version I 0.0. 
Descriptive results of raw data and transformed data for mining companies for 1995~ 
1996 and 1997 are shown in Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 respectively. As shown, findings 
indicated that the data for some of these variables was skewed, causing the mean and 
median to have different values. In order for these variables to be used successfully 
in regression analysis transformation was required. The following variables for 
mining companies are not normally distributed in 1995, and 1997 SZTA, GEAR and 
NEXDR. In 1996, SZTA, OWND and NEXDR are not normally distributed. Tables 
6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 summarise the descriptive results for industrial companies. Variables 
that are not normally distributed include SZTA, OWND and NEXDR in 1995 and 
1996, and SZTA and OWND in 1997. These variables were transformed to achieve 
normality in distributions. 
Data transformation reduces both their skewness and the number of outliers and 
improves normality, linearity and heteroscedacity of residuals (Bradley, cited in 
Tabachnik and Fidell, 1989). As this study proposes to perform multivariate 
analysis, multivariate normality should be achieved beforehand (Tabachnik and 
Fidell, 1989). Several transformations were completed until the transformation that 
produced skewness and kurtosis values nearest to zero and the difference between 
the mean and median was least. Tabachnick and Fidell (1989) support this 
methodology. 
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Transformation results are shown in Tables 6.1 to 6.3 for mining companies and 
Table 6.4 to 6.6 for industrial companies. As shown in the accompanying tables, 
variables for each year were transformed by using either a logarithmic transformation 
{LG) or square-root (SQ) transformation to achieve normality in distribution. 
Graphical examinations of the transformed variables via box-whisker plots and 
histograms revealed that the explanatory variables had become normally distributed . 
. Table 6.1 
Descriptive results of independent variables for mining companies for 1995 
Before data transformation Aftt:r data transformation 
Variable Mean Median Standard Variable Mean Median Standard 
ln=lOOl Deviation ln=lOOl Deviation 
SZTA 1007945 134446 3741308 LGSZTA 5.0302 5.1285 0.9688 
GEAR 0.4295 0.3500 0.5609 SQGEAR 0.5873 0.5916 0.2922 
OWND 0.2404 0.2300 0.1374 OWND 0.2404 0.2300 0.1374 
NEXDR 0.6857 0.7500 0.2055 LGNEXDR -0.1926 -0.1249 0.1797 
Table 6.2 
Descriptive results of independent variables for mining companies for 1996 
Before data transformation After data transformation 
Variable Mean Median Standard Variable Mean Median Standard 
(n=lOOl Deviation (n=lOOl Deviation 
SZTA 1111487 141360 4191646 LGSZTA 5.1138 5.1503 0.9291 
GEAR 0.3426 0.3450 0.1973 GEAR 0.3426 0.3450 0.1973 
OWND 0.2465 0.2300 0.1442 SQOWND 0.4706 0.4796 0.1592 
NEXDR 0.6776 0.7500 0.2074 SQNEXDR 0.8093 0.8660 0.1513 
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Table 6.3 
Descriptive results of independent variables for mining companies for 1997 
Before data transformation After data transformation 
Variable Mean Median Standard Variable Mean Median Standard 
'•=100' Deviation 'n=l00' Deviation 
SZTA 1251461 140228 4546768 LGSZfA 5.1281 5.1467 0.9669 
GEAR 0.4223 0.3900 0.4839 SQGEAR 0.5964 0.6245 0.2593 
OWND 0.2568 0.2500 0.1455 OWND 0.2568 0.2500 0.1455 
NEXDR 0.6780 0.7100 0.2187 SQNEXDR 0.8054 0.8426 0.1722 
Table 6.4 
Descriptive results of independent variables for industrial companies for 1995 
Before data transformation After data transformation 
Variable Mean Median Standard Variable Mean Median Standard 
Deviation Deviation 
SZTA 2039757 176857 10182227 LGSZTA 5.4188 5.2429 0.7426 
GEAR 0.4498 0.4700 0.2550 GEAR 0.4498 0.4700 0.2550 
OWND 0.3267 0.2800 0.1970 SQOWND 0.7280 0.7274 0.1222 
NEXDR 0.7177 0.7500 0.1690 SQNEXDR 0.8407 0.8660 0.1045 
Table 6.5 
Descriptive results of independent variables for industrial companies for 1996 
Before data transformation After data transformation 
Variable Mean Median Standard Variable Mean Median Standard 
Deviation Deviation 
SZTA 2127330 161584 11073472 LGSZTA 5.4576 5.2084 0.7213 
GEAR 0.4564 0.4700 0.2347 GEAR 0.4564 0.4700 0.2347 
OWND 0.3264 0.2700 0.1941 SQOWND -0.5796 -0.5686 0.3290 
NEXDR 0.7215 0.7500 0.1721 SQNEXDR 0.8427 0.8660 0.1072 
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Table 6.6 
Descriptive results of independent variables for industrial companies for 1997 
Before data transformation After data transformation 
Variable Mean Median Standard Variable Mean Median Standard 
Deviation Deviation 
szrA 2319391 211415 12176287 LGSZfA 5.4888 5.3238 0.7295 
GEAR 0.4700 0.5000 0.2346 GEAR 0.4700 0.5000 0.2346 
OWND 0.3513 0.3000 0.2354 SQOWND 0.5632 0.5477 0.1857 
NEXDR 0.7435 0.7500 0.1650 NEXDR 0.7435 0.7500 0.1650 
Correlations 
Table 6. 7 shows the correlation results of the relationship of selected corporate 
characteristics to ASX suggested governance items by mining companies for 1995. 
As shown, OWND is negatively correlated to TGDAsx, this is not in the expected 
direction, however, this correlation is not significant. The following variables in 
1995 are significantly positively correlated to ASX governance disclosures LGSZTA 
(p<0.01), LGNEXDR (p<0.05) and AUD6 (p<0.01). Correlations of ASX suggested 
governance items and additional governance related disclosures (TGD+Asx) to the 
corporate characteristics shown in Table 6.8, are consistent with ASX suggested 
disclosures (Table 6.7), with the same variables having the same level of significance 
for 1995. 
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Table 6.7 
Pearson correlation matrix of corporate characteristics and ASX suggested 
governance items by mining companies in 1995 
LGSZTA SQ GEAR OWND LGNEXDR AUD6 TGD,.sx 
LGSZTA 1.000 
SQGEAR 0.065 1.000 
OWND -0.083 -0.183* 1.000 
LGNEXDR 0.215* -0.177* -0.053 1.000 
AUD6 0.492 .. -0.178* -0.194* 0.218* 1.000 
TGDAsX 0.724° 0.055 -0.015 0.194' 0.365** 1.000 
• Significant at 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
.. Significant at 0.01 level (one-tailed) 
Table 6.8 
Pearson correlation matrix of corporate characteristics and ASX suggested 
items and additional governance items by mining companies in 1995 
LGSZTA SQGEAR OWND LGNEXDR AUD6 TGD+ASX 
LGSZTA 1.000 
SQGEAR 0.065 1.000 
OWND -0.083 -0.183' 1.000 
LGNEXDR 0.215* -0.177* -0.053 1.000 
AUD6 0.492 .. -0.178• -0.194* o.21s• 1.000 
TGD+ASX 0.751'* 0.053 0.042 0.221 • 0.413° 1.000 
• Significant at 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
.. Sisnificant at 0.01 level {one-tailed} 
Table 6.9 shows the correlation results of the corporate characteristics and ASX 
suggested items of governance disclosure by mining companies in 1996. As shown, 
TGDAsx is significantly related to LGSZTA (p<0.01), GEAR (p<0.01), and AUD6 
(p<0.01). SQNEXDR and OWND were not been found to be significant. Table 6.10 
shows the correlation results of the corporate characteristics and ASX suggested 
items plus additional items of governance disclosure. As shown, TGD+ASX is 
significantly related to LGSZTA (p<0.01), GEAR (p<0.01), and AUD6 (p<0.01) and 
OWND (p<0.05). NEXDR was not found to be significant 
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Table 6.9 
Pearson correlation matrix of corporate characteristics and ASX suggested 
governance items by mining companies in 1996 
LGSZTA GEAR OWND SQNEXDR AUD6 TGDAsx 
LGSZTA 1.000 
GEAR 0.281 .. 1.000 
SQOWND -0.091 0.007 l.000 
SQNEXDR 0.235** 0,078 -0.234• 1.000 
AUD6 0.428*" 0.019 -0.188* 0.381 .. 1.000 
TGDAsX 0.565** 0,251** 0.131 0.087 0.304** 1.000 
• Significant at 0,05 level (one-tailed) 
.. Significant at 0.01 level {one-tailed} 
Table 6.10 
Pearson correlation matrix of corporate characteristics and ASX suggested 
governance items and additional governance items by mining companies in 1996 
LGSZTA GEAR OWND SQNEXD AUD6 TGD+ASX 
LGSZTA 1.000 
GEAR 0.281 .. 1.000 
SQOWND -0.091 0.007 1.000 
SQNEXDR 0.235** 0,078 -0.234" 1.000 
AUD6 0.428*' 0,019 -0.188* Q.38\U 1.000 
TGD+ASX 0.663** 0.272*" 0.191* 0,146 0.367*' 1.000 
• Significant at 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
.. Significant at 0.01 level (one-tailed) 
Correlations between the corporate characteristics and governance disclosures 
suggested by the ASX for 1997 are shown in Table 6.11. TGDAsx was significantly 
correlated to LGSZTA (p<0.01), SQGEAR (p<0.01) and AUD6 (p<0.01) and all 
results were in the expected direction. OWND and SQNEXDR were not significant 
in 1997. Correlations between the corporate characteristics and ASX suggested 
items and additional items of governance related disclosures (TGD+Asx) for 1997 are 
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shown in Table 6.12. TGD+ASX was significantly correlated to LGSZTA (p<0.01), 
SQGEAR(p<0.01) and AUD6 (p<0.01). 
Table 6.11 
Pearson correlations matrix of corporate characteristics and ASX suggested 
governance items by mining companies in 1997 
LGSZTA SQGEAR OWND SQNEXD AUD6 TGDAsx 
LGSZTA 1.000 
SQGEAR 0.215 1.000 
OWND -0.058 -0.201 1.000 
SQNEXDR 0.143 0.018 -0.073 1.000 
AUD6 0.443•• 0.099 -0.129 0.176• 1.000 
TGDAsx 0,551•• 0.290 .. 0.062 0.052 0.382° 1.000 
• Significant at 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
.. Significant at 0.01 level (one-tailed) 
Table 6.12 
Pearson correlations of corporate characteristics and ASX suggested items and 
additional governance items by mining companies in 1997 
LGSZTA SQGEAR OWND SQNEXD AUD6 TGD+ASX 
LGSZTA 1.000 
SQGEAR 0.215 1.000 
OWND ·0.058 -0.201 1.000 
SQNEXDR 0.143 0.018 -0.073 1.000 
AUD6 0.443 .. 0.099 -0.129 0.176• 1.000 
TGD+ASX 0.664 .. 0.269•* 0.142 0.121 0.418 .. 1.000 
• Significant at 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
.. Significant at 0.01 level (one-tailed) 
Tables 6.13 to 6.18 show the correlation results for industrial companies. As shown 
in Table 6.13, resulls for 1995 indicate thal LGSZTA (p<0.01), GEAR (p<0.05), 
SQOWND (p<0.01), and SQNEXDR (p<0.05), are significantly positively related to 
TGDAsx, AUD6 is not in the expected direction, however this result is not 
significant. Results of correlations of ASX and additional governance disclosures 
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TGD+Asx to the selected corporate characteristics in 1995 are shown in Table 6.14. 
Significant correlations were between TGD+Asx and LGSZTA (p<0,01), GEAR 
(p<0.01), SQOWND (p<0.01), and SQNEXDR(p<0.05). 
Table 6.13 
Pearson correlations of corporate characteristics and ASX suggested 
governance items by industrial companies in 1995 
LGSZTA GEAR SQOWND SQNEXDR AUD6 TGDAsx 
LGSZTA 1.000 
GEAR 0.518'* 1.000 
SQOWND 0.180* -0.145 1.000 
SQNEXDR 0.160 -0.060 0.100 l.000 
AUD6 -0.113 0.113 -0.111 -0.069 1.000 
TGDAsx 0.524"'* 0.210• 0.328** 0.196' -0.104 1.000 
• Significant at 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
.. Significant at 0.01 level {one-tailed} 
Table 6.14 
Pearson correlations of corporate characteristics and ASX suggested items and 
additional governance items by industrial companies in 1995 
LGSZTA GEAR SQOWND SQNEXDR AUD6 TGD+ASX 
LGSZTA l.000 
GEAR 0.518** 1.000 
SQOWND 0.180* -0.145 1.000 
SQNEXDR 0.160 -0.060 0.100 1.000 
AUD6 -0.113 0.113 -0.111 -0.069 1.000 
TGD+ASX 0.579** 0.257" 0.342** 0.179* -0.138 1.000 
• Significant at 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
.. Significant at 0.01 level {one-tailed} 
Correlation results for TGD ASX to selected corporate characteristics in 1996 are 
shown in Table 6.15. TGDAsx was found to be significantly positively related to 
LGSZTA (p<0.01), GEAR (p<0.01), and AUD6 (p<0.05). ASX and additional 
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governance disclosures TGD+Asx in 1996 was significantly related to LGSZTA 
(p<0.01), GEAR (p<0.01), LGOWND (p<0.05), and AUD6 (p<0.05) as shown in 
Table 6.16. 
Table 6.15 
Pearson correlations of corporate characteristics and ASX suggested 
governance items by industrial companies 1996 
LGSZTA GEAR LGOWND SQNEXDR AUD6 TGD+ASX 
LGSZTA 1.000 
GEAR 0.519*"' 1.000 
LGOWND 0.106 -0.164 1.000 
SQNEXDR 0.085 -0.036 -0.004 1.000 
AUD6 0.360*"' 0.115 0.072 0.097 1.000 
TGD+ASX 0.360** o.2s1 •• 0.111 0.072 0.229* 1.000 
• Significant at 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
•• Significant at 0.01 level (one-tailed} 
Table 6.16 
Pearson correlations of corporate characteristics for ASX and additional 
governance items by industrial companies 1996 
LGSZTA GEAR LGOWND SQNEXDR AUD6 TGD+ASX 
LGSZTA 1.000 
GEAR 0.519** 1.000 
LGOWND 0.105 -0.164 1.000 
SQNEXDR 0.085 -0.036 -0.004 1.000 
AUD6 0.360** 0.115 0.072 0.097 1.000 
TGD+ASX 0.461•• 0.321** 0.170* 0,100 0.309* 1.000 
• Significar,t at 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
•• Significant at O.Ql level (one-tailed} 
Tables 6.17 and 6.18 summarise results for industrial companies in 1997. As shown 
in Table 6.17, TGDAsx was significantly positively correlated to LGSZTA (p<0.01), 
GEAR (p<0.01), and AUD6 (p<0.05). NEXDR is negatively correlated, however 
this result is not significant Additional governance disclosure TGD+Asx in 1997 was 
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significantly related to LGSZTA (p<0.01), GEAR (p<0.01), SQOWND (p<0.05), 
and AUD6 (p<0.01) as shown in Table 6.18. NEXDR was not found to be 
significant. 
Table 6.17 
Pearson correlations of corporate characteristics and ASX suggested 
governance items by industrial companies 1997 
LGSZTA GEAR SQOWND NEXDR AUD6 TGDASX 
LGSZTA 1.000 
GEAR 0.507** 1.000 
SQOWND 0.090 -0.265** 1,000 
NEXDR 0.181 * 0.068 0.091 t.000 
AUD6 0.350** 0.123 0.103 0.092 1.000 
TGDAsx 0.360""' 0.240 .... 0.127 -0.085 0.235* 1.000 
• Significant at 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
.. Significant at 0.01 level (one-tailed} 
Table 6.18 
Pearson correlations of corporate characteristics for ASX and additional 
governance items by industrial companies 1997 
LGSZTA GEAR SQOWND NEXDR AUD6 TGD+ASX 
LGSZTA 1.000 
GEAR 0.507 ... 1.000 
SQOWND 0.090 -0.265** 1.000 
.NEXDR 0.181 * 0.068 0,091 1.000 
AUD6 0.350""' 0.123 0.103 0.092 I.ODO 
TGD+ASX 0.455"* 0.271"" 0.185* O.Ot4 0.294 .. 1.000 
• Significant at 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
.. Significant at 0.01 level {one-tailed~ 
In summary, for mining companies LGSZTA and AUD6 are significant for all 3 
years for both models. LGNEXDR is significant in 1995 for both models but not 
significant in 1996 and 1997. GEAR is significant in 1996 and 1997 for both models 
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but not 1995. OWND is significant in 1996 when ASX and additional governance 
items are included ( model 2), but is not significant in 1995 or 1997, 
In summary, for industrial companies LGSZTA, GEAR were significant for all 3 
years for both models. SQOWND was significant for both models in 1995 and also 
significant in 1996 and 1997 for model 2 when additional items of governance 
disclosure items are included. AUD6 is significant in 1996 and 1997 but not 1995. 
SQNEXDR was significant in 1995 but not in 1996 or 1997. 
These significant positive correlations for both mining and industrial companies lend 
support to the appropriateness of multivariate regression analysis. However, some of 
the independent variables for both mining and industrial companies appear to be 
significantly correlated, consequently additional testing was performed to ensure that 
multicollinearity was not present. As the correlations for mining or industrial 
companies have not reached 0.8 harmful multicollinearity among the independent 
variables is not present (Lewis-Beck, 1987). Results of tolerance levels and variable 
inflation factors (VIF) support this inference. Tables 6.19 to 6.30 show tolerance 
levels and VIF's for each variable. Tests for multicollinearity are provided in a 
forthcoming section. 
OLS Multiple Regression 
Regression analysis is applied in the current study to detennine if a relationship 
exists between governance related disclosures and selected corporate characteristics. 
Results ofOLS multiple regression for mining and industrial companies are outlined. 
There are two models to be tested for mining and industrial companies for I 995, 
1996, and 1997 resulting in the following 12 regressions that are tested; 
127 
Model 1 
(a) TGD(MINASX95)::::; ex+ p, (LGSZTA) + p, (SQGEAR) + p3(0WND) + 
P• (LGNEXDR) + p,(AUD6) + e 
(b) TGD(MINASX96) ::::; ex+ p, (LGSZTA) + p, (SQGEAR) + P,(OWND) + 
p, (LGNEXDR) + p,(AUD6) + e 
(c) TGD(MINASX97) = ex+ p, (LGSZTA) + p, (SQGEAR) + p,(OWND) + 
P• (SQNEXDR) + p,(AUD6) + e 
(d) TGD(INDASX95)::; ex+ p, (LGSZTA) + p, (GEAR) + p,(LGOWND) + 
P• (LGNEXDR) + p,(AUD6) + e 
(e) TGD(INDASX96)::::; ex+ p, (LGSZTA) + p, (GEAR) + p3(LGOWND) + 
p4 (LGNEXDR) + p,(AUD6) + e 
(f) TGD(INDASX97) ::::; ex+ p, (LGSZTA) + p, (GEAR) + p,(SQOWND) + 
p4 (NEXDR) + p,(AUD6) + e 
Model2 
(g) TGD(•MINASX95) = IX+ p, (LGSZTA) + p, (SQGEAR) + P,(OWND) + 
p, (LGNEXDR) + p,(AUD6) + e 
(h) TGD(,MINASx,01= ex+ P, (LGSZTA) + P,<SQGEAR) + P,(OWND)+ 
p, (LGNEXDR) + p,(AUD6) + e 
(i) TGD(,MINAsx91)= ex+ P, (LGSZTA) + P,<SQGEAR) + P,(OWND)+ 
p, (SQNEXDR) + p,(AUD6) + e 
(j) TGD(HNDASX95) = ex+ P, (LGSZTA) + p, (GEAR) + P,(LGOWND) + 
p, (LGNEXDR) + p,(AUD6) + e 
(k) TGD(,INDASX96) = ex+ p,<LGSZTA) + p, (GEAR) + p,(LGOWND) + 
p, (LGNEXDR) + p,(AUD6) + e 
(I) TGD(,INDASX97l= ex+ P,<LGSZTA) + p, (GEAR) + p,(SQOWND) + 
p, (NEXDR) + p,(AUD6) + e 
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Where 
TGDcMINASX9S) = 
TGD(MINASX96) = 
TGD(MINASX97)= 
TGDcINDAsX9SJ = 
TGD{INDASX96) = 
TGD(INDASX97) = 
Total governance disclosures by mining companies in 1995 
where disclosures are those suggested by the ASX through 
listing rule 4.10.3. 
Total governance disclosures by mining companies in 1996 
where disclosures are those suggested by the ASX through 
listing rule 4.10.3. 
Total governance disclosures by mining companies in 1997 
where disclosures are those suggested by the ASX through 
listing rule 4.10.3. 
Total governance disclosures by industrial companies in 1995 
where disclosures are those suggested by the ASX through 
listing rule 4.10.3. 
Total governance disclosures by industrial companies in 1996 
where disclosures are those suggested by the ASX through 
listing rule 4.10.3. 
Total governance disclosures by industrial companies in 1997 
where disclosures are those suggested by the ASX through 
listing rule 4.10.3. 
TGD(+MINASX95) = Total governance disclosures by mining companies in 1995 
where disclosures are those suggested by the ASX through 
listing rule 4.10.3 plus additional governance disclosures. 
TGDc+MINAsx96> = Total governance disclosures by mining companies in 1996 
where disclosures arc those suggested by the ASX through 
listing rule 4.10.3 plus additional governance disclosures. 
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TGDc+MINASX97J = Total governance disclosure's by mining companies in 1997 
where disclosures are those suggested by the ASX through 
listing rule 4.10.3 plus additional governance disclosures. 
TGDc+INDAsx9sJ = 
TGDc+INDAsx96J ~ 
TGD(+INDASX97) = 
LGSZTA 
GEAR 
SQ GEAR 
OWND 
SQOWND 
LGOWND 
Total governance disclosures by industrial companies in 1995 
where disclosures are those suggested by the ASX through 
listing rule 4.10.3 plus additional governance disclosures. 
Total governance disclosures by industrial companies in 1996 
where disclosures are those suggested by the ASX through 
listing rule 4.10.3 plus additional governance disclosures. 
Total governance disclosures by industrial companies in 1997 
where disclosures are those suggested by the ASX through 
listing rule 4.10.3 plus additional governance disclosures. 
;::; Me11sures firm size as Log 10 of total assets. 
;::; Measure for gearing as calculated by total liabilities divided by 
total assets. 
;::; Measure for gearing being the square root of total liabilities 
divided by total assets. 
;::; Measure for ownership diffusion being the percentage of 
shares held by shareholders other than the top twenty 
shareholders. 
;::; Measure for ownership diffusion being the square~root of the 
percentage of shares held by shareholders other than the top 
twenty shareholders. 
;::; Measure for ownership diffusion being Log 10 of the 
percentage of shares held by shareholders other than the top 
twenty shareholders. 
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NEXDR 
SQNEXDR 
LGNEXDR 
AUD6 
Measure for proportion of non-executive directors calculated 
as the number of non-executive directors divided by total 
number of directors. 
Measure for proportion of non-executive directors calculated 
as the square root of the number of non-executive directors 
divided by tot.ii number of directors. 
Measure for proportion of non-executive directors calculated 
as Log 10 of the number of non-executive directors divided by 
total number of directors. 
= Measure for the companies external auditor being one of the 
Big 6 audit firms. This is a categorical variable where 
disclosure receives a score of 1 and otherwise 0. (The Big 6 
auditors include Price Waterhouse, Arthur Anderson, Coopers 
and Lybrand, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst and Young and 
KPMG. 
Regression assumptions and tests for multicollinearity 
Prior to running multiple regression, it is necessary for the regression model to fulfil 
a number of assumptions to ensure that results from the model can be interpreted 
with reliability. Francis (2001, p.120-122) highlights these assumptions and are 
summarised as follows: 
1) Dependent variables must be measured on a metric scale and all of the 
predictors must be either metric or dichotomous. 
2) Each observation in the sample is assumed to be independent of all other 
observations. 
3) In the population, at each combination of values of the independent 
variables, the distribution of residuals has the same spread. 
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4) Multiple regression assumes that the independent variables are all linearly 
related to the dependent variables, and that there is no interaction between 
the Predictors. That is no multicollinearity 
5) Independent variables need to be normally distributed. 
The current shtdy has taken various steps to ensure that all these assumptions are 
met. Firstly the dependent variable is measured on a metric scale, an unweighted 
dichotomous index- of governance related disclosures is used, as described in Chapter 
4. In addition tests for normality of independent variables was undertaken and 
necessary data transformations completed as described earlier. 
Multicollinearity is a potential problem in multiple regression applications arising 
when some or all independent variables are highly correlated. When multicollinearity 
exists, ''the estimated regression coefficients can fluctuate widely from sample to 
sample, making it risky to use the coefficients as an indicator of the relative 
importance of predictor variables" (Emory, 1985, p. 399). There is no definitive 
answer as to what constitutes an acceptable level of multicollinearity. There are 
differing views in that Francis (2001, p. 122) highlights that a VIF greater than 3 is 
cause for concern, while Stevens (1992) suggests that where any VIF is greater than 
10, indicates the presence of multicollinearity and variables should be removed or 
alternative statistics sought. In all of the regressions examined, the VIF are less than 
t.713 and all tolerance levels are close to one, indicating there is no evidence of 
harmful multicollinearity. 
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Regression results of governance disclosures suggested by ASX listing rule 
for mining companies 
This purpose of this section is to provide regression results for governance 
disclosures suggested by the ASX for mining companies over the periods 1995 to 
1997. The results of regression models l(a), l(b) and l(c) are provided. Tables 6.19 
to 6.21 show the regression results for 1995 to 1997. 
Table 6.19 displays the results for model l(a) that examined the relationship of 
mining company governance disclosures as suggested by the ASX to selected 
corporate characteristics for 1995. As shown, the regression has an adjusted R2 of 
0.462 (F=!6.436; p = 0.000) which is statistically significant. Only one variable, 
LGSZTA31 (p<0.01), is significant and in the expected direction. Consequently, 
hypothesis H5(a) is supported and hypotheses Hl(a), H2(a), H3(a) and H4(a) are 
rejected. 
Table 6.19 
Results of multiple regression for model l(a) - ASX suggested governance 
disclosures by mining companies in 1995 
Variable Hypothesis Beta Tolerance VIF T Significance 
One-tailed 
LGNEXDR l(a) 0.065 0.918 1.090 0.808 0.211 
SQGEAR 2(a) 0.022 0.844 1.185 0.259 0.398 
OWND 3(a) 0.074 0.936 1.068 0.930 0.178 
AUD6 4(a) 0.000 0.708 1.413 -0.005 0.498 
LGSZTA 5(a) 0.684 0.793 1.261 7.875 0.000••• 
Adjusted ?-0.462 (F- 16.436: p-0.000) 
••• Significant at 0.01 level 
" 
Additional testing measuring size by market capitalisation did not produce significantly different 
results. 
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Table 6.20 shows the results for model l(b) that examined the relationship of mining 
company governance disclosures as suggested by the ASX to selected corporate 
characteristics for 1996. As shown, the regression has an adjusted R2 of 0.416 
(F=l4.683; p = 0.000) which is statistically significant. The variables LGSZTA 
(p<0.01), GEAR (p<O.I), SQOWND (p<0.01), and AUD6 (p<O.l) are significant 
and in the expected direction. The proportion of non-executive directors is not in the 
expected direction, however the remit is not significant. Hypotheses H2(b ), H3(b ), 
H4(b), and HS(b) are supported, and Hl(b) is rejected. 
Table 6.20 
Results of multiple regression for model l(b) - ASX suggested governance 
disclosures by mining companies in 1996 
Variable Hypothesis Beta Tolerance VIF T Significance 
One-tailed 
SQNEXDR l(b) ·0.012 0.828 1.208 -0.145 0.443 
GEAR 2(b) 0.122 0.914 1.095 1.498 0.069* 
SQOWND 3(b) 0.202 0.933 1.072 2.503 0.007**• 
AUD6 4(b) 0.129 0.718 1.392 1.405 0.082* 
LGSZTA 5(b) 0.557 0.753 1.329 6.192 0.000"'** 
Adjusted?- 0.416 (F-14.683 : p=0.000) 
• Significant at 0. 1 level 
•** Significant at 0.01 level 
Table 6.21 shows the results for model l(c) that examined the relationship of mining 
company governance disclosures as suggested by the ASX to selected corporate 
characteristics for 1997. As shown, the regression model has an adjusted R2 of 0.447 
(F= 16.534; p = 0.000) which is also statistically significant. The variables 
LGSZTA (p<0.01), SQGEAR (p<0.01), OWND (p<0.05), and AUD6 (p<0.05) are 
significant and in the expected direction. The proportion of non-executive directors 
is not significant for 1997. Hypotheses H2(c), H3(c), H4(c), and HS(c) are supported, 
and Hl(c) is rejected. 
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Table 6.21 
Results of multiple regression for model l(c) - ASX suggested governance 
disclosures by mining companies in 1997 
Variable Hypothesis Beta Tolerance VIF T Significance 
One-tailed 
SQNEXDR l(c), 0.001 0.967 1.034 0.009 0.497 
SQ GEAR 2(c) 0.222 0.921 1.086 2.801 0.003**"' 
OWND 3(c) 0.160 0.943 1.060 2.051 0.022** 
AUD6 4(c) 0.184 0.787 1.271 2.148 0.017** 
LGSZTA 5[c) 0.512 0.780 1.283 5.962 0.000*** 
Adjusted r2 = 0.447 (F= 16.534: p-0.000) 
•• Significant at 0.05 level 
*** SignificantatO.Ol level 
Regression results of governance disclosures suggested by ASX listing rult 
for industrial companies 
This purpose of this section is to provide regression results for governance 
disclosures suggested by the ASX for industrial companies over the periods 1995 to 
1997. The results of the following regression models are provided, model l{d), l{e) 
and l(f). 
Table 6.22 shows the results for model l{d) that examined the relationship of 
industrial companies governance disclosures as suggested by the ASX to selected 
corporate characteristics for 1995. As shown, the regression model has an adjusted 
R2 of 0.312 (F= 9.170; p = 0.000) which is statistically significant. The variables 
LGSZTA (p<0.01), SQNEXDR (p<O.l), and OWND (p<0.01), are significant and in 
the expected direction. GEAR and AUD6 were not found to be significant for 
industrial companies in 1995. Notably AUD6 is not in the expected direction, 
however, the result is not significant. Hypotheses Hl{d), H3(d), and HS(d) are 
supported, and H2(d) and H4(d) are rejected. 
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Table 6.22 
Results of multiple regression for model l(d) - ASX suggested governance 
disclosures by industrial companies in 1995 
Variable Hypothesis Beta Tolerance YIF T Significance 
One-tailed 
SQNEXDR l(d) 0.136 0.910 1.098 1.482 0.071' 
GEAR 2(d) 0.010 0.617 1.619 0.092 0.464 
SQOWND 3(d) 0.335 0.883 1.132 3.596 0.001 ••• 
AUD6 4(d) -0.015 0.923 1.083 -0.162 0.436 
LGSZTA 5(d) 0.360 0.584 1.713 3.146 0.001*** 
Adjusted r1 = 0.312 (F= 9.170: p=0.000) 
• Significant at 0.1 level 
••• Significant at O.QI level 
Table 6.23 shows the results for model l(e) that examined the relationship of 
industrial companies governance disclosures as suggested by the ASX to selected 
corporate characteristics for 1996. The regression model has an adjusted R2 of 0.119 
(F= 3.587; p = 0.000) which is statistically signiticant. The variables LGSZTA 
(p<0.05), and GEAR (p<0.1) are significant and in the expected direction. 
LGOWND, SQNEXDR and AUD6 were not found to be significant for industrial 
companies in 1996. Hypotheses H2(e), and H5(e) are supported, and Hl(e), H3(e) 
and H4(e) are rejected. 
Table 6.23 
Results of multiple regression for model l(e) - ASX suggested governance 
disclosures by industrial companies in 1996 
Variable Hypothesis Beta Tolerance VIF T Significance 
One-tailed 
SQNEXDR l(e) 0.042 0.950 1.053 0.427 0.335 
GEAR 2(e) 0.177 0.676 1.480 1.517 0.067• 
LGOWND 3(e) 0.110 0.921 1.085 1.099 0.138 
AUD6 4(e) 0.119 0.865 1.157 1.153 0.126 
LGSZTA 5(e) 0.206 0.599 1.669 1.661 o.osou 
Adjusted?= 0.119 (F= 3.587: p=0.000) 
• Significant at O.J level 
•• Significant at 0.05 level 
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Table 6.24 shows the results for model l(t) that examined the relationship of 
industrial companies governance disclosures as suggested by the ASX to selected 
corporate characteristics for 1997. The regression model has an adjusted R2 of0.156 
(F= 4.556; p ;;:: 0.001) which is also statistically significant. The variables LGSZTA 
(p<0.01), and SQOWND (p<O.l) are significant and in the expected direction. 
NEXDR (p < 0.05) is also significant for 1997, but is not in the expected direction. 
GEAR, and AUD6 were not found to be significant for industrial companies in I 997. 
Hypotheses H3(f), and HS(!) are supported, and Hl(f), H2(t), and H4(t) are rejected. 
Table 6.24 
Results of multiple regression for model l(f) -ASX suggested governance 
disclosures by industrial companies in 1997 
Variable Hypothesjs Beta Tolerance VIF T Significance 
One-tailed 
NEXDR l(Q -0.195 0.920 1.087 -1.991 0.025("') 
GEAR 2(Q 0.131 0.648 I.542 1.127 0.132 
SQOWND J(Q 0.140 0.858 1.166 1.387 0.085' 
AUD6 4(Q 0.122 0.875 1.143 1.216 0.114 
LGSZTA sm 0.291 0.596 1.679 2.447 o.oos••• 
AdjustedR' =0.156(F=4.556: p-0.001) 
• Significant at 0.1 level 
(*•) Significant at 0.05 level (but not in expected direction) 
•u Significant at 0.01 level 
Regression results of governance disclosures suggested by ASX listing rule 
and additional items of governance disclosure for mining companies. 
This purpose of this section is to provide regression results for governance 
disclosures suggested by the ASX and additional items of disclosure for mining 
companies for 1995 to 1997. The results of the following models are provided, 
model 2 (g), (h) and (i). 
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Table 6.25 shows the regression results for ASX and additional items of disclosure 
for mining companies in 1995. The model 2{g) has an adjusted R2 of 0.510 
(F=I9.714; p = 0.000) which is statistically significart. The variables LGSZTA 
(p<0.01) and OWND (p<0.05), are significant and in the expected direction. 
Gearing, proportion of non-executive directors and Big 6 external auditor were not 
found to be significant in 1995. The following hypotheses are supported, H3(g) and 
HS(g). Hypothesis l(g), 2(g) and 4(g) are rejected. 
Table 6.25 
Results of multiple regression for model 2(g) - ASX and addaional items of 
governance disclosures by mining companies in 1995 
Variable Hypothesis Beta Tolerance VIF T Significance 
One-tailed 
LGNEXDR l(g) 0.077 0.918 1.090 1.005 0.159 
SQGEAR 2(g) 0.055 0.844 1.185 0.691 0.246 
OWND 3(g) 0.149 0.936 1.068 1.959 0.026** 
AUD6 4(g) 0.086 0.708 1.413 0.985 0.164 
LGSZTA 5(g) 0.666 0.793 1.261 8.033 0.000*** 
Adjustedr2-0.510(F-19.714: p-0.000) 
.. Significant at 0.05 level 
•
0 Significant at 0.0l level 
Table 6.26 shows the regression results for ASX and additional items of disclosure 
for mining companies in 1996. The model 2(h) has an adjusted R2 of 0.547 
(F=24.155; p = 0.000) which is statistically significant. The variables LGSZTA 
(p<0.01), OWND (p<0.01), AUD6 (p<0.05) and GEAR (p<O.I) are significant and 
in the expected direction. Proportion of non-executive was not found to be significant 
in 1996. The following hypotheses are supported, H2(h), H3(h), H4(h), HS(h). 
Hypothesis l(h) is rejected. 
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Table 6.26 
Results of multiple regression for model 2(b) - ASX and additional items of 
governance disclosures by mining companies in 1996 
Variable Hypothesis Beta Tolerance VIF T Significance 
One-tailed 
SQNEXDR l(h) 0.025 0.828 1.208 0.337 0.369 
GEAR 2(h) 0.109 0.914 1.095 1.519 0.066' 
SQOWND 3(h) 0.281 0.933 1.072 3.955 0.000* .. 
AUD6 4(h) 0.155 0.718 1.392 1.917 0.029** 
LGSZTA 5(h) 0.616 0.753 1.329 7.772 0.000*** 
Adjusted r1 = 0.547 (F= 24.155: p-0.000) 
' 
Significant at 0.1 level 
" 
Significant at 0.05 level 
*"'* Significant at 0.01 level 
Table 6.27 shows the regression results for ASX and additional items of disclosure 
for mining companies in 1997. Model 2(i) has an adjusted R2 of0.527 (F=22.405; 
p = 0.000) which is statistically significant All the variables LGSZTA (p<0.01), 
OWND (p<0.01), AUD6 (p<0.1), SQGEAR (p<O.l), and SQNEXDR (p<O.l) are 
significant and in the expected direction for 1997. The following hypotheses are 
supported, Hl(i) H2(i), H3(i), H4(i), H5(i). 
Table 6.27 
Results of multiple regression for model 2(i) - ASX and additional items of 
governance disclosures by mining companies in 1997 
Variable Hypothesis Beta Tolerance VIF T Significance 
One-tailed 
SQNEXDR l(i) 0.108 0.967 1.034 1.517 0.067' 
SQ GEAR 2(i) 0.102 0.921 1.086 1.397 0.083* 
OWND 3(0 0.306 0.943 1.060 4.228 0.000*"'* 
AUD6 4(i) 0.126 0.787 1.271 1.590 0.058* 
LGSZTA 5(i) 0.597 0.780 1.283 7.511 0.000*** 
Adjusted r2 - 0.527 (F= 22.405: p=0.000) 
' 
Significant at 0.1 level 
" 
Significant at 0.05 level 
*** Significant at O.ot level 
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Regression results of governance disclosures suggested by ASX listing rule 
and additional items of governance disclosure for industrial companies. 
This purpose of this section is to provide regression results for governance 
disclosures suggested by the ASX and additional items of disclosure for industrial 
companies for 1995 to 1997. The results of the following models are provided, 
model 2 G) (k) and (1). 
Table 6.28 shows the regression results for ASX suggested items and additional 
items of disc1osure for industrial companies in 1995. The model 2G) has an adjusted 
R2 of 0.366 (F=l 1.370; p = 0.000) which is statistically significant. The variables 
LGSZTA (p<0.01), LGOWND (p<0.01) are significant and in the expected direction 
for 1995. Gearing and proportion of non~exexutive directors are not significant. 
AUD6 is not in the expected direction, however the result is not significant. The 
following hypotheses are supported, H3G) and HS(j). Hypotheses Hl(j), H2(j), and 
H4(j) are rejected. 
Table 6.28 
Results of multiple regression for model 2G) - ASX and additional items of 
governance disclosures by industrial companies in 1995 
Variable Hypothesis Beta Tolerance VIF T Significance 
One-tailed 
LGNEXDR IU) 0.099 0.910 1.098 1.127 0.132 
GEAR 2U) 0.034 0.617 1.619 0.318 0.37L 
LGOWND 3U) 0.325 0.883 1.132 3.636 0.000* .. 
AUD6 4U) -0.043 0.923 1.083 -0.487 0.314 
LGSZTA SU) 0.422 0.584 1.713 3.837 0.000*"'* 
Adjusted r2 -0.366 (F- 11.370: p-0.000) 
*** Significant at 0.01 level 
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Table 6.29 shows the regression results for ASX suggested items and additional 
items of disclosure for industrial companies in 1996. The model 2(k) has an adjusted 
R2 of 0.238 (F=7.012; p = 0.000) which is statistically significant. The variables 
LGSZTA (p<0.01), LGOWND (p<0.05), GEAR (p<0.1) AUD6 (p<0.05) are 
significant and in the expected direction for 1996. Proportion of non-exexutive 
directors is not significant. The following hypotheses are supported, H2(k), H3(k), 
H4(k), and HS(k). Hypothesis Hl(k) is rejected. 
Table 6.29 
Results of multiple regression for model 2(k) - ASX aud additional items of 
governance disclosures by industrial companies in 1996 
Variable Hypothesis Beta Tolerance VIF T Significance 
One-tailed 
LGNEXDR l(k) 0.052 0.950 1.053 0.565 0.287 
GEAR 2(k) 0.172 0.676 1.480 1.591 0.057• 
LGOWND J(k) 0.156 0.921 1.085 1.677 0.049.,.. 
AUD6 4(k) 0.167 0.865 1.157 1.744 0.042** 
LGSZTA _ 5(k) 0.297 0.599 1.669 2.580 0.006*** 
Adjusted ?-0.238 (F-7.012: p=0.000) 
• Significant at 0.1 level 
.. Significant at 0.05 level 
*** Significant at 0.01 level 
Table 6.30 shows regression results for ASX suggested items and additional items of 
governance disclosure for industrial companies in 1997. The model 2(1) has an 
adjusted R2 of 0.236 (F= 6.939; p=0.000) which is statistically significant. The 
variables LGSZTA (p<0.01), SQOWND (p<0.5) and AUD6 (p<O.l), are significant 
and in the expected direction. Gearing and proportion of non-executive directors are 
not significant. The relationship of NEXDR in 1997 to governance disclosures is 
negatively related, this is not in the expected direction, however the result is not 
significant. The following hypotheses are supported H3(1), H4(1) and HS(!). 
Hypotheses HI(!) and H2(1) are rejected. 
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Table 6.30 
Results of multiple regression for model 2(1) - ASX and additional items of 
governance disclosures by industrial companies in 1997 
Variable Hypothesis Beta Tolerance VIF T Significance 
One-tailed 
NEXDR I (I) -0.116 0.920 1.087 -1.249 0.108 
GEAR 2(1) 0.127 0.648 1.542 1.149 0.127 
SQOWND 3(1) 0.181 0.858 1.166 I.881 0.032° 
AUD6 4(1) 0.148 0.875 1.143 1.556 0.062' 
LGSZTA 5(1) 0.364 0.596 1.679 3.146 0.001 ••• 
Adjusted R2 = 0.236 (F=6.939: p= 0.000) 
• Significant at O. l level 
.. Significant at 0.05 level 
••• Significant at 0.0l level 
Discussion of results 
A summary of the significant variables are shown in Table 6.31. The findings 
indicate that independent variables are significant in a number of the models tested. 
All significant results are in the expected direction. Results will be discussed under 
two headings. Firstly the regression results of the relationship of ASX suggested 
governance disclosures to corporate characteristics, namely, regressions for model 1 
will be elaborated This is followed by a discussion of the regression results for 
model 2 that examined ASX suggested disclosures and additional governance related 
disclosures. 
Model 1: Regression results for ASX suggested governance disclosures 
Models l{a) to l{f) examine the results for mining and industrial companies 
disclosing governance items suggested by the ASX for 1995 to 1997. Proportion of 
non-executive directors (NEXDR) is not significant in 1995, 1996, or 1997 for 
mining companies. NEXDR is not significant in 1995 and 1996 for industrial 
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companies, namely, models l(d) and l(e). NEXDR is significant at the (p<0.05) 
level in 1997 for industrial companies (model 1 (f)}, but, the relationship is not in the 
expected direction. Results are consistent with Carson and Simnett (1997) who did 
not find NEXDR to be significant when they examined industrial companies annual 
reports in 1995, however, this variable has become significant in 1997 in the current 
study. This negative relationship implies that with industrial companies, as the 
proportion of non-executive directors to total director's increases, governance 
disclosures as suggested by the ASX become less. This inference is of concern as 
this result is contrary to literature that implies that non-executive directors are likely 
to encourage more governance related disclosures. This result also adds weight to the 
guidelines provided by the AIMA that state that the majority of board members 
should be independent32 rather than just non-executive as proposed by the Bosch 
Committee. 
Gearing (GEAR) which measures the degree to which the firm uses debt capital is 
notably more significant for mining companies than for industrial companies. GEAR 
is significant for mining companies for 1996 (p<0.1) and 1997 {p<O.O 1) as shown in 
results for Models l(b) and l(c). GEAR is not significant in 1995 for mining 
companies. With industrial companies GEAR is significant in 1996 {p<O.l) and is 
not significant in 1995 and 1997. Results are consistent with Carson and Simnett 
(1997) and Evans and Christopher (1999) who did not find gearing to be significantly 
related to governance disclosures in 1995 for industrial and mining companies 
respectively. Gearing does however become significant in 1996 and 1997 for mining 
companies and for industrial companies in 1996 in the current study. This implies 
that for mining companies as gearing increases, the level of governance disclosures 
32 Refer to Appendix E for AIMA guidelines on independent directors 
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suggested by the ASX appears to be increasing. This indicates the possibility that 
creditors in the mining industry due to the risks involved have more influence over 
what the companies disclose with regards to governance issues. Or perhaps it is that 
the directors of mining companies in engaging in the stewardship function, inherent 
risks of the industry obligate them to be more diligent with their governance 
practices and subsequent disclosures. Support for this inference is provided by 
examining Table 6.32 in Appendix D that shows results of correlations between the 
individual categories of governance disclosures and the independent variables. The 
table shows that GEAR in 1997 is significantly correlated at the (p=0.01) level to 
risk related disclosures in mining companies. 
Ownership diffusion (OWND) as measured by the percentage of shares held by 
shareholders other.than the top twenty shareholders is significant for both mining and 
industrial companies. OWND is not significant for mining companies in 1995, but is 
significant in 1996 (p<0.01) and 1997 (p<0.05). As shown, the significance for 
mining companies emerged after the introduction of the listing rule in 1996. OWND 
diffusion is significant for industrial companies in 1995 (p<0.01 ), is not significant in 
1996, but became significant again for 1997 (p<0.1 ). Results are consistent with 
Evans and Christopher (1999) who examined mining companies and did not find 
OWND to be significantly related to governance disclosures in 1995. However 
results are not consistent with Carson and Simnett (1997) who did not find this 
variable to be significant with industrial companies in 1995. The current study 
examines a smaller sample, but OWND is significant in 1995 for industrial 
companies. 
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External auditor being one of the Big 6 (AUD6) is not significant for both mining 
and industrial companies in 199533 before the listing rule was introduced. The 
relationships found in 1995 were not in the expected direction, however, the negative 
relationship was not significant. AUD6 is significant and in the expected direction 
for 1996 (p<0.1) and 1997 (p<0.05) for mining companies. This highlights that for 
mining companies at least, companies that had an external Big 6 auditor disclosed 
more governance related disclosures suggested by the ASX. AUD6 was not 
significant for industrial companies over all three years of the study. 
SZTA is the most significant variable for both mining and industrial companies for 
model 1. For mining companies size is significant at (p<0.01) for 1995, 1996 and 
1997. Industrial companies are significant at (p<0.01) for 1995 and 1997, however 
significance in 1996 is at (p<0.05) level. Size is positively related to governance 
disclosures suggested by the ASX. This demonstrates that firms that are larger in 
size make a greater number of governance related disclosures and is consistent with 
9revious findings by other Australian studies by Carson and Simnett (1997), and 
Evans and Christopher (1999). 
In summary model 1 demonstrates the relationship of governance related disclosures 
suggested by the ASX to five selected corporate characteristics. Prior to the 
introduction of the listing rule, in 1995 firm size was found to be significant for 
mining companies indicating that H5(a) was supported. For industrial companies in 
1995, ownership diffusion and firm size were found to be significant. Indicating that 
H3(d) and 5(d) are supported. In the periods after the introduction of the listing rule 
" 
Results are consistent with Carson and Simnett (1997) with insignificant results in 1995. 
145 
namely 1996 and 1997, the following variables were found to be significant for 
mining companies, gearing, ownership diffusion, Big 6 external auditor and finn 
size. The following hypotheses were accepted for mining companies, H2(b), H3(b), 
H4(b), HS(b), H2(c), Hl(c), H4(c), and HS(c). For industrial companies in 1996 firm 
gearing and size were significant therefore H2(e) and HS(e) were accepted. In 1997 
ownership diffusion, finn size and proportion of non-executive directors were 
significant. Proportion of non-executive directors was not in the expected direction. 
Therefore H3(f) and HS(f) are accepted. The following hypotheses are rejected for 
model I, Hl(a) to Hl(t), H2(a), H2(d), H2(t), Hl(a), Hl(e), H4(a), and H4(d) to 
H4(!). 
Model 2: Regression results for ASX suggested and additional items of 
governance disclosures 
NEXDR is not significant for mining companies in 1995 and 1996. However, 
NEXDR does become moderately significant at the (p<0.1) level in 1997. NEXDR 
is not significant for industrial companies in any of the years of the study. It should 
however be noted that NEXDR was negatively related to ASX and additional items 
of governance disclosure in 1997 for industrial companies. This was not in the 
expected direction, however, the result was not significant. It appears that mining 
companies that have a greater proportion of non-executive directors influence 
additional items of disclosure in 1997. 
GEAR for mining companies is moderately related to ASX and additional items of 
governance disclosure in 1996 and 1997 (p<O.l). GEAR is not significant in 1995. 
For industrial companies, GEAR is related to TGD+Asx in 1996 (p<0.1), but not in 
1995 or 1997. 
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OWND is significantly related to ASX and additional items of governance disclosure 
for mining companies in 1995 (p<0.05), 1996 (p<0.01) and 1997 (p<0.01). This 
significance is similar for industrial companies where in 1995 (p<0.01), 1996 
(p<0.05) and 1997 (p<0.05). 
AUD6 is significant for mining companies in 1996 (p<0.05) and 1997 (p<O.I), but 
not significant in 1995. This significance is the same for industrial companies where 
1996 (p<0.05) and 1997 (p<0.1) and 1995 is not significant. It should be noted that 
AUD6 is negatively correlated in 1995 for industrial companies, which is not in the 
expected direction, but the result is not significant. 
Firm size is significant at (p<0.01) level for both mining and industrial companies for 
all three years of the study. This indicates that ASX and additional items of 
governance disclosure are highly correlated to firm size. 
In summary model 2 demonstrates the relationship of governance related disclosures 
suggested by the ASX plus additional items of governance disclosure to five selected 
corporate characteristics. Before the listing rule, in 1995 firm size and ownership 
diffusion were found to be significant for mining companies and industrial 
companies. Therefore H3(g), HS(g), H3G), and HSG) are supported. After the 
introduction of the listing rule in I 996, the following variables, gearing, ownership 
diffusion, Big 6 external auditor and firm size were found to be significant for 
mining companies and industrial companies. Therefore, the following hypotheses 
were accepted, H2(h), H3(h), H4(h), HS(h), H2(k), H3(k), H4(k), and HS(k). In 
1997 all independent variables were significant for mining companies. These 
hypotheses were accepted, Hl(i), H2(i), H3(i), H4(i), and HS(i). For industrial 
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companies in 1997 ownership diffusion, Big 6 external auditor and firm size were 
significant. Therefore, H3(1), H4(1) and HS(l) were accepted. The following 
hypotheses are rejected Hl(g), Hl(h), HIG) to Hl(l), H2(g), H2G), H2(1), H4(g), 
H4G). 
Summary 
This chapter has provided results of empirical tests performed to support the 
hypotheses. Overall the results indicate that, firstly, governance disclosures have 
increased from 1995 to 1997. In addition, differences exist with disclosures made by 
mining and industrial companies. Governance disclosures are significantly related to 
GEAR, OWND, AUD6 and SZTA for mining companies and OWND and SZTA for 
industrial companies. Most notable was the significant negative relationship found 
between governance disclosures and NEXDR for industrial companies. Although no 
significant relationships were found, the negative relationships with A UD6 were not 
expected. The following chapter summarises the main findings, implications and 
limitations of the study. Some areas for future research are also provided. 
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Table 6.31 
Summary of significant variables 
MINING INDUSTRIAL 
Models Models 
ASX I +ASX ASX I +ASX 
Variable Hypothesis 1995 1996 1997 1995 1996 1995 1996 1997 1996 
No. I a l(b I c 2 2 I d 1 e 1 2 
1 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 ('') 0 0 (0) NEXDR 
GEAR 2 0 • ... 0 • • 0 • 0 0 • 0 
OWND 3 0 ... .. .. • •• ... ... 0 • ... .. .. 
-... AUD6 4 (0) • .. 0 .. • (0) 0 0 (0) .. • 
"' SZTA 5 ... ... ... ... ... .. . ... .. ... ... .. . ... 
0 Not significant 
(0) Not significant negative relationship 
• Significant at 0.1 Jevel 
.. Significant at 0.05 level 
... Significant at 0.01 level 
(*) Significant at 0.1 level but not in expected direction 
(**) Significant at 0.05 level but not in expected direction 
CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
The objective of this study has been to examine the annual reports of mining and 
industrial companies to empirically determine if there is a relationship between 
governance related disclosures and selected corporate characteristics within a 
political cost theory framework. Two types of governance disclosures were 
examined. Firstly, governance disclosures suggested by the ASX in Appendix 4A of 
listing rule 4.10.334 and secondly, actual governance disclosures made in addition to 
the suggestions of the listing rule. 
Chapter 2 highlights Australian governance related research conducted prior to and 
after the introduction of the tiS-ting rule and some indirectly related overseas studies. 
Chapter 3 elaborates political cost theory, the theoretical framework for the study, 
and provides support for the inclusion of the independent variables and subsequent 
hypotheses development. There are five independent variables including firm size, 
"The indicative list of corporate governance practices that was in Appendix 4A has been 
relocated to be an attachment to the new Guidance Note 9 'Disclosure of Corporate governance 
practices: Listing rule 4,10'. ASX has stated it will conduct a review of the indicative list in 
Guidance note 9 although the timing for this is uncertain. New matters to be included in the 
guidance note are the inclusion ofa statement in the annual report; concerning the main practices 
and procedures for ensuring compliance in Listing rules 3.1 and 15.7 and about the company's 
policies in relation to securities trading by directors and employees, including trading windows" 
(Hempel, S. and Brown, L. 2002, p. 27). 
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gearing, proportion of non-executive directors, Big 6 external auditor and ownership 
diffusion. 
Chapter 4 incorporates the research methodology, outlining the sample selection, 
data sources, definitions for dependent and independent variables and statistical 
analysis to be conducted. The primary data source was the annual report with data 
collected for 100 mining and 100 industrial companies for the years 1995, 1996 and 
1997. Governance disclosures comprised eight categories relating to disclosure of 
directors, board membership, appointment and retirement of directors, ability to seek 
independent advice, remuneration, audit, business risk and ethics. An unweighted 
dichotomous index comprising a total of 55 items was applied to scoring governance 
disclosures. These 55 items were divided into 30 items that related to items 
suggested by the ASX and an additional 25 items found in annual reports of the 
sample of companies. Companies that disclosed an item received a sc"re of one and 
non-disclosure received a score of zero. Individual scores were summed to obtain a 
total score for each company. This total score was used in subsequent multivariate 
regression analysis. 
Chapter 5 provided an analysis of governance disclosures. The results indicated that 
although governance disclosures are being made and have consistently increased~ 
findings have highlighted some areas where disclosures are lacking. Improvements 
in disclosure could be encouraged in areas of reviewing the boards and directors 
performance, procedures for reviewing membership of the board of directors, 
disclosure of compensation arrangements for executives and non-executive directors, 
and the provisions of information on the procedures for nominating external auditors 
and examining the scope and qua1ity of the external auditor. 
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Chapter 6 provides results of statistical tests. Raw data were transformed to allow 
data to be used in Ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regression. Two regression 
models were constructed namely governance disclosures suggested by the ASX and, 
secondly, including additional items of governance disclosures. A total of twelve 
regressions were tested within theses two models. 
Findings 
Overall results clearly indicate that governance related disclosures have increased as 
a result of the introduction of listing rule 4.10.3. Most disclosures have more than 
doubled from 1995, the period prior to the introduction of the listing rule to 1996 and 
1997, the periods after the introduction of the listing rule. In 1995, the most 
prevalent categories of governance disclosure as suggested by the ASX, relate to 
audit and remuneration governance disclosures for both mining companies and 
industrial companies. When additional items of governance disclosure are included, 
risk information also becomes prevalent. After the introduction of the listing rule, 
the most prevalent categories of governance disclosure remain audit and 
remuneration information for both industry groups. The highest ranked item for both 
industry groups was item 2.1 that examined the break-up of directors into executive 
and non-executive directors. The presence of an audit committee and the 
acknowledgment that risk exists were also highly ranked. There was a Jack of 
disclosure for a number of governance items for both mining and industrial 
companies. Some of these included, disclosure of procedures for reviewing the 
performance of directors, acknowledgment that companies have a fonnal review of 
the boards or directors performance, procedures for reviewing the membership of the 
board of directors, the main procedures for establishing and reviewing the 
152 
compensation arrangements for non-executive directors and procedures for 
nominating external auditors. 
The findings of OLS multiple regression model 1 show the relationship of ASX 
suggested governance disclosures to the five selected corporate characteristics. In 
1995 the year prior to the introduction of the listing rule, firm size was significant for 
mining and industrial companies. Ownership diffusion was also significant for 
industrial companies in 1995, but not mining companies. In the year after the 
introduction of the listing rule, 1996, firm size and ownership diffusion, external 
auditor and gearing were significant for mining companies. Firm size and gearing 
were significant for industrial companies in 1996. In 1997 firm size, and ownership 
diffusion were significant for mining and industrial companies. Gearing and Big 6 
external auditor were significant for mining companies and not industrial companies. 
Proportion of non-executive directors was significantly negatively related to 
governance disclosures for industrial companies in 1997, tl lis was not expected. 
The findings of OLS multiple regression model 2 show the relationship of ASX 
suggested disclosures and additional items of actual disclosure to the five corporate 
characteristics. In 1995 the year prior to the introduction of the listing rule, firm size 
and ownership diffusion were significant for both mining and industrial companies. 
In 1996 the year the listing rule was introduced, gearing, ownership diffusion, Big 6 
external auditor and size were significant for mining and industrial companies. In 
1997 firm size, ownership diffusion and Big 6 external auditor were significant for 
mining and industrial companies. Gearing and proportion of non-executive directors 
were significant for mining companies in 1997 but not for industrial companies. 
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Implications 
The implications of the findings are, firstly, that gearing may be considered to be 
more significant within the mining companies due to the inherent risks associated 
with the industry and consequent political visibility of these firms. Directors in 
mining companies appear to be making a conscious choice to voluntarily disclose 
risk related governance information. Additional guidelines or more stringent 
legislation may encourage more consistent risk related disclosures within and 
between industry groups. Further it highlights that any proposed changes to 
disclosure requirements should take into consideration the different risks associated 
with the different industry groups. 
The negative relationship that was found between the proportion of non-executive 
directors and governance disclosures in industrial companies was not expected. This 
does, however, highlight that additional research may be required. This result lends 
weight to the comments provided by Stapledon and Lawrence (1996) who provided 
valuable commentary on the notion of independent non-executive directors. The 
author's highlight that detached monitoring may be difficult for independent non-
executive directors due to inherent affiliations and close allies with management. 
For instance, non-executive directors commonly owe their positions to the 
chairperson or CEO. In addition, some of these non-executive directors are 
themselves executives with other listed companies and it is not uncommon for them 
to socialise in the same circles and this represents potential barriers to vigorous 
effective monitoring. The AIMA recognise this problem and have made 
recommendations that boards should appoint a nomination committee with a chair 
who is an independent non-executive director (1995, para 3.5). It may be time for 
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authorities to encourage more independent directors or place more stringent 
requirements on the role of independent non-executive directors and subsequent 
disclosures in the annual report. With this in mind it should be highlighted that all 
companies have their own circumstances. By conforming to the view of the majority 
as to what constitutes good governance, and implementing widely acceptable 
policies, can often result in over governance. This can be expensive and often 
counter productive to the best interests and efficient operations of a company. For 
example, of what use is an audit committee to a small company where all directors 
already sign off on the accounts (Barnier 2001). 
The recent corporate collapses of large US and Australian based companies has 
raised shareholders concerns with corporate governance. In addition to this, recent 
media attention on the large salaries and bonuses received by corporate executives in 
these failed companies has focussed attention in remuneration and audit related 
information. The current study highlights that information in relation to remuneration 
and audit information was not adequate. Although a targe number of companies 
acknowledged that procedures existed for determining the remuneration of 
executives and non-executives a significant number of mining and industrial 
companies provided no information of the main procedures for determining 
remuneration of executives and non-executives. 
With audit related information a large number of companies had audit committees 
and disclosed the members of this committee, and the main procedures and policies 
of the committee, but few disclosed policies on the procedures for nominating an 
external auditor. Further, a large number of companies failed to provide information 
on reviewing the adequacy of external audit arrangements. 
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Shareholders are becoming reluctant to trust company directors and are demanding 
improved standards of corporate governance in an effort to reduce this gap in trust. 
This wili have implications on the expectations of regulatory bodies to take action to 
protect shareholders and improve governance disclosures. A recent proposal in the 
US has seen legislation introduced to increase fines and jail terms for directors found 
guilty of fraud. Similar proposals have been made in Australia. In an effort to 
improve director accountability in Australia it may also be useful for regulatory 
authorities to examine and suggest improvements in remuneration and audit related 
information. In a final note, as proposed by the Treasurer Mr Peter Costello, 
11tougher regulation was not enough to stamp out corporate misbehaviour, and that 
executives need to take responsibility for maintaining confidence in business 
practices" (Davis and Fabro, 2002). 
Limitations 
This study is subject to a number of limitations. Firstly, the sample size may be 
considered to be biased towards larger companies as the majority of companies were 
taken from the C4 database, which has the annual reports for the top 500 companies 
by market capitalisation. Results are, therefore, only generalisable to larger mining 
and industrial companies. Secondly this study acknowledges that finns may engage 
in various governance related activities, however, these are not disclosed in the 
annual report. This study had a purpose of examining governance disclosures in the 
annual report only. This may be considered a limitation as companies may disclose 
governance information using media other than the annual report such as press 
releases, and other publications for the benefit of shareholders, these are not easily 
accessible. The annual report is readily available and remains one of the most useful 
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tools to obtain governance information. Thirdly, a single researcher undertook the 
content analysis in the annual report and that might result in bias. Nevertheless it is 
possible results may be more consistent by having one researcher. Fourthly, the 
disclosure index used is unweighted which assumes that each item of disclosure is of 
equal importance. While equal ranking may be considered a deficiency, misranking 
of disclosure items is avoided. Finally, the 55 items examined in this study represent 
those suggested by the ASX listing rule together with additional items of disclosure 
found in the annual reports of the companies included in the sample. This list of 
items it not an exhaustive list of governance related disclosures for all companies and 
may be perceived as a limitation. 
Suggestions for future research 
Future research can be undertaken in a number of directions. Consideration fo i 
adopting a weighted index of governance disclosure items including additional items 
required by other stakeholders may be considered. A longitudinal study focusing on 
more recent governance disclosure practices and comparisons with trends overseas 
may be beneficial for regulators in the current climate where directors have been 
found to be misleading stakeholders. 
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APPENDIX A 
ASX Listing Rule 4.10.3 
"For annual reporting periods ending on or after 30 June 1996, a statement of the 
main corporate governance practices that the company has had in place during the 
reporting period. Where the statement identifies a corporate governance practice that 
has been in place for only part of the reporting period, the part of the period for 
which it has been in place must be disclosed. To assist companies, an indicative list 
of corporate governance practices is set out in Appendix 4A" 
Appendix4A 
I. Whether individual directors, including the Chairman, are executive or non-
exccutive directors. 
2. The main procedures that the company has had in place for -
i. devising criteria for board membership 
ii. reviewing the membership of the board, and 
iii. nominating directors 
If any of these procedures involve a nomination committee, a summary of the 
main responsibilities of the committee, and the names of committee 
members. If one or more of the members are not directors of the company, 
their positions in the company. 
3. The companies policies on the terms and conditions relating to the 
appointment and retirement of non-executive directors. 
4. The main procedures, if any, by which directors in the furtherance of their 
duties can seek independent professional advice at the company's expense. 
5. The main procedures for establishing and reviewing the compensation 
arrangements for-
i. the Chief Executive Officer and other senior executives and 
ii. non-executive members of the board 
If these procedures involve a remuneration committee, a summary of the 
main responsibilities and core rights of the committee, and the names of 
committee members. If one or more members are not directors of the 
company, their positions in the company. 
6. The main procedures that the company has in place for-
i. the nomination of external Auditors, and 
ii. reviewing the adequacy of existing external Audit arrangements, with 
particular emphasis on the scope of the quality of the Audit. 
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•• 
If any of these procedures involves an Audit committee, a summary of the 
main responsibilities and core rights of the committee, and the names of 
committee members. If one or more members are not directors of, their 
positions in the company. 
7. The board's approach to identifying areas of significant business risk and 
putting arrangements in place to manage those risks. 
8. The company's policy on the establishment and maintenance of appropriate 
ethical standards. 
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APPENDIXB 
List of mining and industrial companies 
NO I COMPANY NAME 
Mining companies 
ASX 
CODE 
IND I INDUSTRY 
CODE I NAME 
YEAR DATA I CURRENCY ! 
END SOURCE I 
! 1~{~t;e~l~es- --- · -------------:r --;--1i~:~ ~-e(a!s_ -- -:~:b:- ----~:- --+---~~~- --· 11 
- · 3 A1igas Energy iid.- - -- --- ----- -- --- -AGE- - - · 4 --- 1Ellergy · - .. - -- _ ~~o~i~n~ ~ ---C4- --+--- -AiJS- -- - ~ 1 
. - -4 AllglO PiidfiC RC.~ollfCCS-- - --- --- -- - ·xap · -. -· 2 - · joth"eii.felais-- - 31-Dec - -A(fs}A-- ---pQlJNDs·· i 
--s Ashlo"n"Mil'liiiSitd------------··-···-AsH·--- i"" IOthl:iMelals ___ ""J1~oec·----·c4 . Aus· ""' l 
- ·5 AtiiisiaCifiC.Ltd -- -- - --- ·-- ------ "A'fP. - - -.-- ·1001d ____ -·-. --- -·31:oec·· -- -·c:4· -. ·,. -- . A.Us· -- ! 
----··---------------- ______ J________ ---···--·----··--·!---- --- .; 
!~=:ii~;~oidandResourc~Sitd ~~~ --}--]~~::--- --~~:~u~··-,.·{1·--1----1~{ 
,:i:::::::::~It!1~i''~"'; 1~~ f l::~r,- :::::: "!0 :1 :J~{. 
:: ~~:tt::f.:: Ltd ~: F 1~::: : _ _ _ ::::::: H:D + -:~~ ! 
-:::::~ea~:i~l:t~:-ppei-Ltd-------------~~i-- -~--1~~1~---- ---·· _l_l:(?ec __ ~~:~~~-:1·:· __ -5~~-- 1 ~ .iSl~r?~~~~ill~r~pf_i~t~'?'-~~mPanr:Ltd ___ ~~~( :I· t iit::.;:'}" I:::~; ~: i ·::· 
--:t1~::;:i ~~::tl~ -------------· ---~TI- -· · 1-· 1;;~~i(e(a!5~~ J --!-:=~~~ - C4 -i-. - - i~-! 
1s'centaurMirlillg-lltldEXPloiatiOn CTR IGo\d I JO-Jun C4 i!· AUS 
I 19CCntellllla!C0iifcompllllYitd ------cEY-- 4"""IEnel'SY"·--- 1-jo--iun---1 C4 AUS 
1- - 20 Cetltraf Noraeman GOid COrp Ltd -- . -- -CNG" IG01Ct" - . - 1· fo-iuO" C4 1- AUS 
ii: : ~! !j~::it:: ~:--. : : : ~ --------~~: ~ .: 1:En: ~e,lt,•gyi ~ : __ - - _: II-_ --·,r.:,._~D~-~;,.-::_ ·1 ~: ! :~: 
__ 2!J~~a_l_ ~- ~l_li~ I~~~f:rie~ _Ltd_ CNA 4 - _ _ _. _____ , __ ... _ ~". -j- C4 J AUS 
241ComalcoLtd ·------ _!:_~~-- 2 OtherMetals 1 _J_l-D~. C4 _
1
, __ AUS 
___ 25 ~~ns~l!d_ated_~uti_l~- ~td __ . CRT 2 Other Metals i JO-Jun C4 _ _ _ AUS 
_ 26j
1
~ud?!~ !ll 1:~ . _ _ _ CUD _ ~ ~: )?~e~ ~:e!a!s:: JO-Jun C4 AUS 
_3;~;1~:;-~1~:·· ·- - ------ ~~~ ; 1:;:~Metals !~:~~: :· ~: _i- ~~: 
29,Devex Ltd DEV - ICJotd- - . JO-Jun C4 1 AUS 
-- J°OIDOmitlionMin'ingi.!d DOM 1001(( i -30:Jun·· C4 AUS 
·:j"ii~ii~~~J.u_~~i_ull{~td .. EAM 2 J?thCr_~.eta~s_:-1··3·1:nec- C4 AUS 
__ J~l~l~_tr_o_n:ietal~ Minin~ Ltd_. EMM __ i<?~ld_ 30-Ju_n._ i. HARD AUS 
33!Emperor Mines EM? I ;Gold JO.Jun C4 AUS 
,
1
--- J4iEllerg_y_ Eqiiit);CorporatiOn - · - · , 
· ~ j~l~n_e~gy_ Res~~~s-~f ~us~iilill fti( 
36:Esmeraldn Exploration 
r- 37:GeogTllphe Re.'iOUTCeS 
1- -Js:Ghana Gold Mines Ltd 
t - i9(Gold Milles Or Ausll'llfii Ltlf 
[- -4010~!~ ~ines OfsBrd-il"lia - -
~ _ 41 ~o!~fi~J~s Lt~- __ _ 
, 42 Goldrim Mining Australia j - 43 Gwalia Consolidated Ltfd 
[: 44 ~er~t(ReSO~~~s- - : 
EEC 4 iEnerSY- JO.Jun C4 AUS 
ERA 4 · !Ellergy" ·· 
1 
Jo.ju-n 1 · C4 ; AUS 
ESE I [Gali. .. :·-Jo.Jun ASX _, AUS 
-~H~ _ .j 1~~ld. ~. [_~O-Ju~n~ HARD .i AUS 
--~(iS _ -I I j':iold _ _ _ _ ' JO.Jun -, C4 AUS 
~~; · i· 2 -l~::r ¥etais- ~~:~~: i H~:D ~~: 
j~~ld _ _ _ , _ 30-Jun C4 AUS 
1
1<:1old _ _ __ i _30-J~n ASX AUS 
Other Metals , 30-Jun C4 AUS 
j~OJd --- -- -·--3o-J1Jn C4 AUS 
- __ , 
GLD 
GRM 
GWC I 2 
HER 
.. 
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NO COMPANY NAME ASX I IND I INDUSTRY YEAR I DATA i CURRENCY CODE CODE I NAME END I SOURCE 
45 HomeStake Mining HSM I I Gold 31-Dec C4 !US 46 lntennin Resources \RC Gold JO-Jun HARD AUS - - -- - - - .. - - -
47 Kidston Gold Mines Ltd KGM I Gold Ji-Dec C4 AUS 48 Kiwi Gold KIW Go1if ! 31-Mar GA SNZ i I 49 Lihir Gold LHG 
I 
Gold JI-Dec GA SUS 
. . . - - - . r C4 I AUS 50 Macmahon Holdings MAH 2 Other Metals JO-Jun 
--t- I .. -~1IMiicl'8es-·Mmiri'g-Con1}aiiY"L1d MMC I Gold i 31-Dec C4 SNZ 
":i2iM!l.gellan Petr01eum A"\15b"ll.1ia Ltd MAG I 4 Energy ! JO-Jun C4 J AUS 
_ -~~1-~~ik~th-~ _Mirl~rlliS -- -- ·- MKA I 4 rnergy i JO-Jun HARD AUS 
' I 
I I 54 MIM Holdings Ltd MIM 2 Oth_er Me!als I JO-Jun C4 AUS ~ ~~[~I ~yS~onG~~d-~!n~~ Lil~~LY- -MLG I 1Gold JO-Jun C4 I AUS 561New Zealand Oil and Gas NZO 4 IEl'lergy i JO-Jun C4 I SNZ 57)Ne'Nc-rl!si Minfng Ltd ! NCM 1Gold I JO-Jun ! C4 + AUS I SB]Niugini Miriill.g Ltd. la01ct ' - ,_ NML JI-Dec ' C4 SUS 
(-- 591Non,,mdy Mioiog Ltd NDY ! ja01ct_ JO-Jun C4 I AUS 
-1-- ! 60 North Flinders NFM ! 3 -:Diversified Res JO-Jun C4 AUS 
i ' -6l1NorthLtd NBH ___ jG~ld_ JO-Jun C4 AUS 
' -r--
_, -
621Novus Petroleum Ltd NVS 4 :Enersy JI-Dec C4 AUS 
I ! -1- -6JINullabor Holding NLB ! 1Gold JO-Jun HARD AUS 
64J~il Company of Aus~aii!l ~td OCA ! 4 ]Ener8Y JO-Jun C4 AUS I 
6SjOilSearch Ltd OSH ' 4 - ]Energy JI-Dec C4 SKINA 
1 - 66)61yntpus Res-ources OLP 2 
I - -
JI-Dec GA AUS iOther Metals 
r - - ' - - - - - -
OTR I 1Gotd JO-Jun C4 SNZ · 6710tter Gold Mines 
I 10ther Metals 681Pacific Mining PFM 2 JO-Jun ASX AUS 
69j Paget Mirling PGT :aold JO-Jun GA AUS 
10\ Pancontinental Min ins PCM 2 ;Other Metals JO-Jun AGSM AUS 
f1 j Pasminco Ltd PAS 2 ,Other Metals JO-Jun C4 AUS 
721 Perseverance Corp PSV :ootd 30-Jun C4 AUS 
731 Petsec Energy PSA 4 'Energy 31-Dec C4 AUS 
141Placer Dome Inc PDG 2 : Other Metals JI-Dec C4 SUS 
J - . • I 
75 j Portman Mining Ltd PMM 4 :Enersy JI-Dec C4 AUS 
' 76;Precious Metals PMA :Gold JO-Jun C4 AUS 
11:QCT Resources Ltd QRL 4 !Energy JO-Jun C4 AUS 
78jQNI Ltd QN\ 2 Other Metals JO-Jun C4 AUS 
79;Queensland Metals Corp ' QMC 2 · Other Metals JO-Jun C4 AUS 
80!Range Resources RRS Gold JO-Jun ASX AUS 
st!Resolule Ltd RSG 'Gotd JO-Jun C4 AUS 
82 RGC Ltd RGC Gold JO-Jun C4 AUS 
83;Rio Tinto- CRA RIO 3 Di\'ersified Res JI-Dec C4 AUS 
84 Santos Ltd STD 4 Ener8Y JI-Dec C4 AUS 
85
1
Sa\·age Resources Ltd SVR 2 Other Metals JO-Jun C4 AUS 
86 'Sons ofGwalia Ltd SGW Gold JO-Jun C4 AUS 
sis, Barbara Mines Ltd SBM Gold 30-Jun C4 AUS 
881Slnlits Reso~es Ltd SRL 2 Other Metals JI-Dec C4 AUS 
89°Tasmania Mines TMM 2 Other Metals GA AUS 
90°Ticor Ltd TOR 3 Diversified Res JI-Dec C4 AUS 
91 :Triako Resources TKR 2 Other Metals 30-Jun HARD AUS 
9i' Valiant Consolidated VLT I Gold JI-Dec C4 AUS 
93 Wenie Gold WER :Gold 30-Jun HARDIC4 AUS 
94°Westem Metals WMT 2 Other Metals JO-Jun C4 AUS 
95:westem Reef WRF Gold 30-Jun HARD AUS 
96 · Westralian Sands Ltd WSL 2 Other Metals JI-Dec C4 AUS 
9iWMC Ltd WMC 2 Other Metals 30-Jun C4 AUS 
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!NO 1,1COMPANYNAME ASX IND II INDUSTRY I YEAR I DATA CURRENCY 1· I I CODE CODE NAME END SOURCE 
C4 
AGSM 
HARD 
GA 
ASX 
IND 
= Connect 4 Database 
= Australian Graduate School of Management disks (library) 
= Hard copy from ECU Library 
= Global Access - UWA library - www.pdmarkga.eo.uk/ 
= Australian Stock Exchange 
= Industry 
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Industrial companies 
NO !COMPANY NAME ASX IND 
' 
INDUSTRY NAME YEAR I DATA !CURRENCY' 
CODE CODE! END SOURCE ! 
_ )I ~~e_la_i~e- Baru.c_ ~t~ _____ ADB 16 i Banlcs and Finance JO-Jun I- C4 AUS 
_ 21~~e!a_i~e Br_ig~t~n ~td- ___ - . ABC 7 jB_~iiding Materials _ 30-Jun C4 AUS 
3!~~1~~1~ Hoidi~gs_L_t~ _ AHD 24 Tourism and Leisure lO-Jw, I C4 i AUS 
. AMC-
- !Paper and Packaging 30.Juri 1 I 41Amcor Ltd 12 C4 AUS SIAPEagCl"SLtd - - · APf( 22 iMisc. lndllStrillls ~~~= l C4 AUS ,IChemicals- ' 6, Asia Picific Spedalt}' Chemicals-Ltd APY 10 C4 . 
I 
AUS 
I : :lli:i:~~t·i,~td. -- ' AKC 22 [Misc. Industrials 30-Jun C4 AUS ATP 22 j~isc. lndustria_ls 30-Jun C4 AUS 
ASL 22 !Misc. Industrials 30-Jun C4 ' AUS I
I '°['"'''" Ltd ANE 7 ,Building Materials 30-Jun C4 I AUS 11 AustI"alian Chemical Holdings - - ACH 10 !chemicals 30-Jun C4 AUS t . 12 t::i'"'"'" Cm•olidotol ln,ostn<i~ AUC 19 I 1nv and Fiitcl ·s"erv 30-Jun C4 AUS ! I 
: ·1~ r~us~~l_i~n- FOundatio:n· Jnvestn_w:nt AF!- 19 :Inv and Finci"SerV 
---J~~i:\ C4 AUS 141 Australian Gas Light Company, The AGL 5 j lnfrast and Util C4 AUS 
. ·" ['"'"'"'" ""''"'' '"'"'"'" Ltd 
ANI II I Engineering - -- - I C4 31_-~ec I AUS 
16 Australian Provincial Newspapers APN IS ;Media 31-Dec j C4 AUS 
___ .1-!0:ldi_ng~ ' I 
\- __ l_7(ustrim Ltd ARL" 2l i Div Industrials Jo.Jun 1 C4 AUS 
:Tourism and Leisure ' 
I 
18 AWA Ltd AWA 24 30.Jun ! C4 AUS 
19; Ba-nk of Queensland BQD 16 iBanics and Finance 
~0-Jun I C4 AUS 
- 2o;si?1_a_HoldingS Ltd BTA 21 ! Misc. Services 30-Jun C4 AUS I . 2118\ack_mores Ltd BKL 21 j Misc. Services 30.Jun I C4 AUS I 221Boral Ltd BOR 7 [ Building Materials 30-Jun ! C4 AUS 
' . 2~ )BT Equity Managem~nl . 31-DCC ! BTE 
" 
'Inv and Find Serv C4 AUS 
2~i BT Resources Management Ltd BTM 
" 
j1nv and Fine] Serv 30-Jun I C4 AUS 
25°BTR Pie BTL 23 : Div Industrials 30-Jun : C4 AUS 
26iBums. Philp and Cofl1}any Ltd BPC 9 : Food and Hshld goods 30-Jun j C4 AUS 
27jCadbury Schweppes Public Ltd CBS 9 'Food and Hshld goods JO.Jun C4 AUS 
__ :company 
' I
31-D" i i _ 2_8jCambooya Investments Ltd CBI 19 'Inv and Find Serv C4 AUS 
I CIN 19 : Inv and Fine I Serv C4 AUS 
I 
291Carlton Investments Ltd 30-Jun I 
JO!Chatham Investment-Co. Lid CTM 19 : Inv and Fincl Serv 30.Jun i C4 AUS 
31 :coles Myer Ltd CML ll !Retail 30-Jun i C4 AUS 
- I - - - -
:Banks and Finance 30.Jun 1 C4 321Commonwealth Bank Of Australia CBA 16 AUS 
- °J3;cons01idated Paper Industries- CPI 12 ! Paper and Packaging 30.Jun , C4 AUS 
' : Div Industrials 34 Coventry Group Ltd CYG 2l JO.Jun 1 C4 AUS 
3s!cre\'et Ltd iEngineering ' CRV II 30-Jun ,' C4 AUS 
- I - . 
: Misc. Services 361CSL Ltd CSL 21 30-Jun C4 AUS 
- . - . . DVD. . ' 
i- 37'Davids Ltd ll Retail 30-Jun I C4 AUS I . - - - - !Develop and Contr 30-Jun 1 L . 381Dellin Property Group Ltd DPG 6 C4 AUS l . .. 11nv and Fine\ Serv ' 391Develo_plt)ent CapJtal of Aust~lia Ltd DVC 19 30-Jun I C4 AUS 
40 Diversified United Investment Ltd DUI 19 Inv and Fincl Serv 30-Jun ! - C4 AUS 
_4-1 jDjerriwatfh Investments Ltd DJW 19 ·'Jnv and Fine! Serv 30.1un I C4 AUS 
421Email Ltd F.ML 2l Div Industrials 30-Jun ! C4 AUS 
43iEneigy Developments Ltd 'ENE 5 'lnfrast and Util JI-Dec; C4 AUS 
44:Enterprise Solutions Asia Pacific Ltd ESA 18 '.Telecommunications 30-Jun : C4 AUS 
4S1F Al Insurance Group Ltd 17 ' JO.Jun ] C4 FAI ·insurance AUS 
461Femz Corporation Ltd FZC IO "Chemicals 30-Jun C4 AUS 
4 7' Finemore Holdings Ltd ' FMH 14 Transport 30-Jun · C4 AUS 
48:Foodland Associated Ltd FOA ll Retail 30.Jun · C4 AUS 
49/Forrester and Parker ·ar()IJP Ltd FRP 6 Develop and Contr 30.Jun : C4 AUS 
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INO I COMPANY NAME 
I 50 Goodman Fielder Ltd 
I: :sJ Go~iit~ B~s:L,d _ 
52 Greenchip Investments Ltd 
i --53 Green's Foods Ltd 
'
! _ 54 Hancock and Gore Lid 
SSIHIH Winterthur Insurance 
I . 56 Hol~n Ltd _ 
1 
57[ Hydromet Corporation Ltd 
j 58!1ntellect Holdings Ltd 
I - 59!1poh Ltd 
' 60!Jatdine Matheson Holdings Ltd 
: - 6IiLemvest Ltd 
f -- 62!Matine Ltd 
63!MaxiLink Ltd , 
64;McConnell Dowell Corporation Ltd 
65]Memtec Ltd 
- 66!Metal Manufactures Ltd 
67•Metalcorp Ltd 
- 681MMI Ltci 
69(Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd , 
70!Petaluma Ltd 
71 )Pioneer International Ltd 
721Pirelli Cables Australia Ltd 
73!Priinac Holdings Ltd 
74) Prime Television Ltd 
7SjQBE Insurance Group LtJ 
76iQUF Industries Ltd 
77)R.M. Williams Holdings Ltd 
78j Reece Australia Ltd 
79; Rock Building Society Ltd, The 
-, 
80) Rural ~ress Ltd 
81 [Seven Network Ltd 
82!SGIO Insurance Ltd 
8~jsimsmetal Ltd 
84;Spectnun Network Systems Ltd 
85'.Spicers Paper Ltd 
' 86 Spottess Group Ltd 
81ispo1less Services Ltd 
88)Sunraysia Television Ltd 
89: Technicbe Ltd 
90: Telecasters Australia Ltd 
91 'Telecom Corporation Of New Zealand 
,Ltd 
92 Television and Media Services 
93 TelTJIO Services Ltd 
94' Tiger Investment Company Ltd 
9s'TooG1 and Co. Ltd 
96.Wako Kwikfonn 
97' Walker Corporation 
98 Wattyl Ltd 
99 Wesfanners Ltd 
100 Whitefield Ltd 
ASX 
CODE 
GMF 
GOW 
GR! 
GFD 
HNG 
HIH 
HLN 
HMC 
!HG 
!PH 
JMH 
LEV 
MAT 
MAX 
MDC 
MET 
MMF 
MTL 
MMU 
PPT 
PLM 
PNI 
PRL 
PRH 
PRT 
QBE 
QUF 
RMW 
REH 
ROK 
RUP 
SEV 
SGI 
SMS 
SNM 
SCP 
SPT 
SPS 
STV 
THE 
TCA 
TEC 
TMS 
TEM 
TIG 
TIH 
WKM 
WKC 
WYL 
WES 
WHF 
IND I INDUSTRY NAME 
CODE: 
9 iFood and Hshld goods 
13 - - )Retaii 
19 · - :1llv and Fiilcl S-erv 
9 ;Food and Hshld goods 
23 IDiv Industrials 
17 ·insurance 
14 'Trans~ort 
22 •Misc. Industrials 
22 iMisc. Industrials , 
6 · Develop and Contr 
23 · :oiv lndllStrials 
I.. -
19 :1nv and Fine\ Serv 
19 iliiv and Fine\ Serv 
19 ,Inv and Fine[ Serv 
, . 
6 ,Develop and Contr 
, 
22 jMisc. Industrials 
23 piv Industrials 
22 •Misc. Industrials 
17 
19 
8 
7 
18 
22 
15 
17 
9 
13 
7 
16 
15 
15 
17 
22 
18 
12 
22 
22 
IS 
18 
IS 
18 
IS 
22 
19 
19 
7 
6 
7 
23 
19 
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:Insurance 
! Inv and Fincl Serv 
t Alcohol and Tobacco 
i Building Materials 
[Tel~ommunicatiOns 
I Misc. Industrials 
!Media , 
I Insurance 
'. Food and Hshld goods 
:Retail 
1Building Materials 
, . ]Banks and Finance 
jMedia 
I Media 
itnsurance 
' I Misc. Industrials 
[Telecommunications 
iPaper and Packaging 
!Misc. Industrials 
iMisc. Industrials 
!Media 
:Telecommunications 
[Media 
I Telecommunication 
[Media 
! Misc. Industrials 
, 
j Inv and Fine] Serv 
!1nv and Fine] Serv 
.
1
, Building Materials 
Develop and Contr 
[ Building Matcri~ls 
I Div Industrials 
' iInv and Fine] Serv 
YEAR I DATA I CURRENCY! 
END SOURCE I 
30-Jun i C4 AUS 
30-J\111- ! - C4 - j - AUS 
C4 -1
1
-- AUS 31-Dec 
30-Jun 
31-Dec 
- -, 
31-Dec I 
JO-Jun 
JO-Jun 
30-Jun 
31~oec j ~ 
31-Dec : 
30-Jun i 
30-Jtll\ : -
, -
30-Jun I 
Jo-Jun 1 
- - - ' -
"·'"" I 31-Dec, 
30-JUJI 1 · 
JO.Jun 
30-Jun 1 ,_ 
30-Jun ! 
30.Jw, i 
31-Dec, 
- ! -
30-Jun i 
30-Jun . 
30-Jun . 
- I 
30-Jun I 
30·Jun i 1-30-Jun 
1
, 
30-Jun 
3o-JWI ) 
30-Jun 
30-Jun 
30-Jun 
~0-Jun I 
30-Jun j 
"·'"" I 30-Jun I 
30-Jun 
"·'"" I 30-Jun j 
30-Jun , 
' 
30-Jun ; 
30-Jun 
30-Jun 
30-Jun '. 
30-Jun 
30-Jun j 
30-Jun I 
Jo.Jun I 
30-Jun- ; 
C4 AUS 
! AUS C4 
C4 1- AUS 
--j .. 
C4 I 
C4 , 
--l -
C4 , 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
I 
I 
I 
I 
' i 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
AUS 
APPENDIXC 
Exchange rates 
SOURCE: Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin 
DATE £0.00 $A $US $A $NZ $A $KINA $A 
30/06/95 $0.7086 1.4112 $1.0621 0.9415 
30/06/96 $0.7890 1.2674 $1.1552 0.8657 
30/06/97 $0.7455 1.3414 $1.0996 0.9094 
31/12/95 £0.4814 $2.0773 $0.7450 1.3423 $1.1400 0.8772 0.962 1.0395 
31/12/96 £0.4710 $2.1231 $0.7965 1.2555 $1.1255 0.8885 1.0549 0.9480 
31/12/97 £0.3937 $2.5400 $0.6527 1.5321 $1.1219 0.8913 1.1077 0.9028 
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Table 6.32 
Pearson correlations matrix - Mining companies 1997 - Categories of ASX disclosures (One-tailed) 
LGSZTA SQGEAR OWND SQNEXDR AUD6 EXEC BMEM APRET INADV REM AUD RSK ETHIC TOD 
LGSzrA 1.000 
SQGEAR o.21s• 1.000 
OWND -0.580 -0.201• 1.000 
SQNEXDR 0.143 0.018 -0.730 1.000 
AUD6 0.443 .. 0.099 -0.129 0.176* 1.000 
EXEC 0.184* O.IS4 -0.148 0.507 .. 0.178* 1.000 
BMEM 0.409•• 0.121 0.165 0.100 0.343* 0.058 1.000 
..... APRET 0.219* 0.079 -0.118 -0.085 0.070 -0.101 0287 .. 1.000 ..... 
INADV 0.056 0J)9] 0.171* -0.410 -0.088 0.033 0.279 .. 0.0'12 1.000 
REM 0.503 .. 0.380 .. 0.043 -0.029 0.359 .. 0.121 0.514 .. 0.288 .. 0.320 .. 1.000 
AUD 0.332 .. 0.065 0.034 0.070 0.252 .. 0.061 0.350 .. 0.231* 0.239 .. 0.438 .. 1.000 
RSK 0.467** OJOOH -0.096 0.006 0.351** 0.137 0.251 .. 0.294 .. 0.125 0.502 .. 0.331 .. 1.000 
ETHIC 0.332 .. 0.143 0.079 -0.JOI 0.123 -0.118 0.311 .. 0.327 .. 0.162 0.308 .. 0.188* 0.316 .. 1.000 
TGD o.ss, .. 0.290 .. 0.062 0.052 0.382 .. 0.156 0.749•• 0.492 .. 0.451 .. 0.841 .. 0.666 .. 0.603•• 0.471•• 1.000 
• Significant ::ii 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
•• s; "ficanl al 0.01 level (ODe-tailed) 
Table 6.33 
Pearson correlations matrix - Mining companies 1997 - Categori,s of +ASX disclosures (One-tailed) 
LGSZTA SQGEAR OWND SQNEXDR AUD6 EXEC BMEM APRET INADV REM AUD RSK ETHIC TGD 
LGSZTA 1.000 
SQGEAR 0.215'" 1.000 
OWND -0.058 -0.201 • 1.000 
SQNEXDR 0.143 0.018 -0.073 1.000 
AUD6 0.443** 0.099 -0.129 0.176* 1.000 
EXEC 0.184"' 0.154 -0.148 0.501•• 0.178• 1.000 
BMEM 0.398 .. 0.083 0.202* 0.095 0.347 .. 0.021 1.000 
.... APRET 0.219* 0.079 -0.118 -0.085 0.070 -0.IOI 0.287** 1.000 
"" !NADY 0.056 0.093 0.171* -0.4!0 -0.088 0.033 0.279** 0.092 1.000 
REM 0.555 .. 0.339*'" 0.072 0.063 0.391 .. 0.164 0.527** 0.227* 0330 .. 1.000 
AUD 0.407 .. 0.027 0.055 0.129 0.367 .. 0.104 0.369 .. 0.259 .. 0.213• 0.483** 1.000 
RSK 0.591 .. 0.286** 0.153 0.!02 0.296 .. 0.151 0.370 .. 0.097 0.030 0.546*'" 0.294 .. 1.000 
ETHIC 0.406** 0.139 0.072 -0.012 0.051 O.o35 0.191* 0.208'" 0.174'" 0.323** 0.203• 0.233 ... 1.000 
TGD 0.664'"'" 0.269*• 0.142 0.121 0.418 .. 0.178• 0.722 .. 0.35"7 .. 0.367 ... o.sss•• 0.610•• 0.699** 0.472•• 1.000 
• Significant at 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
.. Si ·ficant at 0.01 level one-tailed) 
Table 6.34 
Pearson correlations matrix - Industrial companies 1997 - Categories of ASX disclosures (One-tailed) 
LGSZfA GEAR SQOWNO NEXDR AUDo EXEC BMEM APRET INADV REM AUD RSK ETHIC TOD 
LGSZfA 1.000 
GEAR 0.507•• 1.000 
SQOWNO 0.090 -0.265 .. 1.000 
NEXDR 0.181 0.068 0.091 1.000 
AUD6 0.35\1 .. 0.123 0.103 0.092 1.000 
EXEC 0.235• 0.139 0.118 0.386 .. 0.146 1.000 
BMEM 0.260* 0.140 0.142 -0.056 0.186 -0.018 1.000 
-__, APRET 0.206• -0.042 OJJ94 
'D 
-0.015 0.071 0.141 o.21s• 1.000 
INADV -0.134 -0.148 0.037 -0.106 0.000 -0.219• 0.289 .. 0.187 1.000 
REM 0.346*• 0.273•• 0.065 -0.!08 0.243* 0.055 0.420 .. 0.203* 0.277** 1.000 
AUD 0.167 0.235* -0.027 -0.004 0.000 0.212• 0.251* 0.190 0.142 0.410 .. 1.000 
RSK 0.266** 0.307 .. 0.044 -0.161 0.224* 0.190 0.288 .. -0.035 0.138 0.367 .. 0.249* 1.000 
ETHIC 0.202• -0.012 0.211• 
-0.060 0.168 -0.041 0.299 .. 0.248* 0.186 0.299 .. 0.254* 0.183 1.000 
TOD 0.360 .. 0.240* 0.127 -0.085 0.235* 0.154 0.738** 0.422 .. 0.448 .. 0.795 .. 0.625 .. 0.514 .. 0.486•• 1.000 
• Significant at 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
•• Significant at O.ot level (one-tailed) 
Table 6.35 
Pearson correlations matrix - Industrial companies 1997 -Categories of +ASX disclosures (One-tailed) 
LGSZTA GEAR SQOWND NEXDR AUD6 EXEC BMEM APRET !NADY REM AUD RSK ETHIC TGD 
LGSZTA 1.000 
GEAR o.so1•• 1.000 
SQOWND 0.090 -0.265•• 1.000 
NEXOR 0.181 0.068 0.091 1.000 
AUD6 0.350 .. 0.123 0.103 0.092 1.000 
EXEC 0.235* 0.139 0.118 0.386 .. 0.146 1.000 
BMEM 0.344 .. 0.163 0.132 -0.006 0.197* 0.040 1.000 
00 APRET 0.206* -0.042 0.094 -0.015 0.071 0.141 0.229* 1.000 0 
INADV -0.134 -0.148 . 0.037 -0.106 0.000 -0.219• 0.260** 0.187 1.000 
REM 0.354** 0.293 .. 0.059 -0.093 0.278 .. O.IJO 0.442 .. 0.175 0.237* I.ODO 
AUD 0.212* 0.253 .. -0.013 0.135 0.0IO 0.335** 0.271 .. 0.152 0.o75 0.418** 1.000 
RSK 0.439•• 0.257** 0.278** 0.050 0.299** 0.151 0.359** 0.178 -0.014 0.328** 0.203* 1.000 
ETHIC 0.163 0.009 0.155 -0.006 0.182 0.002 0.288** 0.228* 0.218* 0.246* 0.195 0.407 .. 1.000 
TGD 0.455** 0.271** 0.185 0.014 0.294** 0.204* 0.755 .. 0.387 .. 0.323•• 0.763** 0.578** 0.652** 0.552** 1.000 
• Significant at 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
.. Significant at O.ot level (one-tailed) 
APPENDIXE 
AIMA guidelines on independent directors 
AIMA (1995, rara. 3.2) defines an independent director as a non-executive director 
who: 
• is not a substantial shareholder of the company or an officer of or otherwise 
associated directly or indirectly with.: substantial shareholder of the company; 
• has not been employed within the last 3 years in any executive capacity by the 
compan~, or any other group member; 
• is not retained as a professional adviser to the company or any other group 
member or a principal of a firm or company so retained; 
• is not a significant supplier or customer of the company or any other group 
member or an officer of or otherwise associated directly or indirectly with a 
significant supplier or customer; 
• has no significant contractual relations3hip with the company or any other group 
member other than as a director of the company; and 
• is otherwise free from any interest and any business or other relationship which 
could, or could reasonably be r!:!rceived to, materially interfere with the directors 
ability to act with a view to the best interests of the company (the residual 
category) 
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